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Abstract
This study examined the issues that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to
academic culture. Defined here as presidents who come from non-academic
backgrounds, such as government, business, or the military, this paper used a case study
design and pragmatist approach to analyze the experiences of three such individuals, Gen.
Dwight D. Eisenhower at Columbia University (1948-1953), former North Carolina Gov.
Terry Sanford at Duke University (1969-1985), and former U.S. Sen. Paul S. Trible at
Christopher Newport University (1996-present). A combination o f historical research
and interview formats were utilized to learn about the experiences that Eisenhower,
Sanford, and Trible had in adjusting to academic culture at their respective universities.
This study found that Eisenhower had a very difficult adjustment experience while
Sanford and Trible were more successful in adapting to academic culture. This study
concluded that for non-traditional presidents, vision, adaptability, commitment to
institution, and prior academic exposure were key issues in facilitating a successful
adjustment experience to academic culture.
Keywords: academic culture, college president, non-traditional
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
As American higher education advances into the 21st century, the college
presidency is undergoing a rapid and significant evolution. Once the reserve of career
academics, dwindling government funding and increased competition for private support
are prompting hiring boards at college and universities to seek out individuals who are
adept at fundraising as well as friend-raising (Howard, 2007; Tromble, 1998). To find
such leaders, higher education institutions are appointing their presidents increasingly
from professional sectors outside o f the academy, including the business, military, and
government realms (The American College President, 2012; Basinger, 2002; Fischer,
2005, Greenberg, 1998; Trachtenberg, Kauvar, & Bogue, 2013; Will, 2003).
Often referred to as non-traditional presidents, these new types of leaders were
defined for the purposes o f this study as college presidents with little to no prior
professional experience in higher education. Over the past 28 years, these non-traditional
college presidents have become more common across all institutions, increasing in
representation in higher education from 10.1% in 1986 to 20.3% in 2011 (The American
College President, 2012). The number of presidents with experience outside of academe
across various four-year institutions, which are the focus o f this study, is also compelling.
For instance, in 2011 non-traditional presidents comprised 15% of all doctorate-granting
institution presidents, 15.5% of master’s institution presidents, as well as 25.7% of
baccalaureate institution presidents (The American College President, 2012). However,
despite their growing presence, little scholarly research has been done to analyze their
efficacy as educational leaders. To date, the majority o f writing on non-traditional
presidents has been solely in the form of editorial commentary (Cotnam, 2006). Further,
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little is known about how these non-traditional presidents perceive, respond to, and adapt
to academic culture.

Statement of the Problem
Based on existing scholarly literature, there are distinct differences between
academic and non-academic cultures. Scholars portray non-academic cultures
(particularly business culture) as profit driven and being focused on the bottom line
(Hofstede, Van Deusen, Mueller, & Charles, 2002). Conversely, academic culture
prioritizes notions o f academic freedom, collegiality, and collective decision-making
(Rosovsky, 1990). Further, while scholars have generally portrayed non-academic
cultures as highly organized and goal-oriented, others have described academic culture as
an organized anarchy with highly ambiguous goals (Cohen & March, 1974; Lane, 1985;
Pfeffer, 1997). While there has been a recent neo-liberal push for higher education to
adopt more business-like practices, the traditional foundations of academic culture have
remained sound (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
These differences in cultures are significant and carry important implications for
non-traditional college presidents, since most will be unfamiliar with academic culture
upon assuming their posts. Recent higher education history is full o f highly publicized
examples o f non-traditional college presidents (Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at Columbia
University, former U.S. Sen. Robert “Bob” Kerrey at New York’s New School, etc.) who
had serious difficulties making the adjustment to academic life. Their problems ranged
from disputes with faculty leaders to trouble adjusting to the collective decision-making
process found in many areas o f higher education. However, there are other examples of
non-traditional presidents who made the cultural transition with little or no trouble.
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Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the potential for this clash of cultures is increasing
as the number o f non-traditional presidents in American higher education is rising
gradually. For instance, the September 2014 appointment o f veteran Florida state
legislator John E. Thrasher as president of Florida State University was met with
considerable protest from students and faculty, who had favored more traditional
academic candidates (Schmidt, 2014). Dismissing the selection process as being tainted
with political favoritism, the faculty senate had even passed a resolution for Thrasher not
to be appointed, claiming that “he lacked the stated qualifications required for the
position” (Schmidt, 2014, p. 2). However, several board of trustee members countered
that with Thrasher’s immense political network, he was uniquely positioned to raise
funds for the university and increase its national reputation (Schmidt, 2014). Ultimately,
this episode at Florida State University may foreshadow a clash between academic and
non-academic cultures that could become even more acute in the future.
According to the American Council on Education’s (ACE) 1986 Report on the
College Presidency, about 10.1% o f all (four-year and two-year) college presidents came
from outside o f higher education. Redden (2008) noted that after reaching 14.7% in
2001, the numbers slipped back to 13.1 % by 2006. However, by 2011 the number had
grown significantly to over 20% o f the overall presidential population for four-year
college presidents - the object o f this study - and roughly 17% for two-year college
presidents (The American College President, 2012). More specifically, private colleges
have traditionally hired a larger number of their presidents from outside academe (Song
& Hartley, 2012; The American College President, 2012). According to ACE’s The
American College President (2007), the percentage o f non-traditional presidents serving
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at private institutions (18.9%) in 2006 was over double the number of non-traditional
presidents serving at public institutions (7.3%). By 2011, the percentage o f nontraditional presidents serving at private institutions had grown to 27.6%, while the
percentage of non-traditional presidents at public institutions was 13.9% {The American
College President, 2012). Interestingly, the hiring gap between private and public
institutions increased incrementally between 2006 (11.6%) and 2011 (13.7%).

Purpose of Study
As the ranks o f non-traditional presidents are growing steadily in American
higher education, it is imperative that greater scholarly attention is placed upon them.
More specifically, focused research is needed to determine what issues they face in
adjusting to academic life. As the rising number o f non-traditional presidents is
beginning to generate significant potential for a culture clash between the worlds of
academic and non-academic culture, this issue needs to be studied in order to provide
current and future non-traditional presidents the information they need to succeed in
office. The alternative would be to just stand by and watch several of these presidents
possibly fail, such as when former U.S. Sen. Robert “Bob” Kerrey and former U.S.
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers suffered faculty no-confidence votes during their
presidential tenures at the New School and at Harvard, respectively (Santora & Foderaro,
2008). However, such a strategy would be counterproductive to the nation’s educational
interests. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the issues that nontraditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive what
lessons could be learned to inform future practice.
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Methods Summary
Employing a qualitative research methodology and case study format, data were
obtained by studying three non-traditional presidents and the experiences they had in
adjusting to academic culture. These presidents included Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
who served as president o f Columbia University from 1948 to 1953, former North
Carolina Governor Terry Sanford, who served as president of Duke University from 1969
to 1985, and former U.S. Sen. Paul S. Trible, who has served as president o f Christopher
Newport University (CNU) since 1996. Collectively, these individuals are among the
highest profile non-traditional academic leaders who have served as college presidents in
the United States. Moreover, they each experienced unique adjustment processes to
academic life in different historical, cultural, and organizational contexts that merit closer
study. Data were collected by a combination of qualitative approaches, including
archival research, content analysis, and interviews.

Research Paradigm
The research paradigm that served as a foundation for this research was
pragmatism (Biesta & Burbules, 2004; Creswell, 2012). Individuals holding this
worldview “focus on the outcomes of the research - the actions, situations, and
consequences o f inquiry - rather than antecedent conditions” (Creswell, 2012, p. 22).
Further, there is a focus on the practical implications of research as well as a concern for
applications and solutions to problems (Creswell, 2012). Thus, instead o f focusing on
methods, pragmatists examine the problem being studied as well as the questions asked
about the problem (Creswell, 2012). Considered by many to be the only uniquely
American philosophy, pragmatism, according to Schwandt (2001), had its roots in the
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work ofW illiam James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and Charles Sanders
Peirce (1839-1914).
Though there are many versions of pragmatism, the philosophy generally “views
knowledge as an instrument or tool for organizing experience, and it is deeply concerned
with the union o f theory and practice” (Schwandt, 2001, p. 204). This study fit within the
realm o f pragmatism because it endeavored to draw practical lessons about the issues that
non-traditional presidents face in adjusting to academic culture from the experiences of
three modem non-traditional presidents. Ultimately, this research is intended for use as a
resource for new non-traditional presidents as they begin the process o f learning about
and/or adapting to academic culture. It would also be a vital resource for those involved
in the selection o f non-traditional presidents, including board of trustee members and
other academic leaders. By examining this study, they would have a more complete
understanding o f the academic culture as well as the possible issues (both positive and
negative) that non-traditional presidents face in acclimating to it. In following the
pragmatist philosophical tradition, this study focused primarily on outcomes - namely
how it could help new non-traditional presidents adapt to academic culture.

Research Questions Investigated
The research questions that were addressed in this study included:
1. What perceptions do non-traditional presidents have o f academic culture?
A) How do those perceptions help them in adjusting to academic culture?
B) How do those perceptions hinder them in adjusting to academic culture?
2.

How do non-traditional presidents adjust to academic culture?
A) What are (if any) the key issues that non-traditional presidents face in
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adjusting to academic culture?
B) How have some non-traditional presidents been able to adjust to
academic culture successfully while others could not?

Significance of the Study
Understanding more about the issues that non-traditional college presidents face
in adjusting to academic life is significant for several reasons. On a personal level, this
study serves as important exploratory research to provide a strong foundation for my
future research in this area. On a broader level, this study is also significant because it
addresses a key leadership challenge that many new non-traditional college presidents
face - what are the issues involved in adjusting to academic culture and how can that
adjustment best be achieved? Further, to what extent are these adjustment experiences
influenced by institutional type? As rising numbers of leaders with non-academic
backgrounds are appointed to college presidencies, research in these areas will be an
important resource for those who need to make that transition successfully.
Moreover, whatever academics think of these non-traditional college leaders, they
are becoming a more common presence at higher education institutions across the United
States. As the higher education community looks increasingly to this type o f leader for
leadership, it is imperative that non-traditional presidents are studied more closely in
order to help prevent possible adjustment problems and to help facilitate success. Thus,
the findings from this study could help inform practice for new non-traditional presidents
in the future. For instance, exposing such presidents to this information in leadership
development programs could possibly enable them to avoid some of the mistakes made
by their predecessors. These findings would also be useful for hiring boards, giving them
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a more sophisticated understanding about non-traditional presidents and the adjustment
issues that they face upon entering office.

Theoretical Perspective
The theoretical perspective for this study was rooted in two distinct strains of
leadership theory. In recent years, several scholars have studied the leadership process
within academic settings (Boyett, 1996; Gregory, 1996; Neumann & Neumann, 1999;
Pounder, 2001; Ramsden, 1998; Randall & Coakley, 2007; Rowley & Sherman, 2003).
Within the broad realm o f leadership theories, two specific theoretical approaches adaptive leadership and change leadership - are most applicable to how non-traditional
presidents may lead while adjusting to academic culture. Heifetz (1994) pioneered the
research on adaptive leadership, basing it on the premise that leadership is more o f a
process rather than individual personal capabilities (Heifetz, Kama, & Kramer, 2004;
Randall & Coakley, 2007). According to Randall and Coakley (2007), “this process
requires people to focus on the specific problems at hand and to modify the way they
have worked in the past” (p. 327). In his model of adaptive leadership, Heifetz (1994)
focused it on the process and not the person, and the model employed the knowledge of
all who have a vested interest in moving the organization to the next level (Randall &
Coakley, 2007).
Along with Ronald Heifetz, other scholars have studied how leaders lead most
effectively in a culture o f change, often referring to the concept as change leadership
(Beckhard & Pritchard, 1992; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Bolman & Deal, 1997;
Fullan, 2001; Goleman, 2000; Hamel, 2000; Koteen, 1991; Kotter, 1996). Heifetz (1994)
argued that people must re-conceptualize their philosophy o f leadership, framing it as the
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mobilization o f people to solve tough problems instead of merely looking for a heroic
figure to save them. Thus, this study utilized both adaptive leadership and change
leadership as a theoretical lens to explore the extent to which Presidents Eisenhower,
Sanford, and Trible were able to adjust to academic culture.

Definition of Key Terms
The following key terms were used in this study:
-

Academic Culture: an institution in which values such as objectivity, academic
freedom, and respect for students and human subjects guide academic behavior,
and are therefore reflected in the language, symbols, and ceremonies of academic
life (Clark, 1983; Dill, 2012).
College President: a generic term for the chief executive officer o f a college or
university. Other titles may include university president or chancellor (Cotnam,
2006).

-

Non-Traditional College President: A college or university president who meets
one or more o f the following conditions (Cotnam, 2006):
1) Lacking an academic doctoral degree (Ph.D. or Ed.D)
2) Holding an immediate prior position outside o f higher education
3) Having no faculty experience (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001)

Summary
Due to the increasing demands and complexities inherent in the modem college
presidency, more and more hiring boards are looking to executives from outside the
realm of higher education to provide leadership. This has been driven in part by the rise
o f neoliberalism in higher education since the mid-twentieth century (Slaughter &
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Rhoades, 2004). Based on a philosophy of generating wealth and building a free market,
neoliberalism within the higher education context involves transitioning colleges and
universities toward privatization and commercialization (Brentnall, 2013). This vision
has also been used as a rationale for the withdrawal o f state funding from public
universities, prompting them to adopt neoliberal practices only used previously by their
private institutional peers (Fish, 2009). However, critics o f neoliberalism contend that
such short-term, profit-driven approaches rob the academy o f its fundamental mission
and consequently short-change its students (Giroux, 2014).
Within this neoliberal paradigm, recent history has shown that non-traditional
college presidents can often provide the fundraising and friend-raising prowess that many
revenue-starved institutions are currently seeking (Bomstein, 2011). However, little
empirical research has been done to analyze this new type o f president to which colleges
and universities are looking increasingly for leadership. Chapter 1 outlined the statement
o f the problem and the means by which this study will explore the issues that nontraditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture. To provide the
necessary context for this study, the next chapter will provide a thorough literature review
that explores the applicable scholarship in the evolution o f the college presidency, the
demands on modem presidents, the dynamics of academic culture, as well as the
processes o f adaptive and change leadership. This section will provide the appropriate
contextual background to examine the methodology for this study, which will be outlined
in Chapter 3. Each presidency will then be reviewed in individual chapters, followed by
a findings chapter that also examines implications for future research.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
As discussed in Chapter 1, the college presidency is undergoing a significant
change in response to increased organizational complexity and increased demands for
fundraising as well as friend-raising prowess (Howard, 2007; Tromble, 1998). Thus,
higher education institutions are appointing more regularly their presidents from
professional sectors outside of the academy, including the business, military, and
government realms (Basinger, 2002; Fischer, 2005, Greenberg, 1998; Will, 2003). Often
referred to as non-traditional presidents, they were defined for the purposes o f this study
as college presidents with little to no prior professional experience in higher education.
While these non-traditional college presidents are becoming more common across
the higher education landscape, little scholarly research has been done on them to analyze
their impact on higher education. To date, the majority of writing on non-traditional
presidents has been solely in the form of editorial commentary (Applebome, 1995;
Basinger, 2002; Cotnam, 2006; Fischer, 2005; Greenberg, 1998; Mead-Fox, 2009;
Redden, 2008). Further, little is known about how these non-traditional presidents
perceive, respond to, and adapt to academic culture. Therefore, the purpose o f this study
was to explore the issues that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to
academic culture and derive what lessons could be learned to inform future practice.
This literature review explores existing scholarly and anecdotal literature on nontraditional presidents and the issues they face in adjusting to academic culture. Further, it
examines existing research attempting to define academic culture and how it compares
and contrasts with other forms of organizational culture. Further, this literature review
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explores research on the leadership approaches that presidents often use to engage with
their academic community - namely adaptive and change leadership.

Overview of Literature Review
The following literature review examines the existing scholarship that pertains to
non-traditional presidents. It includes some of the aforementioned media coverage and
statistical reports, along with scholarly research on the college presidency that focus at
least in part on non-traditional presidents. There is also a section on academic culture,
which has received far more attention in the scholarly literature than non-traditional
presidents. This literature review includes references to research that attempt to define
academic culture as well as studies on how it compares and contrasts with other types of
organizational culture. Further, there is a section on adaptive and change leadership,
which provides a framework for what approaches non-traditional presidents may use in
adjusting to academic life. However, it is useful to begin this study with applicable
research on the evolution o f the college presidency and how non-traditional presidents
have figured into that process, specifically in modem times.

The Evolution of the College Presidency
Several scholars have explored the evolution of the college presidency over the
last two to three centuries (Bomstein, 2003; Kauffman, 1980; Nelson, 2009; Rudolph,
1990). From the colonial era through the mid-20th century, the college presidency was
largely the reserve of academics (Kauffman, 1980). In the 18th and 19th centuries,
presidents would often serve as professors and continue teaching while performing their
administrative duties (Bomstein, 2003; Rudolph, 1990). As higher education evolved in
the 20th century, a career track began to take a more focused shape. According to Cohen
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and March (1974), those aspiring to the presidency would begin their careers as faculty
members, and earn successive promotions to department chair, dean, and finally provost
or academic vice president. However, further research suggested that this career ladder
was a bit too simplistic; arguing that most presidents did not advance through the ranks in
that particular order, and had even skipped certain steps on occasion (Moore, Salimbene,
Marlier, & Bragg, 1983). Nevertheless, the predominant path to the presidency during
this period remained an academic one - requiring aspirants to hold a series of faculty and
or administrative positions before making the jump to a presidency (Bimbaum &
Umbach, 2001; Wessel & Keim, 1994). This pattern has continued to the present day,
with roughly 80% o f all college presidents coming from traditional academic
backgrounds {The American College President, 2012).
Consequently, college presidents with academic backgrounds remained the norm
throughout the so-called “Golden Age” of higher education (spanning from roughly 1945
to 1970). However, as the twentieth century progressed the recruiting and hiring pattern
began to gradually shift, as the demands on the college president began to change (Cook,
1997). As Whetten and Cameron (1985) argued:
For at least two decades after World War II, higher education
administrators had a relatively easy job. By traditional standards,
administrative effectiveness was almost universal. Enrollments were
increasing, revenues were growing... and almost unprecedented prestige
was associated with college professors and administrators in the eyes of
the public... All o f that changed in the 1970s and was magnified in the
1980s: the availability o f funds was severely curtailed; the legitimacy and

13

usefulness of college degrees called into question... the public prestige
associated with faculty and administrator status plummeted along with
their relative earnings, (p. 35)
According to Keller (1983), for these and other reasons, the postwar higher
education boom had begun to fizzle by the mid-1970s. Further, beginning in the mid1960s' larger numbers o f students, driven by population growth and a growing middle
class, began attending college (Bomstein, 2003). This growth prompted an expansion in
educational infrastructure as well as in the numbers of faculty, but also in the
administrative staff necessary to manage the more complex organization. Thus,
institutional administrative structures gradually became more elaborate, and the
presidency became more bureaucratic and managerial in nature. All of this was also
happening in a time when financial resources were increasingly scarce. A 1996
commission established by the Association of Governing Boards described the modem
academic president as “juggler-in-chief, expected to meet an endless stream of individual
needs and special demands within and outside the institution” (Renewing the Academic
Presidency, 1996, pp. 9-10). Along the same lines, Asghar (2013) argued that the
modem college presidency is probably the most demanding leadership job possible.
Along with growing institutional complexity, the job requirements for academic
presidents began to change in the 1970s. Gone were the days when a broad array of
academics could assume college presidencies. Instead, the job was beginning to require
individuals with specialized skills. For example, state funding for many public
institutions began to decline in the 1990s, prompting these colleges to look toward private
sources for financial support (Bomstein, 2003; St. John & Parsons, 2005). This
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development caused many governing boards to look favorably upon presidential
candidates with experience in fundraising and networking, skills that many career
academicians do not possess. As Bomstein (2003) noted, the Council for the
Advancement and Support Education (CASE) documented an increase in the number of
college presidents with backgrounds in advancement from 25 to 167 between their 1982
and 1997 surveys. As Applebome (1995) explained:
It’s not that corporate tycoons and professional managers are displacing
classicists and zoologists en masse as university presidents. But
increasingly, as the demands on university presidents center on raising
money, restructuring and political savvy rather than traditional academic
pursuits, universities are considering less traditional candidates for the
pressure cooker job o f university president, (p. 1)
Consequently, the college presidency is no longer exclusively the reserve o f career
academics, and non-traditional presidents are slowly but surely becoming more common.
As Nelson (2009) noted, “of course, college presidents are educators. But the reality is
that presidents do not as actively play and are not as forced by nature o f their office to
serve the role o f educator as was once the case” (p. 70). This trend can also be explained
by examining the evolving responsibilities of modem college presidents, which are
increasingly calling for skills in fundraising and friend-raising that career academics do
not always possess.
Evolving responsibilities of the college president. In addition to researching the
evolution o f the college presidency in general, higher education scholars have begun
studying the evolution o f responsibilities for presidents. This area o f research is
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important as it shapes what qualities hiring boards will look for in presidential applicants.
For instance, hiring boards have a modem tendency to hire people who are like them,
typically possessing non-academic professional backgrounds such as business and
government (Glazer-Raymo, 2001). Thus, with the increasing complexities of the
modem college presidency, it only reinforces the notion among hiring boards to hire
people who have the necessary and expanded skill set to handle the job. Increasingly, job
requirements tap skills in fund development, entrepreneurial development, and
partnership creation.
As Bimbaum (1988) wrote, “the days of amateur administration when faculty
temporarily assumed administrative positions and then returned to the classrooms are
long since over at most institutions” (pp. 6-7). Based on this assumption that businessoriented hiring boards want leaders who can focus on the bottom line, Bimbaum (1988)
further noted that as colleges and universities become more complex, specialized
knowledge in such areas as federal regulations, higher education law, organizational
management, and student development theory are required o f administrators to pursue
their work effectively. In a similar vein, Esterberg and Wooding (2012) noted that
modem presidents have the “fundamental responsibility o f setting the direction for the
campus, seeking sources o f funds, and making the budget work” (p. 27). Consequently,
presidents across all four-year institutional types reported in 2011 that fundraising and
budgetary/financial management, and not academics, consumed most of their time (The
American College President, 2012).
Several scholars have supported this view, stressing that the academic presidency
has become more complex than ever before (Bomstein, 2003; Kerr, 1991; Neumann,
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1989; Silber, 1989). Neumann (1989) found that presidential strategy has become more
complex over the years and that it now focuses more on shaping organizational members’
perceptions and attitudes. Further, she concluded that changes in presidential strategy
may result from changes in the environment or in the presidents themselves as they learn
the job (Neumann, 1989). However, the study was limited by a small sample size and did
not highlight non-traditional college presidents.
Bomstein (2003) argued that the presidency is made more difficult because of
increasing public and media scrutiny. In a similar vein, Kovala (2014) asserted that
college presidents must now engage in the “everlasting interview” (p. 1), where they are
constantly held accountable to their institutions’ students, faculty members,
administration, and community. Kerr (1991) concluded that modem college presidents
are more like political leaders, “depending on persuasion and coalition building rather
than the authority o f office to get things done” (pp. 218-220). This point was echoed by
Asghar (2013), who argued that since college presidents work closely with tenured
faculty who cannot be easily fired, they must lead through collaboration and cajoling, not
control. However, what remains unknown is how non-traditional presidents approach
faculty interaction.
Pusser (2000) stated that many observers now believe the academic presidency is
“an untenable position... mutating beyond the ability of anyone to do the job” (p. 3).
This long list o f challenges is leaving a noticeable impact on the cadre of professionals
who are qualified enough and willing to take on a college presidency. Higher education
observers are now noticing a “shrinking pool” o f qualified candidates for presidential
positions (Mead-Fox, 2009, p. 1). As Mead-Fox (2009) argued, the changing nature of
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the college presidency along with shifting cultural norms regarding family obligations are
now causing many aspiring academic leaders to rethink their presidential aspirations.
Consequently, it is increasingly difficult for hiring committees to find superior candidates
(Mead-Fox, 2009). With a multitude o f on-the-job challenges, it is clear that the role of
college president is in the midst of a dynamic paradigm shift.
C areer paths leading to the college presidency. Even though research on nontraditional presidents is sparse, scholars have completed valuable work in related areas
that can provide useful insights. Moore and associates (1983) conducted pioneering
research concerning variations in career paths among presidents of four-year institutions,
but the study was limited by a small sample size of 156 presidents. However, the study
found that a single hierarchical trajectory does not reflect accurately the career experience
o f the majority o f deans or presidents (Moore, et al., 1983). Almost two decades later,
Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) conducted a more thorough study that addressed such
issues as gender, age, and highest degree earned. They concluded that although extensive
research has developed demographic profiles of four-year college presidents, relatively
little is known about the career paths that lead to the presidency (Bimbaum & Umbach,
2001). In their own research, they posited four career paths among college presidents the “scholar,” “steward,” “spanner,” and “stranger” (p. 206). “Scholars” represented the
traditional faculty path to the presidency, while “stewards” were career higher education
administrators. The non-traditional paths are represented in the “spanner,” who spends a
career rotating in and out o f higher education, and the “stranger,” who has never held a
position in the academy (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 206).
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Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) concluded that the traditional scholar path remains
the “royal road” to the presidency and is followed by the “steward” path (p. 210). They
further stated, “for ‘strangers,’ the presidency may be less likely to represent a
commitment to education than a target of opportunity created by some unusual
confluence of events” (pp. 204-205). They also indicate that the numbers of nontraditional presidents varied depending upon institutional type. Cotnam (2006) compared
the “activities, concerns, and goals” of non-traditional versus traditional presidents and
concluded that traditional presidents showed more interest in “academic matters, faculty
related activities, and governmental support and regulation” (p. 1). In noting the
advantages that non-traditional presidents bring to academe, McCulloch-Lovell (2012)
argued that they were likely to have previous experience with budgeting, fundraising, and
adapting to a wide variety o f workplaces. Further, McCulloch-Lovell (2012) noted that
non-traditional presidents bring with them a healthy impatience to the academy, asserting
that their usual reply to “we don’t do it this way” is “why not?” (p. 2). However, what
remains unknown is how non-traditional presidents actually engage with academic
culture, and whether exposure to academic culture influences their priorities in office.
Bomstein (2003) in her research on the academic presidency defined one o f the
key factors for efficacy, individual legitimacy, as the “president’s background, career,
and identity characteristics, and how they mesh with the institution’s needs” (p. 25).
Further, Bomstein (2003) noted that the key threats to achieving legitimacy were lack of
cultural fit, management incompetence, misconduct, erosion o f social capital,
inattentiveness, and grandiosity. Moreover, Bomstein (2003) asserted that the lack of
cultural fit was the most dire legitimacy threat for non-traditional presidents. Conversely,
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Bomstein (2003) noted that those coming to the presidency from the traditional “royal
road” (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 210) with service at prestigious institutions
enjoyed the highest degrees o f individual legitimacy. However, Bomstein (2003) also
noted that such individuals usually had little experience in areas within external relations,
such as fundraising, politicking, and networking. Perhaps in response to this reality,
Basinger (2003) and Redden (2008) noted an increased interest among hiring committees
in so-called “hybrid models” (pp. 2-3), that is, aspiring college presidents with academic
credentials as well as experience outside the academy. In many ways, they are similar to
the “spanners” listed in the Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) model (p. 206). Such
individuals normally served as faculty members before entering non-academic arenas,
and could effectively bridge the gap between aspiring traditional-track and nontraditional presidents in the future. Given the spanning of college and business careers,
more research is required to understand better their efficacy as college presidents.
While existing scholarly research on non-traditional presidents is sparse, more
work has been done in the area of studying academic culture. A question that has
interested scholars in recent years is how academic culture compares with the cultures
found in other organizations, such as those found in the business and government sectors.
However, making such comparisons has proven challenging at times since scholars have
not yet reached a consensus as to what academic culture really entails.

Defining Academic Culture
For several decades, higher education scholars have also endeavored to define
academic culture and explore what distinguishes it from other types o f organizational
culture. According to Kezar and Eckel (2002), the research in this area has progressed
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through three distinct phases. First, researchers in the 1960s (Clark, 1970; Lunsford,
1963; Riesman, Gusfield, & Gamson, 1970) used culture to illustrate how academic
culture was unique compared with other institutions (Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Later higher
education studies in the 1980s (Chaffee & Tierney, 1988; Peterson, Cameron, Jones,
Mets, & Ettington, 1986) linked institutional culture with organizational success (Kezar
& Eckel, 2002). To explore this connection with institutional culture and organizational
success more deeply, several studies have also demonstrated the way that different
cultures shaped various institutional functions, including governance (Chaffee & Tierney,
1988), leadership (Bimbaum, 1988), and planning (Hearn, Clugston, & Heydinger, 1993;
Leslie & Fretwell, 1996).
According to Kezar and Eckel (2002), two links between culture and change have
been made in higher education literature as a result of previous research. The first link
suggests that institutions need to have a culture that encourages change (Curry, 1992;
Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Thus, the goal of this line o f research has been to determine the
aspects o f culture that need to be fostered to promote institutional change (Schein, 1985:
Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Meanwhile, the second link suggests that culture or key
institutional elements that shape culture, such as a vision or mission, are modified as a
result o f the change process (Chaffee & Tierney, 1988; Eckel, Hill, & Green, 1998;
Guskin, 1996). In their line o f research, Kezar and Eckel (2002) presented a proposed
third link, in addition to the first two, “investigating the ways in which culture shapes an
institution’s change processes and strategies” (p. 438). They characterize culture as the
modifying element rather than the subject of modification (Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Thus,
there are a variety o f opinions among scholars about the role that culture plays in an
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organizational setting - with some believing that culture shapes the organization, and
others believing that the organization shapes the culture.
Schein (1992) proposed a model of culture that contains three elements; artifacts,
espoused values, and assumptions. Artifacts represent the visible elements in a culture,
including such things as dress codes, furniture, art, work climate, organizational
structures, etc. (Schein, 1992). Espoused values are the values normally espoused by
leading figures o f a culture, which should in turn be in line with the general assumptions
o f the culture (Schein, 1992). Assumptions reflect the shared values within the specific
culture and are typically not visible to its members (Schein, 1992).
Along with presenting this cultural model, Schein (2010) also noted that
subcultures may exist within organizations. Specifically, Schein (2010) identified three
distinct groups that constitute subcultures within organizations; operators, engineers, and
executives. Operators are characterized by a high level o f human interaction, strong
communication, trust, and teamwork (Schein, 2010). Conversely, engineers are focused
on pursuing abstract solutions to problems and developing functional systems (Schein,
2010). Finally, executives are described as lone heroes who maintain a sense o f rightness
and omniscience (Schein, 2010). For organizations to function correctly, Schein (2010)
noted that proper alignment o f these subcultural groups was critical. Schein (2010)
argued that many problems typically attributed to bureaucracy, environmental factors, or
personality conflicts among managers are in fact the result o f a lack o f alignment between
these subcultures. However, what remains unknown is how non-traditional college
presidents engage with the subcultures found within the academy, and how these
subcultures influence their adjustment process to academic culture. What also remains
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unknown is the extent to which these subcultures align with the organizational cultures
with which non-traditional presidents are most familiar.
Despite these research advances in recent years, the process o f actually defining
academic culture has been challenging. According to Tierney (1988), “a usable
definition o f organizational culture appropriate to higher education has remained elusive”
(p. 6). To further complicate matters, scholars have had difficulty determining whether
the academy even constitutes a profession (Williams, 2008). For instance, as Piper
(1994) and Taylor (1999) asked, are academics professional as discipline experts or as
educators? As Taylor (1999) further noted, “traditional.. .understandings of academics’
sense o f professionalism are neither fixed, nor closed... [but are]... social constructions partial, patchy, and incomplete” (p. 116). Thus, it is clear that the academy as both a
profession and as a distinct culture invites a large number o f definitions and
interpretations. To that end, increased scholarly interest in organizational culture has
generated increasingly broad and divergent concepts of culture (Tierney, 1988). Defining
academic culture is further complicated by the popular image o f the Ivory Tower, where
professors can engage carelessly in enlightened discourse without having to worry about
the challenges o f the outside world (Aguirre, 2000).
Nevertheless, some scholars have been able to produce a general definition of
academic culture that is useful when considering how non-traditional presidents may
perceive this unique environment. Supporting the research o f Schein (2010) on
subcultures, Adams (1988) and Becher (1989) wrote that academic communities are
notably fractured places with distinct tribes and territories. Further, if colleges and
universities “are like a conglomeration of tribal communities organized into villages and
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hamlets, then the disciplines serve as the tribes into which individual scholars are
organized” (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012, p. 81). According to Esterberg and Wooding
(2012), it is this tribe - the discipline - with which most faculty members are identified.
Fundamentally, the discipline represents the faculty members’ overarching professional
identity (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012). Therefore, campuses contain competing and
contradictory loyalties, as faculty members are often split between commitments to their
institution versus commitments to their discipline (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012).
Consequently, this dynamic makes it difficult for presidents who seek transforming
institutional change, as they must struggle to get faculty members to look beyond their
own departments and disciplines and appreciate the needs of the larger campus
community (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012).
Aguirre (2000) and Stewart (1995) defined academic culture as a lifestyle that
socializes faculty to perform and value activities that are vital to membership in the
academic community, such as attending conferences, presenting papers, and conducting
research. Clark (1983) and Dill (2012) argued that universities are “culturally loaded”
institutions, in which values such as objectivity, academic freedom, and respect for
students and human subjects guide academic behavior, and are therefore reflected in the
language, symbols, and ceremonies of academic life (Dill, 2012, p. 11). Further, another
key characteristic of academic culture is its resistance to rapid change. Traditionally,
academic culture has been fairly static and conservative, changing only minimally in
response to external pressures (Crawford & Crawford, 1997; Hesketh et al., 1996). This
resistance to change is interesting considering that higher education has undergone major
periods o f transformation over the past century.
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In Clark’s (1981) study, he concluded that academic culture was also highly
complex, with systems o f belief permeating academic institutions on at least three levels:
the culture of the entaprise, the culture of the academic profession at large, and the
culture o f the academic discipline (as cited in Dill, 1982). The culture o f the enterprise
refers to the traditions and symbols o f academic life, such as titles, degrees, a specified
curriculum, and examinations (Dill, 1982). The culture o f the academic profession at
large refers to the established tradition of scholars organizing themselves into guilds or
other professional organizations, such as the American Association o f University
Professors (Dill, 1982). Lastly, the culture of the academic discipline refers to the
distinct ideologies found within the academy’s various disciplines (Dill, 1982). These
levels help to produce an academic culture that is multi-faceted and complex when
compared with many other organizational cultures. Despite this complexity, higher
education as an organizational form has never been more powerful than it is today, as
universities through their research, academic programs, and disciplines increasingly
define the legitimacy o f knowledge in modem society (Bastedo, 2012; Clark, 1983; Frank
& Meyer, 2007).
Along with attempting to produce a usable definition of academic culture,
scholars have also endeavored to define what specific cultural components comprise
academic life. Some o f this work has evolved from Bolman and Deal’s (1984) Four
Frames Model, which views organizations as a mental model operationalized in four
frames; the structural frame, the human resource frame, the political frame, and the
symbolic frame. While the structural frame focuses on the architecture o f the
organization, such as goals and role coordination, the human resource frame emphasizes
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understanding people and their relationships (Bolman & Deal, 2013). Conversely, the
political frame emphasizes power, competition, and winning scarce resources, while the
symbolic frame captures organizational life as drama and focuses on ceremony and ritual
(Bolman & Deal, 2013). Using the Four Frames Model, a study by Bensimon (1989)
concluded that most college presidents view their institutions through multiple frames.
Out of 32 presidents interviewed, 13 espoused a single frame, 11 espoused two frames,
seven espoused three frames, and one espoused four frames (Bensimon, 1989). However,
the study’s sample size was small and it did address non-traditional college presidents
specifically. Further, the non-traditional presidents who possessed more of a multi-frame
perspective were located at community colleges instead of four-year institutions. Thus,
what remains unknown is whether all non-traditional college presidents view the
academy through a particular frame, or whether it varies by each individual.
Tierney (1991) developed a model of unique university culture, proposing that
academic culture consisted o f six categories: environment, mission, socialization,
information, strategy, and leadership. By examining each o f these six categories, Tierney
(1991) argued that researchers could obtain a clearer picture of a university’s culture.
Meanwhile, Bergquist (1992) established that the academy is made up of four distinct
cultures. First, the collegial culture finds meaning primarily in the disciplines represented
by faculty at the institution (Bergquist, 1992). Those aligned with this culture value
faculty research and scholarship and consider their institution’s primary enterprise as the
generation, interpretation, and dissemination of knowledge (Bergquist, 1992). Second,
the managerial culture is comprised by those who find meaning in the organization,
implementation, and evaluation of work that is directed toward specified goals and
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purposes (Bergquist, 1992). Further, they hold assumptions about the capacity o f the
institution to define and measure its goals and objectives clearly (Bergquist, 1992).
Third, the developmental culture is comprised by those in the academy who find
meaning in the creation o f programs and activities that promote the personal and
professional growth o f all members of the academic community (Bergquist, 1992).
Those aligned with this culture value openness and service to others and encourage the
potential for cognitive, affective, and behavioral growth among students, faculty,
administrators, and staff (Bergquist, 1992). Fourth, the culture of advocacy centers on
the establishment of equitable and egalitarian policies and procedures for the distribution
of resources and benefits at the institution (Bergquist, 1992). Those who find meaning in
this culture value confrontation and fair bargaining among constituency groups and
conceive o f the institution’s enterprise as either the undesirable promulgation of existing
and repressive social attitudes or the establishment of new and more liberating ones
(Bergquist, 1992). Because o f its focus on confrontation and bargaining, the culture of
advocacy is somewhat similar to Bolman and Deal’s (1984) political frame.
In later research, Bergquist and Pawlak (2008) identified two additional cultures
found in the academy. The virtual culture centers on finding meaning by responding to
the knowledge generation and dissemination capacity o f the postmodern world and
promoting an open and global perspective (Bergquist & Pawlak, 2008). Those aligned
with this culture believe the purpose of their institution is to link its educational resources
to global and technological resources, thus broadening the global learning network
(Bergquist & Pawlak, 2008). Meanwhile, the sixth category, the tangible culture, finds
meaning in its roots, the community, and its spiritual grounding (Bergquist & Pawlak,
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2008). Those aligned with this culture value the predictability o f a value-based, face-toface education in a stable physical location and conceive o f the institution’s enterprise as
the honoring and reintegration of learning from a local perspective (Bergquist & Pawlak,
2008).
Despite the advances in research concerning the components of academic culture,
scholars argue that more focused study is urgently needed (Kezar & Eckel, 2002;
Tierney, 1988). According to Tierney (1988), “our lack of understanding about the role
o f organizational culture in improving management and institutional performance inhibits
our ability to address the challenges that face higher education” (p. 4). To that end, a key
challenge in the exploration o f academic culture has been the lack o f research on sub
cultures found in the academy (Kezar & Eckel, 2002). While most scholars have studied
academic culture as a broad, all-encompassing concept, some scholars have argued that it
also consists o f multiple levels, including the enterprise, the institution, the subgroup (i.e.
faculty, administrators), and the individual level (Martin, 1992). Moreover, diversity
scholars could also argue that academic culture may differ based on race, class, and
gender (Bastedo, 2012; Bensimon & Neumann, 1994). Thus, more research is needed to
determine how these different levels and subgroups compare and differ within the
academy.
Further, much of the research on academic culture has dealt with how educational
leaders must operate within its framework. According to Kezar and Eckel (2002), more
research is needed to determine when it is best for leaders to operate within an existing
cultural framework or to challenge it. That also raises the question as to whether
academic culture is universal or whether it varies to some degree by institution (Kezar &
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Eckel, 2002). Thus, more research on how much context impacts academic culture is
also needed. Moreover, no known studies have attempted to explore the adjustment
process o f non-traditional presidents to academic culture using the aforementioned
definitions, models and approaches.

Academic culture under threat. To best understand how non-traditional
presidents engage with academic culture, it is useful to explore this culture’s role and
level o f vitality in modem society. Along with attempting to define academic culture,
scholars have studied the challenges it faces along with its prospects for future survival in
a society that wants to increasingly see tangible, measurable results. While academic
culture has a long and distinguished tradition in Western civilization, many scholars have
argued that its long-term survival is under threat (Beck & Young, 2005; Dill, 1982; Rice,
1999; Rowland, 2002; Williams, 2008). Beck and Young (2005) identified the modem
primary threats as the increased calls for greater professionalism, productivity, and
managerial oversight coming from non-academic authorities. Williams (2008) attributed
academic culture’s vulnerability to the challenges created by evolving socio-economic
conditions. Such an argument sounds plausible in an era o f ever-growing virtual
universities and on-line degree programs. In a similar vein, Rice (1999) attributed the
plight o f faculty and academic culture to a decline of extrinsic rewards, such as salaries
and professional opportunities. Dill (1982) maintained that academic culture was in
decline because o f the steady erosion of an enterprise culture originally based on
sectarian religious beliefs. Specifically:
In the United States the loss o f meaning of enterprise culture has been
relatively rapid. In only a hundred years we have moved from colleges
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and universities with the symbols and traditions o f required chapel, a
liberal education heavily based upon religious and moral precepts, and
baccalaureate services at graduation, to secular institutions which retain
many o f these symbols and rituals but have discarded the underlying
religious faith which gave these symbols meaning. In its place, we have
adopted a faith in disciplinary ideology. But at the enterprise level we
have failed to develop a corresponding culture rich enough in symbol and
ritual to provide a unifying sense o f belief. (Dill, 1982, p. 311)
Further, Dill (1982) argued that the rapid growth of systems o f higher education,
along with a growing orientation toward the individual, discipline-based career was
eroding traditional academic culture significantly. A primary cause o f these phenomena
was the rapid proliferation o f fields, disciplines, and PhD recipients in the years
following World War II, resulting in an elimination of shared traditions, identification
with a common calling, and the sense of a single academic profession (Dill, 1982).
Further, instead of identifying with academic culture in general, faculty have come to
identify with the culture of their discipline (Nisbet, 1971), or even more specifically, with
just their own professional careers (Blankenship, 1977; Dill, 1982; Rice, 1999).
Consequently, “faculty members who a generation ago would define themselves in terms
of their institution - ‘I am a member of the Harvard faculty’ - now identify themselves in
terms o f their field - ‘I am a sociologist, currently at Harvard’” (Dill, 1982, p. 311).
However, what remains unknown is how these faculty attitudes influence the adjustment
processes o f non-traditional college presidents to academic culture.
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Com paring academic culture with other cultures. Along with attempting to
define academic culture and its prospects for long-term viability, scholars have explored
how it compares and contrasts with other types of organizational culture. This research is
significant when studying how non-traditional presidents engage with academic culture.
Coming from the worlds o f the military, government, business, etc., non-traditional
presidents are likely much more familiar with other forms of organizational culture upon
assuming their posts. Thus, understanding how academic culture compares and contrasts
with other forms of organizational culture provides a framework for the possible issues
that a new non-traditional president may face in adjusting to academic life.
According to Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker, and Riley (1999), a major difference
between academic and non-academic organizational cultures has to do with goal
ambiguity. In general, most organizations are goal-oriented, such as businesses trying to
make profit or hospitals trying to help sick people. However, colleges and universities
have vague, ambiguous goals that force them to have to make decisions with a high
degree o f uncertainty. Thus, goal ambiguity is one of the chief characteristics of
academic organizations (Baldridge et al., 1999). This could present a key challenge for
new non-traditional college presidents who are used to leading goal-oriented institutions.
Along with goal ambiguity, scholars have determined that other distinct
differences exist between academic and non-academic cultures. For instance, some
scholars have done extensive research on the specific intricacies o f academic culture,
explaining how it is a unique entity when compared to other organizational cultures (Dill,
2012; Lane, 1985; Williams, 2008). Lane (1985) found that while differentiation (i.e.
division o f the organizational culture into smaller sub-units) exists in every organization,
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higher education is characterized by extreme differentiation. Specifically, academic work
is first divided according to subject matter or academic department and then in relation to
the orientation o f each scholar (Lane, 1985; Smith, 1990). Thus, each academic
department is typically a world unto itself. Lane (1985) also concluded that academia is
often characterized by an interplay between the academic organization and the academic
man/woman. Whereas an academic organization is typically passive, with slow and
collective decision-making, the academic man/woman is active, busily pursuing their
individual research agendas (Lane, 1985).
Bimbaum (1988) also studied this phenomenon of parallel organizational
structures in higher education, referring to it as a “dualism o f controls” (p. 9). However,
instead o f focusing specifically on the interplay between academic organization and
scholar, he examined this interplay on a variety of fronts, including faculty vs. board
interaction and faculty vs. administrator interaction. Bimbaum (1988) characterized
these interactions as a problem of governance, as this organizational structure is often
difficult to lead and perceived as disorganized by outside cultures. Moreover, he
concluded that there is a clear problem in higher education organization that has an
impact on its culture. In organizations, “administrative authority is predicated on the
control and coordination o f activities by superiors; professional authority is predicated on
autonomy and individual knowledge” (Bimbaum, 1988, p. 10).
Noting that these types o f authority are in fundamental disagreement, Bimbaum
(1988) found that such an arrangement can make it quite difficult to lead an academic
organization because both types o f authority are equally present within that culture.
Thus, this arrangement o f competing orientations will increase the need for collegiality
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and collective decision-making in order to satisfy all of the stakeholders involved (i.e.
faculty, administrators, board members). This approach to authority is quite different
than business, military, or government organizations, in which only administrative
authority is typically present and singular decision-making is more common. This
background o f reasoning is quite helpful in understanding why it can be difficult for nontraditional presidents to adjust to academic culture. They come from organizational
cultures where only administrative authority is present, and are typically not used to the
professional authority possessed by faculty members as well as some administrators.
In his typology of organizational cultures, Mintzberg (1980) labeled the one best
suited for academic organizations as “professional bureaucracy” (p. 333). In this
decentralized culture, organizations hire highly trained specialists, known as
professionals, in its hiring core (Mintzberg, 1980). Given considerable autonomy, these
professionals work freely not only o f the administrative hierarchy but also o f their own
colleagues (Mintzberg, 1980). Moreover, managers in this culture must have the support
o f professional operators and be professionals themselves in order to maintain credibility
and power (Mintzberg, 1980). Mintzberg’s (1980) model for professional bureaucracy
may help to explain why non-traditional college presidents may have difficulty in
adjusting to academic culture. If they are not considered to be professional by their
faculty peers, it may lead to legitimacy problems.
Further, non-traditional presidents may be more accustomed to Mintzberg’s
(1980) model for “machine bureaucracy” (p. 332), particularly if they come from
business, government, or military backgrounds. In this more centralized culture, there are
formalized procedures in the operating core, as well as centralized power for decision
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making (Mintzberg, 1980). Moreover, there is an elaborate administrative structure along
with a clear distinction between staff and managers (Mintzberg, 1980). Overall, this
culture stands in marked contrast to the professional bureaucracy model (Mintzberg,
1980). Thus, additional research is needed to explore the extent to which the differences
between Mintzberg’s (1980) models for professional and machine bureaucracy impact
non-traditional college presidents.
Rosovsky (1990) also wrote extensively about academic culture, noting that
academics are typically happier and more satisfied professionally than their peers in
business, government, or the military because they have more freedom o f movement,
minimal direct supervision, and they have the opportunity to work in the pleasant,
attractive, and tranquil surroundings found on most college campuses. To support his
claim, he referenced a study (Ladd & Lipset, 1976) that surveyed faculty job satisfaction
for American academics. It found that 88% of the sample maintained that if they were to
begin their careers anew, they would still want to be college professors (Ladd & Lipset,
1976). However, such arguments raise a possible limitation of research on academic
culture by such scholars as Rosovsky (1990), Bimbaum (1988), and Lane (1985). When
they described and analyzed academic culture, they only referred to faculty members, and
not to other key constituency groups within an academic setting. Further, according to
Gappa, Austin, and Trice (2007), modem professionals, including academics, are not as
tied to their employers and careers as they were in previous decades. According to
Berrett (2012), faculty members are also more stressed and strapped for teaching time,
suggesting that the faculty sentiments expressed in Ladd and Lipset (1976) may be
different today among modem academics. Overall, it would be useful to examine more
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research on how academic administrators perceive and engage with academic culture, and
determine if there are any differences with the perceptions held by faculty members.
As with academic culture, there has also been extensive research on non-academic
culture, particularly within the realm of business. While non-academic culture is
portrayed as having distinct differences from its academic counterpart, there also appear
to be some areas of similarity. For instance, Gordon (1991) argued that corporate culture
is strongly influenced by the characteristics of the industry in which the company
operates. Thus, the organizational culture of a local insurance agent’s office would be
influenced by the corporate culture of the larger company of which it is a part (Gordon,
1991). This line of reasoning could also fit within academic culture, as overarching
cultural themes such as academic freedom, intellectual growth, and advancement of
knowledge would be present within the culture on many college campuses.
In recent years, scholars have also pointed to other areas o f similarity between
academic and corporate culture, asserting that they are slowly becoming more alike. For
instance, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) studied the rise o f what they called academic
capitalism, or the tendency o f colleges and universities to engage in market-like
behaviors. Prompted by a sluggish economy and declining state support for public
institutions, colleges and universities have increasingly sought to generate revenue from
their core educational, research, and service functions (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
Recent examples o f this strategy have included encouraging faculty to pursue research
that leads to patents and to develop curricular materials that can be copyrighted and
marketed (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
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While Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argued that academic culture is becoming
more like corporate culture, Bastedo (2012) argued the opposite, maintaining that many
corporations are beginning to take on aspects of academic culture. For instance, Bastedo
(2012) pointed out that several corporations are giving employees greater autonomy,
implanting sabbaticals in certain cases, and encouraging greater research and
development. Overall, due to economic realities and shifting societal norms, it appears
that the lines between academic and corporate culture are blurring to a certain extent.
Further research would be useful in determining if a similar pattern is taking place
between academic culture and other forms of non-academic culture, such as those found
in the military and the government.
However, while there are possible similarities between academic and nonacademic cultures, the research indicates that there are also key differences. Gordon
(1991) asserted that corporate culture would likely possess a greater sense of shared
assumptions and values than its academic counterpart, which is often influenced by its
extreme differentiation. Further, Rotemberg (1993) argued that autocratic leadership and
management styles are more likely to be found in non-academic organizational cultures,
where administrative authority is more prevalent. As mentioned in Bimbaum (1988), an
autocratic governance style would not likely last long within academic culture because of
the strong presence of professional authority held by faculty members in particular.
Hofstede et al. (2002) came upon another possible difference when they concluded that
profit and growth o f the organization were the top priorities of executives in nonacademic cultures. Within academic culture the importance of those profit-oriented goals
would depend upon the constituency group in question. While presidents, boards of
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trustees, and financial administrators would be interested in profit and growth, those
goals may not be o f as much importance to faculty members, who may be more interested
in academic freedom, student success, and intellectual growth.
Overall, based on existing research, academic culture appears to be a unique
enterprise immersed in special traditions, symbols, and ceremonies, which also values
objectivity and academic freedom (Clark, 1983; Dill, 2012). Moreover, modem research
makes a compelling argument that academic culture is quite different than other types of
organizational culture. As opposed to other organizational cultures, academic culture is
characterized by extreme differentiation and is highly decentralized, especially within the
faculty ranks (Lane, 1985). Further, the advanced education and expertise of faculty
members and many administrators often necessitates a collective decision-making
approach not often found in other organizational cultures (Bimbaum, 1988). Specifically,
the belief is promoted among faculty that they are a community o f scholars who
collectively governs academia (Aguirre, 2000; Chaffee & Tierney, 1988; Clark, 1970;
Mortimer & McConnell, 1978). To that end, autocratic leadership is not an approach that
works well within academic settings (Bimbaum, 1988). This reality about autocratic
leadership is a compelling and sobering point, considering that many non-traditional
presidents come from organizational cultures (such as business, the government, or the
military) where that form of leadership is more common (Rotemberg, 1993).

Adaptive and Change Leadership
Considering that there are key similarities and differences between academic
culture and other forms o f organizational culture, it raises the question as to what are the
best leadership strategies for presidents to employ within a higher education setting,
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particularly if they are unfamiliar with academic culture. Moreover, what resources can
presidents utilize in order to lead colleges and universities effectively? Along with
literature on organizational culture, research on leadership theory comprises another
important dimension in exploring how non-traditional college presidents can adjust to
academic culture and lead within it effectively.
Scholars have conducted extensive research on the types of personal influence
that leaders possess. Within a higher education setting, this research would inform how
college presidents establish and maintain the credibility to lead their institutions, as well
as to advance their formal agendas. Some o f the seminal work in this area was conducted
by Bourdieu (1985) through his model for four forms of capital - economic, social,
cultural, and symbolic. Bourdieu (1985) developed these terms in the early 1970s as a
means for revealing the dynamics o f power relations in social life and for studying the
role that these forms o f capital play in the leadership process. According to Bourdieu
(1985), economic capital refers to command over economic resources; social capital
refers to resources based on group membership, relationships, and networks o f influence;
and cultural capital refers to forms o f knowledge, skills, education, and advantages a
person has, which gives them a higher status in society. Cultural capital is further
comprised o f three subtypes. The embodied state refers to the inherited (non-genetic) and
acquired traits and skills embedded in the individual (Bourdieu, 1985). The objectified
state refers to things that are owned (such as artwork), while the institutionalized state
refers to institutional recognition of one’s cultural capital, normally understood as
academic credentials (Bourdieu, 1985). Bourdieu (1985) also developed the concept of
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symbolic capital, which refers to the resources available to an individual on the basis of
honor, prestige, or recognition.
In recent decades, scholars have also researched the types of power that
organizational leaders possess. Power sources can be classified in two general forms position power and personal power (Bass, 1960; Etzioni, 1961; Rahim, 1988; Yukl &
Falbe, 1991). According to Yukl (2006), types of position power, based upon
opportunities inherent in a person’s position, include legitimate power (power stemming
from formal authority over work activities), reward power (the power to distribute gifts
or incentives), and coercive power (the power to distribute punishment). Information
power (control over the flow of information) and ecological power (control over the
physical environment, technology, and organization of the work) are also categorized
under position power (Cartwright, 1965; Raven, 1965; Yukl, 2006).
Conversely, personal power stems from the attributes of the leader himself or
herself (Yukl, 2006). According to Yukl (2006), it includes referent power (power based
on affection, admiration, and loyalty), and expert power (task-relevant knowledge and
skill). While the research on power and capital is abundant, what remains unknown is
how it applies to non-traditional college presidents. Do non-traditional presidents all
possess the same types o f power and capital, or does it depend upon the person and
situation? Moreover, would any expert power possessed by non-traditional presidents be
diminished in an academic setting, where they are surrounded by highly-educated
scholars? More research is needed to address these questions.
Several scholars have also studied the leadership process within academic settings
(Boyett, 1996; Gregory, 1996; Neumann & Neumann, 1999; Pounder, 2001; Ramsden,
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1998; Randall & Coakley, 2007; Rowley & Sherman, 2003). Within the broad realm of
leadership theories, two specific theoretical approaches - adaptive leadership and change
leadership - are most applicable to how non-traditional presidents, as well as traditional
presidents, may lead while adjusting to academic culture. Heifetz (1994) pioneered the
research on adaptive leadership, basing it on the premise that leadership is more of a
process rather than individual personal capabilities (Heifetz, Kania, & Kramer, 2004;
Randall & Coakley, 2007). According to Randall and Coakley (2007), “this process
requires people to focus on the specific problems at hand and to modify the way they
have worked in the past” (p. 327). In his model of adaptive leadership, Heifetz (1994)
focused it on the process and not the person, and the model employed the knowledge of
all who have a vested interest in moving the organization to the next level (Randall &
Coakley, 2007). However, it is important to note that most of the examples that Heifetz
(1994) used in his research are non-academic, prompting the question o f how his adaptive
leadership model would work in an academic cultural setting. Nevertheless, the Heifetz
(1994) model still provides a useful framework to examine how adaptive leadership could
possibly work in such a setting.
As part o f his model, Heifetz proposed that leaders are confronted by two types of
problems - technical and adaptive (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002). Technical problems are
well defined with known solutions, and anyone with the right expertise and resources can
solve them (Heifetz, 1994; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Conversely, adaptive problems
are not well defined and consequently present no known solutions in advance (Heifetz,
1994; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Instead, it requires learning to formulate workable
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solutions (Heifetz, 1994). Senge (1997) supported this rationale, asserting that learning is
the “currency o f survival” in an era o f constant change (p. 46).
Recognizing the important role that learning plays in the modem world, several
scholars have studied the dynamics o f adult learning. For instance, Knowles (1980)
introduced the European concept o f andragogy to American scholarly audiences, defining
it as “the art and science of helping adults learn” (p. 43). Centered on the concepts of
independence and self-directed learning, Knowles (1980) maintained that there were five
assumptions underlying andragogy. They describe the adult learner as someone who (1)
has an independent self-concept and who can direct his or her own learning, (2) has
accumulated a reservoir o f life experiences that is a rich resource for learning, (3) has
learning needs closely related to changing social roles, (4) is problem-centered and
interested in immediate application o f knowledge, and (5) is motivated to learn by
internal rather than external factors (Knowles, 1980; Merriam, 2001). Based on these
assumptions, Knowles (1980) developed a program-planning model for designing,
implementing, and evaluating educational experiences for adults (Merriam, 2001).
In a similar vein, Mezirow (1996) developed a transformational learning model
that helped explain how adults changed the way that they interpreted their world (Taylor,
2008). This model is based on the premise that “learning is understood as the process of
using a prior interpretation to construe a new or revised interpretation o f the meaning of
one’s experience in order to guide future action (Mezirow, 1996, p. 162). This
transformative process is formed and circumscribed by frames of reference, defined as
“structures o f assumptions and expectations that frame an individual’s tacit points of
view and influence their thinking, beliefs, and actions” (Taylor, 2008, p. 5). According to
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Taylor (2008), it is the revision of a frame of reference in concert with reflection on
experience that culminates in a paradigmatic shift. This dynamic is specifically what is
addressed by the theory o f perspective transformation (Taylor, 2008).
Applying many o f these concepts about learning to leadership, Amey (2005)
concluded that instead o f viewing leadership as a series of career stages through which
particular skills are learned, it is more effective to conceptualize leadership as a broader,
ongoing process of learning. Beckhard and Pritchard (1992) echoed this point about
learning, finding that leading any successful change or adaptation requires a conscious
decision to move to a learning mode, where learning and doing are both valued. Further,
when adaptive problems exist, there are generally many different stakeholders involved
with their own interpretations of the issues at hand (Randall & Coakley, 2007).
Consequently, solutions stem from the stakeholders themselves, and not from one single
entity, because the problem is based in their own attitudes, priorities, and behavior
(Heifetz et al., 2004; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Thus, if a leader does not recognize that
their organization is confronted with adaptive problems and employs a more technical
approach; successful change will fail to occur (Randall & Coakley, 2007). However,
what remains unknown is how these principles apply to non-traditional presidents. For
instance, will they be more inclined to follow one approach or another given their
leadership in other contexts? Moreover, would non-traditional presidents be more likely
to see the adaptive changes needed considering their ability to cross over and adapt to a
new organizational culture and profession? More research is needed to answer these
questions.
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According to Randall and Coakley (2007), “the adaptive leadership model
includes six stages when executing change in a complex, organizational setting where
non-routine decisions are required” (p. 328). These include identifying the type of
problem, focusing attention, framing the issues, securing ownership, managing
stakeholder conflict and stress, and creating a safe haven (Heifetz & Laurie, 1997). Yukl
(2006) maintained that this approach to leadership is “consistent with the idea that
flexible, adaptive leadership is essential to deal successfully with the difficult challenges
posed by trade-offs, competing objectives, and changing situations” (p. 373).
Along with Ronald Heifetz, other scholars have studied how leaders lead most
effectively in a culture o f change, often referring to the concept as change leadership
(Beckhard & Pritchard, 1992; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Bolman & Deal, 1997;
Fullan, 2001; Goleman, 2000; Hamel, 2000; Koteen, 1991; Kotter, 1996). Heifetz (1994)
argued that people must re-conceptualize their philosophy o f leadership, framing it as the
mobilization o f people to solve tough problems instead of merely looking for a heroic
figure to save them. Fullan (2001) followed this view in his framework for change
leadership. He believed that five components o f leadership “represent independent but
mutual reinforcing forces for positive change” (Fullan, 2001, p. 3). They include moral
purpose, or the intention o f making a positive difference in the lives of others, as well as
understanding the change process. The components also include relationship building
along with knowledge creation and sharing. Finally, one of the most crucial components
is coherence making (or sense making), since effective change leaders must help
followers make sense o f chaotic conditions and help them see the larger picture (Fullan,
2001; Weick, 1995). Along with those components, Fullan (2001) believed that effective
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change leaders possess certain personal characteristics that help them engage with
followers. They include energy, enthusiasm, and hopefulness, and Fullan (2001) argued
that all effective change leaders possess them.
In a similar vein, Kotter (1996) proposed an eight-step process for initiating
transformation in organizations. The steps were to establish a grand strategy, create a
guiding coalition, develop a vision and strategy, communicate the change vision,
empower broad-based action, generate short-term wins, consolidate gains and produce
more change, and anchor new approaches in the culture (Kotter, 1996). Kotter and
Cohen (2002) revised these steps, listing them as follows: increase urgency, build the
guiding team, get the vision right, communicate for buy-in, empower action, create short
term wins, do not let up, and make the changes stick. Hamel (2000) presented a similar
eight-step process for leading change. His steps included building a point o f view,
writing a manifesto, creating a coalition, picking your targets and your moments, co
opting and neutralizing, finding a translator, pursuing small victories, and finally
integrating the new approach (Hamel, 2000). Further, Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector
(1990) created a model for drawing out bottom-up ideas and energies from within the
organization. The model called for mobilizing joint commitment to change and
developing a shared vision for how to best move forward (Beer, et al., 1990).
In order to understand leading in times of change, it is important to have a better
framework in place regarding the change process. Kezar (2014) asserted that there are
six fundamental theories o f change, upon which many change implementation models are
built. The theories are also instrumental for leaders in understanding how change works,
and include scientific management, evolutionary, social cognition, cultural, political, and
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institutional (Kezar, 2014). The scientific management approach assumes that
organizations are purposeful and adaptive, while evolutionary theories maintain that
change is the result of, and dependent on, circumstances, situational variables, and the
environment faced by each organization (Cameron & Smart, 1998; Camall, 1995;
Morgan, 1986; Peterson, 1995; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Social cognition theory
maintains that change can be best understood and enacted through individuals and their
thought processes, while cultural theory is based on the premise that change occurs
naturally as a response to constant alterations in the human environment (Morgan, 1986;
Peterson, 1997; Scott, 1995; Weick, 1995).
Lastly, political theories identify change as being a natural part o f human
interaction, occurring as different agendas and interests are negotiated, while institutional
theory examines how higher education as a social institution might change in different
ways from other types o f organizations (Kezar, 2014). Although these theories provide a
useful framework for understanding change, what remains unknown is how nontraditional presidents interact with them and how the theories may be employed
differently depending upon context. Moreover, do non-traditional presidents tend to
favor some o f these theoretical perspectives over others, or does it depend upon the
individual thoughts and interests? More research is needed to shed light on these
questions.
While many change leadership models have been developed, some scholars have
questioned their usefulness and efficacy. Fullan (2001) considered many o f these models
to be contradictory and difficult to follow. He also argued that the change models were
often much too general and unclear as to how to best proceed (Fullan, 2001). Along
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those lines, Argyris (2000) considered many of these change leadership models to be
“non-actionable advice” (p. 3). Fullan (2001) argued that there is no single, universal
strategy to lead change effectively in all situations. Further, he proposed that “change
can be understood and perhaps led, but it cannot be controlled” (Fullan, 2001, p. 33).
However, despite the preponderance o f research on change leadership, few studies have
connected it specifically to non-traditional college presidents and their process of
engaging with and adjusting to academic culture. More research in that area is urgently
needed, as non-traditional presidents are typically appointed to oversee periods of
significant change at their institutions. According to Trachtenberg, Kauvar, and Bogue
(2013), difficulty adapting to change is among the major reasons why some college
presidents fail, so it is imperative that we achieve a better understanding of how nontraditional as well as traditional college presidents cope with change. Research is also
needed to determine if adaptive or change leadership strategies can be used equally well
in academic versus non-academic organizational cultures.

Conceptual Model
After examining the relevant literature pertaining to the college presidency,
academic culture, and leadership, a conceptual model emerged (See Figure 1) in my mind
that links these three areas together. In this model, seven factors contribute in
approximately equal degrees to the non-traditional president’s adaptive experience to
academic culture. The factors are split into three main categories - institution-driven
factors, leadership-oriented factors, and external factors. In this model, the green circles
represent institution-driven factors, including the institution’s culture and subcultures,
duties and responsibilities of the presidency at that institution, and how the non-
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traditional president’s professional background intersects with the institutional culture.
Meanwhile, the teal circles represent leadership-oriented factors specific to the nontraditional president, including adaptive leadership ability and responsiveness to change.
Finally, the purple circles represent external factors, including the evolution of the
college presidency and the broader societal context. Collectively, these factors provide a
framework for understanding the various issues that non-traditional college presidents
face in adjusting to academic culture.
Figure 1 - Conceptual Model

Summary
Extensive research has been undertaken to explore the unique dynamics o f
academic culture and how it compares with other organizational cultures. Further,
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additional research has focused on how academic leaders most effectively lead in a
higher education environment. However, there have been no scholarly studies that
explore how non-traditional college presidents specifically engage with, adapt to, and
lead within academic culture. While scholars have studied the evolution of the college
presidency as well as the skills needed for the office, there has been little research on the
unique dynamics o f non-traditional presidents. One study (Cotnam, 2006) analyzed the
leadership style o f traditional versus non-traditional presidents, and found that traditional
presidents showed more interest in academic activities while non-traditional presidents
showed more interest in financial and management-related activities. However, beyond
that singular study there has been little to no scholarly research on the issues nontraditional presidents face adjusting to academic culture. The studies that are available on
non-traditional presidents are typically limited in their generalizability by small sample
sizes. Scholars have mentioned the issue o f small sample size frequently as a
fundamental challenge in this area of research because the ranks of non-traditional
presidents are still fairly small (Cotnam, 2006). Thus, this limitation makes it a
challenging group to study.
There are other little-researched areas that would merit more investigation to
better inform our understanding of non-traditional presidents. For one, more scholarly
research within the context o f non-traditional presidents is needed in the realm of
institutional fit, or how new presidents acclimate to their college or university’s
community. According to Will (2010), once a candidate meets all the objective criteria
(earned terminal degree, appropriate experience, etc.) for appointment, the final selection
o f a new president will depend almost entirely on an assessment - by the candidate and
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by the institution’s constituents - o f the level of cultural comfort they have with one
another. An interesting question for future study is whether non-traditional presidents
have a more challenging time achieving institutional fit because o f their lack of exposure
to academic culture?
Moreover, more research is needed concerning the priorities that boards of
trustees possess in selecting new presidents. Supporting the notion of institutional fit,
Johnston and Ferrare (2013) argued that boards must define their institution’s leadership
needs in order to find a president who can meet those requirements. However, according
to the Association of Governing Board’s (AGB) 2010 Statement on Board Responsibility
for Institutional Governance, current social, political, economic, and technological issues
present multiple challenges for governing boards. Such issues can in turn make
determining the necessary qualifications for a new president difficult. For instance,
modem colleges and universities are increasingly limited by insufficient resources,
greater calls for scrutiny and accountability, and a highly competitive marketplace
(Statement on Board Responsibility for Institutional Governance, 2010). Thus, such
limitations can influence the qualifications that boards want in a new president. What
can be most challenging in this context is the rapid pace of change, driven by things like
technology and increased competition (Statement on Board Responsibility for
Institutional Governance, 2010). Such rapid change can make determining institutional
needs difficult, which can in turn complicate the search process for a new president.
At present, literature that informs our understanding o f how governing boards
respond to these challenges while conducting presidential searches is limited. More
research in this area could help explain why the numbers of non-traditional presidents are
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steadily rising in American colleges and universities. Are non-traditional presidents seen
as a possible answer to these growing institutional challenges? Governing boards may
assume that prospective presidents from non-academic backgrounds may be uniquely
equipped to handle the complex issues inherent in modem college and universities.
Conversely, some scholars argue that mixing non-traditional presidents with governing
boards can sometimes result in contentious relations (Trachtenberg, Kauvar, & Bogue,
2013). However, there is still a considerable gap in the literature when it comes to
understanding how governing boards engage with non-traditional presidents. While
scholars have studied academic culture extensively along with adaptive and change
leadership, and to a lesser extent institutional fit for presidents and priorities for boards,
no study thus far has combined all o f these research strands to better inform our
understanding o f non-traditional presidents.
This presents a key problem since the higher education community knows
relatively little about a group to whom they are looking increasingly for leadership.
Although the ranks o f non-traditional presidents are still small when compared with
presidents from traditional academic backgrounds, their numbers are growing (The
American College President, 2012). Further, if the current rates of growth continue, nontraditional presidents could constitute a significant proportion of all college presidents in
the not too distant future. Thus, research in this area would help fill a critical gap in the
literature and would be o f great use to hiring boards and other higher education scholars
eager to learn more about this new breed o f college president. In addition, research on
how non-traditional presidents adapt to and even influence academic culture would be of
use to potential non-traditional presidents themselves, providing them with a useful
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resource to pursue a job successfully that is becoming increasingly complex. In the end,
all constituencies within the higher education community would benefit immensely by
gaining a better understanding of this phenomenon.
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Chapter 3 - Methodology
As noted in previous chapters, the purpose o f this study was to explore the issues
that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive
what lessons could be learned to inform future practice. To obtain the necessary data,
this project entailed a combination of qualitative methodological approaches to explore
the issues that three non-traditional college presidents - Dwight D. Eisenhower at
Columbia University (1948 to 1953), Terry Sanford at Duke University (1969 to 1985),
and Paul Trible at Christopher Newport University (1996 to present) - faced as higher
education leaders needing to adapt to academic culture. Using a case study format, I
combined historical research and content analysis techniques with interviews to study
these three non-traditional presidents from three distinct time periods. By studying past
non-traditional presidents as well as a long-serving current one, I anticipated achieving a
better understanding o f their institutional impacts than if I were studying only current
non-traditional presidents exclusively. Studying past non-traditional presidents allowed
me to obtain a better sense of their institutional impact and legacy. Further, I anticipated
having access to a wider cross-section of data sources than with newer non-traditional
presidents, who likely have not been in office long enough to generate the necessary
sources for data collection needed in this study.
An emergent research design was utilized in order to adjust the inquiry plans and
strategies in response to what was learned as the study unfolded (Schwandt, 2001). At
the outset of this study, I had no formal hypothesis concerning the issues that nontraditional presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and planned to follow the data
where it took me. Therefore, inferences were made from drawing conclusions from

52

particular premises (Schwandt, 2001). In qualitative research, three kinds of procedures
for making inferences are deductive, inductive, and abductive (Schwandt, 2001). For this
study, inductive analysis was utilized to reached a general set o f conclusions about the
participants following my analysis o f their experiences adjusting to academic culture
(Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008; Schwandt, 2001). This approach was effective for
this study as I needed to collect data, in the forms o f content analysis, historical research,
and (in President Trible’s case) interviews, on each non-traditional president before
reaching any general conclusions.
To examine Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, a combination of historical
research and content analysis techniques were utilized. Along with those two
approaches, an interview protocol was conducted with President Trible, as well as with
other senior CNU faculty and administrative leaders who were present when he first
came to the University. By using this multi-faceted approach, I anticipated discovering
the primary issues that Presidents Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible faced in adjusting to
academic culture. Moreover, I anticipated learning what strategies they utilized to make
this adjustment during the early stages o f their presidencies.

Research Questions Investigated
The research questions that were addressed in this study included:
1. What perceptions do non-traditional presidents have o f academic culture?
A) How do those perceptions help them in adjusting to academic culture?
B) How do those perceptions hinder them in adjusting to academic culture?
2.

How do non-traditional presidents adjust to academic culture?
A) What are (if any) the key issues that non-traditional presidents face in
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adjusting to academic culture?
B) How have some non-traditional presidents been able to adjust to
academic culture successfully while others could not?

Participants
This study centered on the examination of three non-traditional college presidents
from distinct historical eras - Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible.
Eisenhower was a career U.S. Army officer who achieved legendary status as Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe during World War II (Smith, 2012). He later served as
chief o f staff of the U.S. Army before his 1948 appointment as president of Columbia
University (Smith, 2012). Following his service there, Eisenhower served as president of
the United States from 1953 to 1961. Terry Sanford was a World War II veteran and
prominent attorney who served as governor o f North Carolina from 1961 to 1965. He
was also a close political ally of John F. Kennedy and was rumored to have been
Kennedy’s choice as a running mate in the 1964 presidential election had Kennedy lived
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). Following his tenure as Duke University’s president, he later
represented North Carolina in the U.S. Senate from 1986 to 1993 (Covington & Ellis,
1999). In a similar vein, Paul Trible began his career as a noted Tidewater Virginia
attorney and prosecutor before serving in the U.S. House o f Representatives from 1977 to
1983 and the U.S. Senate from 1983 to 1989 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987). Following his
service in Congress, he served as part of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations and
taught briefly at Harvard before assuming the presidency of Christopher Newport
University in 1996 (Hamilton, 2011).
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A combination o f convenience and purposeful sampling was used to identify the
participants for this study - Presidents Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible. In convenience
sampling, the researcher selects participants because they are willing to be studied, while
in purposeful sampling, researchers intentionally select individuals to learn or understand
the central phenomenon (Creswell, 2012). Within the realm of convenience sampling, I
chose to study Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford because their papers were either
readily accessible in nearby archives or have already been published. This high level of
access provided for an efficient and logistically feasible data collection process.
President Trible also fit the criteria for convenience sampling because he was accessible
for research purposes by virtue o f my long association with him, he was relatively close
in geographic proximity, and an interview with him could easily be scheduled and
completed within the time frame required for this study. Because of this close
association with Trible, I took steps to bracket my bias and assumptions and maintained a
research reflexivity log during the study.
However, aspects o f purposeful sampling also applied to all three participants.
For this study, I utilized three guidelines in selecting the participants after surveying
historical and current college presidents who possessed exclusively non-academic
backgrounds. First, I wanted to study some of the most high-profile examples of non
academics who became college presidents. By examining their adjustment processes to
academic culture, I believed that these pioneering leaders could provide useful lessons for
aspiring non-traditional presidents and other key stakeholders. By serving during World
War II as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe prior to serving as president of
Columbia, I believed that President Eisenhower met this guideline quite well. Similarly,
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as a former North Carolina governor and national Democratic Party leader, President
Sanford also fit the criteria. Lastly, President Trible served as an example o f a highprofile, non-traditional president in the modem era, owing to his service as both a U.S.
congressman and U.S. senator.
Second, I wanted to study non-traditional presidents who had a range of
experiences in adjusting to academic culture - specifically one highly negative
(Eisenhower), one highly positive (Sanford), and one somewhere in-between (Trible).
While history serves as a judge of the success of Eisenhower and Sanford, the modem
day presidency o f Trible is still occurring. Even though the final assessment of Trible’s
leadership remains unknown, however, his having served 18 years as president of CNU
affords a preliminary judgment o f his success. Using this “pendulum” approach,
President Eisenhower fit the bill as a non-traditional president who arguably failed to
adjust to academic culture, while President Sanford fit as someone who enjoyed a much
more positive experience. Lastly, President Trible fit the criteria for a non-traditional
president who, to date, has landed somewhere in the middle as he has experienced both
successes and challenges in this area during his presidency. Further, President Trible was
a useful participant for this study since he is currently one o f the longest-serving nontraditional college presidents in the nation. Over the course o f his tenure, he has also
worked closely with faculty to spearhead major curricular changes and building
construction campaigns at CNU. Thus, the data derived from an examination of
President Trible’s experiences was useful for the purposes of this study.
My third criteria for selecting participants centered on their placement in a larger,
chronological framework. By choosing non-traditional presidents from three distinct
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historical periods, this study could investigate how the contextual variables in each time
frame influenced the perception that academic stakeholders had concerning nontraditional presidents. Thus, by selecting Presidents Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible,
they each fit well into a broader chronological spectrum - with Eisenhower covering the
late 1940s/early 1950s, Sanford covering the 1970s/early 1980s, and Trible covering the
late 1990s/2000s.
Since President Trible is a currently serving non-traditional president, I was also
able to draw on additional members o f the CNU community to serve as participants in
this study. Specifically, I utilized the same combination of purposeful and convenience
sampling to identify five senior academic and faculty leaders who could speak to the
issues that President Trible faced in adjusting to academic culture. These were all
individuals who had been at CNU for either all or the vast majority o f the Trible era.
Since there were not that many individuals left at CNU who fit those criteria, I believed
that interviewing five participants was sufficient. This total emerged because I wanted
individuals who could reflect on the long trajectory and evolution o f Trible’s leadership
over time, instead o f those who did not have as much exposure and were therefore not in
a position to comment on the evolution.

Data Sources
The data for this study came from a variety of sources. In examining Presidents
Eisenhower and Sanford, most of my data came from primary sources such as journals,
letters, speeches, period newspaper articles, and memoirs. In historical research, a
primary source is “a record that was generated by people who personally witnessed or
participated in the historical events o f interest” (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007, p. 537). Thus,
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diary entries, memoirs, speeches, and letters written by Presidents Eisenhower and
Sanford were of paramount importance for this study. Specifically, personal documents
were critical sources of data for this study. Personal documents generally refer to any
first-person narrative that describes an individual’s actions, experiences, and beliefs
(Plummer, 1983; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). They typically consist of such writings as
intimate diaries, personal letters, and autobiographies (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). Many of
these sources were contained in archives such as those at the Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Library, Columbia University, and Duke University. However, others were
published, particularly the papers o f President Eisenhower, and were readily accessible
through books and online databases.
Secondary sources, such as biographies and media coverage, were also useful as
supplementary sources for the purposes of data triangulation. According to Gall and
associates (2007), secondary sources are “documents in which individuals give an
account o f an event at which they were not present” (p. 537). Over the past few decades,
there have been several major biographies o f President Eisenhower written. Further,
there has been at least one major biography of Terry Sanford as well as two books about
CNU’s institutional history. These secondary sources provided useful data in the form of
scholarly insight and interpretation on each of the three presidents. Such data were useful
for data triangulation purposes in this study.
For President Trible, some o f my data also came from a combination of primary
and secondary sources, including university documents, newspaper articles, and
published books pertaining to CNU’s history. However, as President Trible was the only
living figure among the individuals profiled in the three case studies, the bulk o f the data
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came from an interview with him. Further, six additional interviews were conducted with
five senior CNU faculty members and administrators (See Appendix A) who have served
throughout the Trible presidency - or for the vast majority o f it - and could speak to the
issues he faced in adjusting to academic culture. One participant was interviewed twice once for the original pilot study and a second time for this study. Three of the interviews
were done for an earlier pilot study on this topic that was approved by The College of
William and Mary’s institutional review board (IRB). The other three interviews were
done for the purposes o f this study. For both sets of interviews, the interview protocol
was nearly identical (See Appendix C). Since these individuals have known President
Trible for a number of years, their reflections on this topic also served as a valuable
source for data triangulation in this study.

Procedures for Data Collection
The data collection process began with preparing and filing the necessary
paperwork to The College of William and Mary’s IRB. This paperwork was then
reviewed and ultimately approved. For all three presidents, data were then collected
through the framework o f a case study format. According to Gall and associates (2007),
a case study is “the in-depth study of one or more instances o f a phenomenon in its reallife context that reflects the perspective o f the participants involved in the phenomenon”
(p. 447). In a case study, a substantial amount o f data are collected about the specific
case selected to represent the phenomenon (Gall et al., 2007; Merriam, 1998; Stake,
1995; Yin, 1989). Moreover, a case study design typically involves the study o f a
phenomenon in its real-life context (Gall et al., 2007; Kirk & Miller, 1986). Since three
non-traditional presidents were examined for this study, a cross-case comparison, also
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known as a cross-case analysis, was employed in order to compare and contrast each
president (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Schwandt, 2001; Yin, 1989). According to Yin
(1989), the choice of multiple case designs follows a replication rather than a sampling
logic. Specifically, additional cases are chosen for study because they are expected to
yield “similar information or findings or contrary but predictable findings” (Schwandt,
2001, p. 47).
According to Yin (1989), a case study strategy is preferred when the inquirer
seeks answers to how or why questions, when the inquirer has little control over the
events being studied, when the object of the study is a contemporary phenomenon in a
real-life context, when boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not too
clear, and when it is desirable to utilize multiple sources of evidence. This study
followed all o f the guidelines mentioned above as I carefully examined primary and
secondary source documents pertaining to each presidency. It also followed a case study
design by incorporating semi-structured interviews in certain cases with President Trible
and other senior faculty and administrative leaders on the CNU campus. Because o f its
focus on the study o f a phenomenon in its real-life context, I believed that a case study
format was the best method to capture the unique experiences that Presidents
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible each faced in adjusting to academic culture.
Within this case study framework, a combination o f approaches was utilized to
collect data for all three presidents. First, a historical research technique was utilized to
study Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford. Historical research entails the “process of
systematically searching for data to answer questions about a phenomenon from the past
to gain a better understanding o f the foundation o f present institutions, practices, trends,
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beliefs, and issues in education” (Gall et al., p. 529). According to Edson (1986),
historical investigation is similar to other qualitative research methodologies in four
distinct ways: 1) the emphasis on the study of the context, 2) the study o f behavior in
natural rather than in contrived or hypothetical settings, 3) the appreciation of the
wholeness of experiences, and 4) the centrality of interpretation in the research process.
Along these lines, data for Eisenhower and Sanford were collected through reviewing
primary source documents in archival settings as well as in published books.
To obtain these data, I designed and implemented a search plan (See Appendix B)
before conducting thorough archival research. According to Gall and associates (2007),
historians need to have some idea of what they are looking for before beginning a search
for data. Thus, the first step in my search plan involved studying preliminary sources for
Eisenhower and Sanford. Preliminary sources are indexes to primary and secondary
sources, and may include bibliographies as well as indexes to archival holdings at
libraries (Gall et al., 2007). For the purposes of this study, lists of archival holdings were
useful as a means of identifying materials that shed light on the issues that Eisenhower
and Sanford faced in adjusting to academic culture. Therefore, I reviewed the indexes to
the Dwight D. Eisenhower papers at Columbia University and at his presidential library
as well as the indexes for Terry Sanford’s papers at Duke University to identify key
documents before proceeding with further historical research. This approach allowed me
to save time and devote the bulk o f my attention to documents that would provide useful
data for this study.
To coincide with this historical research approach, content analysis was also
utilized to obtain data for coding and the generation of key themes. According to
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Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), content analysis is “a technique that enables researchers to
study human behavior in an indirect way, through an analysis o f their communications”
(p. 483). For Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, their writings were analyzed to look
for key words and phrases that pertained to the issues they faced in adjusting to academic
culture. These key words and phrases were then coded for further analysis (See
Appendix E). According to Schwandt (2001), coding “is a procedure that disaggregates
the data, breaks it down into manageable segments, and identifies or names those
segments” (p. 26).
For this study, I believed that this combination of historical research and content
analysis was the best approach to analyzing the issues that Eisenhower and Sanford faced
in adjusting to academic culture. As noted by Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), a principal
advantage o f historical research is that it permits the investigation of topics and questions
that cannot be studied any other way, such as things pertaining to the past. Since both
presidents are now deceased, it was no longer possible to collect data from them
personally through interviews. Moreover, the vast majority o f faculty and administrative
leaders from Columbia University and Duke University who would have been familiar
with their adjustment processes were also likely deceased. Thus, by permitting the study
o f evidence from the past, historical research and content analysis provided the most
effective methods to collect data for this study (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006).
To a certain extent, historical research and content analysis approaches were also
utilized to study President Trible. As with Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, I studied
primary and secondary source documents that provided insights to the issues he faced in
adjusting to academic culture. However, since Trible was a living, currently serving
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higher education executive, most data for his case study were collected through semi
structured interviews. According to Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), semi-structured
interviews are fairly formal and consist of a series of questions designed to elicit specific
answers from respondents. They are most useful when time with the respondent is
limited and it is desirable to obtain specific or focused information (Schwandt, 2001).
For the purposes o f this study, semi-structured interviews were most effective since they
provided a framework for the discussion and allowed for targeted answers to specific
questions in a short period o f time.
One hour-long interview with President Trible was held in the conference room
attached to his office suite on the CNU campus. An interview protocol (See Appendix C)
with nine questions was utilized to explore aspects of Trible’s experiences as a nontraditional president, his experiences interacting with academic culture, and the strategies
he utilized to adapt to it. A modified version of the same protocol (See Appendix C) was
used to interview five senior faculty and administrative leaders (See Appendix A) - with
one participant being interviewed twice - and each interview was held in their respective
offices. Further, a consent form (See Appendix D) was provided to each of the
participants for their signature. They kept one signed copy while I kept the other. As
outlined in the consent form (See Appendix D), their real names were not included (See
Appendix A) in this study in order to protect their privacy and permit a full range of
discussion. Instead, they were listed simply as “Participant 1,” “Participant 2,” etc.
Following the in-person meetings with President Trible and the five administrative and
faculty leaders, the interviews were transcribed and coded. The transcripts were then sent
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to the participants for member checking and I made modifications and corrections based
on their feedback.

Procedures for Data Analysis
For all three case studies (Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible), a thematic analysis
was conducted following data collection to develop categories that summarized the data
(Gall et al., 2007). This analysis also incorporated the time and contextual variables
present during each presidency. For this study, a grounded, a posteriori, inductive,
context-specific scheme was developed and utilized. According to Schwandt (2001), this
schematic approach allows analysts to a) work with the actual language of respondents to
generate the codes or categories, and b) work back and forth between the data segments
and the codes or categories to refine the meaning of categories as they proceed through
the data. For the purposes of this study, this approach was most effective since it offered
a high degree of flexibility for developing codes and categories from raw data. Since the
data largely came from studying historical documents that do not pertain to the specific
focus o f this study, that flexibility was crucial for effective data analysis. After this
coding process, themes were then derived from these categories, followed by the
determination of aggregate and then final themes for use in this study.
While analyzing the data for this study to determine findings and conclusions,
following the accepted standards for trustworthiness criteria was critical. According to
Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness consists o f a set of criteria that are used to
judge the quality or goodness of qualitative inquiry. These criteria essentially mirror the
criteria set forth for effective quantitative research. Further, trustworthiness is considered
the quality o f an investigation and its findings that make it noteworthy to audiences
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(Schwandt, 2001). Lincoln and Guba (1985) determined that trustworthiness is
comprised o f four criteria - credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
Credibility runs parallel with internal validity as used in quantitative research and
addresses the level o f fit between respondents’ views of their life ways and the inquirers’
reconstruction and representation of the same (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001).
Transferability runs parallel with external validity as used in quantitative research and
deals with the issue of generalizability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001).
Meanwhile, dependability is closely associated with reliability as used in quantitative
research and focuses on the process o f the inquiry, helping to ensure that the process is
logical, traceable, and documented (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). Finally,
confirmability runs parallel with objectivity as used in quantitative research and helps
ensure that the data and interpretations of an inquiry are not just merely the figments of
the inquirer’s imagination (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). It calls for linking
assertions, findings, and interpretations to the data in clearly discemable ways (Schwandt,
2001 ).
To provide dependability for this study, I included detailed instructions outlining
the specific research process in a manner allowing future researchers to replicate it if
needed. Meanwhile, to provide credibility, confirmability, and to a certain extent
transferability for this study, the procedure of triangulation was utilized to check the
integrity o f the inferences drawn from the study (Lincoln & Denzin, 2011; Schwandt,
2001). According to Creswell (2012), triangulation is the process o f corroborating
evidence from different individuals, types of data, or methods of data collection. This
helps ensure accuracy since the information draws on multiple sources o f information,
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individuals, or processes (Creswell, 2012). For this study, the primary data were derived
from the writings o f Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, as well as from interview
responses from President Trible. These data were triangulated by comparing them to two
other types o f data. First, they were compared with the writings or interview responses of
senior faculty and administrative leaders at their respective universities. Second, they
were compared with secondary sources such as newspaper articles, biographies, and other
scholarly publications analyzing each president. The objective o f utilizing triangulation
was to ensure that these distinct forms of data corroborated with one another, thus
helping to also provide confirmability. Since I was only studying three non-traditional
presidents, the prospects for transferability were limited. However, the data triangulation
in this study provided a good foundation of findings that would at least have bearing on
the study o f other non-traditional presidents.
To provide further confirmability and validity for the study, I utilized peer review,
which is considered an integral verification procedure in qualitative research (Creswell,
1998; Glesne, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). According to Glesne (2006), peer review
and debriefing allow for external reflection and input on your work. For this study, a
member o f my dissertation committee (Dr. Eddie Cole) served as a peer reviewer. Dr.
Cole has expertise in conducting historical research. Specifically, I shared with him
samples o f my data in the form of correspondence, interview transcripts, etc. along with
the codes and themes I generated from those data. Ultimately, this provided me the
opportunity to have an additional scholar concur with my findings and support my data
triangulation.
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Along with meeting the accepted criteria for trustworthiness, it was also crucial
that this study met the standards set forth for analyzing historical documents. Thus, it
was important to ensure the genuineness o f the historical sources used for this study.
According to Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), “perhaps more so than in any other form of
research, the historical researcher must adopt a critical attitude toward any and all sources
he or she reviews” (p. 549). Along those lines, two key objectives for historical
researchers are to determine whether the document under analysis was really written by
the supposed author and to determine whether the information contained in the document
is true (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006).
The first objective requires external criticism, which refers to the process o f
determining genuineness o f any and all documents the researcher uses (Fraenkel &
Wallen, 2006; Gall et al., 2007). Since documents can sometimes be forged, falsified, or
ghostwritten it is important that I took care to be diligent in this area. Meanwhile, the
second objective refers to internal criticism, which “involves evaluating the accuracy and
worth o f the statements contained in a historical document” (Gall et al., 2007, p. 542).
According to Gall and associates (2007), internal criticism is more complicated than
external criticism because it includes the historian’s judgment about the truth of the
statements in a historical source as well as an evaluation of the person who wrote them.
In addition, there is the added challenge for historians of trying to glean perception and
intention from the historical data (Gall et al., 2007). For the purposes of this study,
internal criticism and the interpretation o f intention and perception were important factors
for consideration, and I was careful to ensure that the contents of each document I
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examined were accurate and appropriately interpreted by comparing them with other
historical sources.

Researcher Positionality
I was originally drawn to this study because of my experience working with
President Trible at CNU. I have been employed by the university since 2003, serving
first as an administrator before becoming a full-time faculty member. With strong
personal interests in American history and politics, I have also long been intrigued by the
idea o f a former elected official with little prior higher education experience presiding
over a university. Thus, I was interested in how such an individual with a non-academic
professional background engaged successfully with academic culture. While conducting
background research for a pilot study leading up to this project, I was further interested in
how historically, some non-traditional presidents adjusted quite successfully to academic
culture while others did not. It led to me to wonder if the success or failure could be
attributed to each individual non-traditional president, or to situational factors beyond
their control.
In pursuing this study, I enjoyed certain benefits while having to overcome a few
challenges. I anticipated few challenges studying Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford
beyond the logistics o f coordinating archival research and traveling to the necessary
venues for data collection, which included the libraries at Columbia University and Duke
University. However, one key challenge I faced involved the rigors of conducting
historical research and content analysis. My study involved reviewing hundreds of pages
o f documents. Thus, I needed to ensure that I allowed enough time to do the thorough
data collection and analysis that were required for this study.
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As a longtime CNU employee with longstanding professional relationships with
President Trible’s staff, scheduling and conducting an interview with him was not
difficult. Several officials in his office, including Trible himself, were aware of my
interest in this general topic and were more than happy to help in this endeavor.
However, one challenge I experienced could be attributed to my long association with
President Trible. I have enjoyed a long and productive friendship with him for 15 years
now and view him as a mentor. This relationship, coupled with my observation o f his
achievements in office during my tenure at CNU, has prompted me to develop a largely
positive view concerning the efficacy and value of non-traditional presidents.
Therefore, I took care throughout this study to bracket my own sentiments as
much as possible and endeavored to maintain a strict objectivity when interviewing
President Trible and analyzing data. Further, I was careful to listen in the interview not
just for complimentary language about Trible’s presidency, but also for constructive
criticism given to him by others concerning his leadership style and possible challenges
he faced in adjusting to academic culture. Overall, the need for reflexivity was very
important over the course of this study. It allowed for critical self-reflection and
provided an important means of inspecting the entire research process (Denzin, 1997;
Schwandt, 2001). In order to facilitate this process of reflexivity, I maintained a field
journal throughout this study where I could maintain a log of my personal notes as well
as reflections (Schwandt, 2001). This journal played a valuable role in helping to
produce a thoughtful and well-designed study.
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Limitations and Delimitations
This study was delimited in the fact that it only examined three non-traditional
college presidents at three distinct higher education institutions. Thus, it has little
generalizability beyond that narrow area. This study also had several limitations. For
one, while the intention for this study was to examine non-traditional presidents with no
prior academic experience, the participants actually represented only one particular type those who come from a public sector background, which includes such areas as
government and military service. Non-traditional presidents from exclusively private
sector backgrounds were not examined. Thus, the results from this study may not be
applicable to other types o f non-traditional presidents, including those from private sector
backgrounds. Further research is needed to determine whether there are differences in
the adjustment process to academic culture for different types of non-traditional
presidents - namely between those from public sector backgrounds versus those from
private sector backgrounds.
Another limitation was that the study focused on only three higher education
institutions in distinct periods o f time - Columbia University in the late 1940s/early
1950s, Duke University in the 1970s/early 1980s, and Christopher Newport University in
the late 1990s and 2000s. While some o f the findings in this study may be applicable to
non-traditional presidents at other types of institutions, they will not apply in all cases
due to differences in time, culture, and institutional contexts. Again, further research is
needed to explore if there are differences in how non-traditional presidents adapt to
academic culture depending upon institutional type and time context.
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A further limitation o f the study involved the challenges inherent in conducting
historical research. According to Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), historical research is
among the most difficult types o f research to conduct. This challenge is because of the
severe limitations imposed by the nature of the sample o f documents and the
instrumentation process, which is typically content analysis (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006).
For instance, in historical research, researchers cannot ensure representatives o f a sample
or check the reliability and validity of the inferences made from the available data
(Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006). Further, for the purposes of this study, there was the threat
o f taking statements made by Eisenhower and Sanford about academic culture out of
context since they are now deceased and can no longer speak for themselves to provide
elaboration or clarification.

Ethical Considerations
Since two o f the cases in this study (Eisenhower and Sanford) are historical while
the other one (Trible) is modem, I encountered different ethical considerations within
each realm. For the historical case studies, following the accepted guidelines of proper
archival research was an important consideration. Further, abiding by the usage and
permissions guidelines o f certain archival documents I examined was also an issue.
However, since Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford are both deceased, this provided
greater flexibility in areas such as IRB approval than if they were both still living.
For the modem case study, ensuring the confidentiality o f informants beyond
President Trible was important since I was using an interview protocol. This
confidentiality was especially critical since the study required the informants to speak
candidly about Trible, who is either their direct or indirect superior. Thus, data collected
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from these interviews were kept in a secure location and I was the only researcher with
direct access to these data. Further, in order to ensure confidentiality, I was the only
researcher who knew the true identities o f the informants in this study. I did not
encounter the same situation with the historical case studies since all parties involved in
those cases were likely deceased.

Summary
The purpose o f this study was to explore the issues that non-traditional college
presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive what lessons could be learned
to inform future practice. Using a qualitative, case study approach, this study examined
the experiences o f three non-traditional presidents from distinct historical periods in
American higher education. Included were Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at Columbia
University (1948-1953), former North Carolina Gov. Terry Sanford at Duke University
(1969-1985), and former U.S. Sen. Paul Trible at Christopher Newport University (1996present). This chapter has outlined the methodological approaches that were utilized in
order to gather and interpret the necessary data. The next chapters will provide a
contextual overview o f the experiences o f each president at their respective universities
and explore the findings from the study’s data collection and analysis process.
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Chapter 4 - Dwight D. Eisenhower and Columbia University
As noted in previous chapters, non-traditional college presidents are gradually
becoming a more common fixture across all levels of American higher education.
However, despite their growing numbers, little is known about the issues that they face in
adjusting to academic culture. Moreover, existing evidence suggests that the adjustment
experiences o f non-traditional college presidents may vary depending upon such factors
as the president’s leadership approach, historical context, institutional context, and even
unforeseen events (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001; Bomstein, 2003; Cotnam, 2006). This
chapter explores the experiences of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as president of
Columbia University from 1948 to 1953. The findings from this study indicated that
Eisenhower personified a non-traditional college president who did not adjust well to
academic culture. Instead, his tenure as president was a rocky one, leaving behind a
legacy o f bitterness within Columbia’s campus community that remained years after his
tenure (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985).
Noted historian Stephen Ambrose (1990) once described Eisenhower as one of
the greatest leaders from the Western world in the 20th century. This was a man who led
armies o f millions during World War II and helped to mastermind the greatest
amphibious invasion ever attempted in world history (Smith, 2012). Moreover,
Eisenhower managed to hold together against incredible odds the largest multinational
alliance ever assembled, forging a path to victory over Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Neal, 1978; Smith, 2012). However, when it came to
leading a complex, urban university like Columbia, Eisenhower was unable to make it
work (Clark, 2013; Smith, 2012). To make matters worse, he never adapted well to
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academic culture and had an uncomfortable relationship at best with Columbia’s faculty
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). Using data derived from
Eisenhower’s personal and official correspondence, along with selected secondary
sources, this study found that his failure to adjust to academic culture stemmed from a
combination o f factors. These included intense frustration over mounting political,
military, and academic obligations; being overextended professionally; lacking the
necessary academic experience for the position; and advocating a presidential vision that
did not coincide with Columbia’s institutional needs. To put these factors into
perspective, this study situated Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia within a broader
framework that included his personal history, a historical context o f the post-World War
II higher education landscape, and Columbia’s institutional context during that period.
Those sections follow below.

Personal History
Dwight D. Eisenhower was bom on October 14,1890 in Denison, Texas.
Following a childhood spent in Kansas, a strong interest in military history as well as
financial necessity prompted him to attend West Point, from which he graduated in 1915.
Coming from a large family with limited financial means, West Point proved to be the
only viable option for Eisenhower to obtain a college education. Following graduation,
he married Mamie Doud Eisenhower, with whom he eventually had two children.
Eisenhower spent World War I serving stateside in various staff officer positions. His
lack o f combat experience on the warfront was a source of embarrassment for
Eisenhower, and was used by rivals to denigrate him in later years. Nevertheless, his
stellar reputation as a staff officer brought him into close contact with several prominent
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military leaders, including Generals John J. Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, and George C.
Marshall. Such influential connections combined with his natural talent for military
administration allowed Eisenhower to rise steadily through the ranks, and he was
promoted to brigadier general in October 1941 (Ambrose, 1990). During the World War
II era, the promotion progression for U.S. Army officers would have been as follows:
second lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier
general (one-star), major general (two-star), lieutenant general (three-star), general (fourstar), and General o f the Army (five-star).
Advancement for Eisenhower continued as the United States entered World War
II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Following rapid promotions to major
general and then lieutenant general, Eisenhower led the Allied invasion of North Africa
in November 1942 - code-named “Operation Torch.” After overseeing the invasion of
Sicily and earning promotion to general in 1943, Eisenhower was appointed Supreme
Allied Commander o f Allied forces, charged with planning the proposed Operation
Overlord. In that capacity, he worked closely with some o f the top Allied leadership,
including Winston Churchill, British Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, and
French Gen. Charles de Gaulle. In recognition of his success in the D-Day campaign,
Eisenhower was promoted to General o f the Army in December 1944 (Ambrose, 1990).
Following the German surrender, he served as military governor of the U.S.
occupation zone in Germany and then replaced Gen. George C. Marshall as U.S. Army
chief o f staff in November 1945 (Ambrose, 1990). Not one to give compliments lightly,
Marshall praised Eisenhower’s wartime leadership, telling him, “you have completed
your mission with the greatest victory in the history o f warfare... you have been selfless
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in your actions, always sound and tolerant in your judgments and altogether admirable in
the courage and wisdom o f your military decisions” (as cited in Jacobs, 2001, p. 4).
However, by early 1947, Eisenhower was pondering his next career move, as his term as
Army chief o f staff was coming to an end. While at age 57 he was too young and vibrant
to retire, the immensely popular Eisenhower was also ready for a bit of a rest. Despite
lucrative financial offers from the corporate world, he wanted to remain in some form of
public service. A military historian at heart, Eisenhower had often dreamt of leading a
small liberal arts college in a sort o f semi-retirement with his wife, Mamie (Ambrose,
1990; Clark, 2013; Neal, 1978). Thus, while uncertain of what the future would hold
Eisenhower was open to the prospect of a career in higher education (Jacobs, 2001).
Historical Context
By the late 1940s, the higher education landscape that Eisenhower contemplated
entering was full of challenges as well as opportunities. Following World War II,
American colleges and universities entered a “Golden Age” that was marked by
prosperity, prestige, and popularity (Clark, 2013, p. 16; Thelin, 2011, p. 260). Much of
this success was fueled by a strong federal government commitment to enhance college
access, along with the availability o f millions of returning World War II veterans who
were eager to obtain college educations (Rudolph 1990; Thelin, 2011). In order to adjust
adequately to a peacetime economy and to avert civil strife among disgruntled veterans
who arrived home without jobs or prospects, the U.S. Congress passed the G.I. Bill in
1944 to provide educational support for college-bound veterans (Clark, 2013; Thelin,
2011). The bill guaranteed one year o f education for 90 days of military service, plus one
month for each additional month o f active duty up to 48 months (Thelin, 2011). Along
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with paying tuition, it also provided funds for fees, books, and other supplies (Thelin,
2011).
Despite initial projections that the section o f the G.I. Bill regarding educational
benefits would not attract much interest, it was wildly popular, with college enrollments
passing one million in 1946 (Thelin, 2011). Eventually, of the 11 million veterans who
returned home following World War II, roughly one third utilized G.I. Bill benefits to
attend colleges and universities (Rudolph, 1990). Aware o f this financial boon, many
higher education institutions put into place marketing initiatives to attract veterans to
their campuses (Thelin, 2011). The net result o f such efforts was a doubling in
enrollments at American colleges and universities between 1943 and 1946 (Thelin,

2011).
Along with the G.I. Bill, other federal government initiatives during this period
benefitted higher education institutions immensely. One such example was the Truman
Commission, a 28-member body appointed by President Harry S. Truman in 1946. The
commission’s task was to explore the functions of higher education in supporting
democracy and to identify the means by which the subsequent plans could best be
performed (Thelin, 2011). The resulting 1947 Truman Commission Report, entitled
Higher Education fo r American Democracy, concluded that the United States devoted far
too little of its gross national product to investment in postsecondary education (Thelin,
2011). Another report, developed in 1945 by the preeminent scientist Vannevar Bush
and entitled Science, the Endless Frontier, argued for the utilization of American higher
education institutions in federal government research (Clark, 2013; Thelin, 2011). The
impact o f this document for colleges and universities was monumental, as it positioned
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the federal government as a research patron and contractor, working with scores of higher
education institutions to advance scientific research (Clark, 2013; Thelin, 2011). Thus,
the late 1940s was an exciting and lucrative period for American higher education, as it
enjoyed spectacular success between unprecedented student enrollments and strong
financial support from government and corporate sources (Clark, 2013).
However, this era was not without its challenges for colleges and universities
across the nation. For one, higher education leaders debated the role that their institutions
should play in the rapidly evolving societal landscape (Rudolph, 1990). Some questioned
the long-range impact on American higher education of pursuing the enlargement of
educational opportunity through the G.I. Bill (Rudolph, 1990). Further, they speculated
openly whether it was in the best interest of colleges and universities, traditionally the
domain o f the elite, to open their gates to the masses (Rudolph, 1990). Thus, this
question o f whether American higher education was sacrificing quality for quantity
concerned many educators throughout the nation (Rudolph, 1990).
Higher education leaders also came to realize that the rapid increase in student
enrollment on their campuses, driven by the G.I. Bill, came at a steep price. First, most
colleges and universities had not prepared to handle such a high volume o f students.
According to Thelin (2011), “the swelling of postwar enrollments signaled the need for
massive construction o f laboratories, classroom buildings, and dormitories” (p. 265).
Consequently, institutions scrambled to keep up with the extraordinary demand for new
facilities. Also, higher education leaders found it difficult to accommodate the needs of
G.I. Bill students (Thelin, 2011). These veterans were older than the traditional college
student, were in some cases disabled, and were usually married with children (Thelin,
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2011). This group o f adult learners required college faculty and administrators to
reassess everything from how they designed curricular offerings to what campus
activities they should offer. The G.I. Bill students also prompted traditional-aged college
students to rethink their activities (Thelin, 2011). According to Thelin (2011), “how, for
example could the hazing o f a fraternity initiation intimidate a twenty-six-year-old army
veteran who had been in mortal combat” (p. 266)? Consequently, the presence of
millions o f veterans on college campuses presented something of a double-edged sword
for American higher education during this time. On the one hand, these veterans
provided a large amount o f revenue and prosperity for higher education institutions. On
the other hand, they also created a number of logistical, infrastructural, and curricular
problems.
Another major challenge stemmed from the growing threat o f communism across
the globe. Known as either the “Red Scare” or the “McCarthy” era, the period from 1947
to 1954 was characterized by intense ideological conflict and driven by the fear that a
serious communist-based threat existed within the United States (Clark, 2013, p. 17;
Foster, 1997, p. 1). Consequently, American society was propelled into “a period of
fervent anti-communism, which produced one o f the most severe episodes o f political
repercussion the United States has ever experienced” (Foster, 1997, p. 1). This
repercussion was best characterized by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Un-American
Activities Committee, a congressional task force that endeavored to seek out suspected
communists from all walks o f American society (Thelin, 2011).
This Red Scare era proved to be highly problematic for American higher
education. During World War II, the nation’s colleges and universities were seen as
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centers o f democracy, teaching citizens about civic engagement and providing research
expertise that contributed to national defense (Thelin, 2011). However, after the war,
concerns began to rise that these same institutions were havens for dissidence and
disloyalty (Thelin, 2011). Such thinking was driven largely by vague accusations that
leading scholars nationwide had ties to the Communist Party (Thelin, 2011).
Consequently, faculty members at many institutions were subjected to political
compliance tests in order to be considered for federal research funding or to even keep
their jobs (Thelin, 2011). This demand for loyalty oaths prompted intense debate about
the importance of academic freedom, and even prompted some faculty members at
schools such as Berkeley to resign their positions in protest (Thelin, 2011). Hundreds of
others with suspected communist ties were quietly dismissed by presidents and boards o f
trustees without due process (Thelin, 2011). It was a very troubling period in American
higher education that tested the leadership prowess of many college presidents.
Unfortunately, many campus presidents proved to be “more interested in defusing
external scrutiny than in defending their professors’ traditional rights o f academic
freedom” (Thelin, 2011, p. 275). Therefore, despite the significant benefits for higher
education brought about by the increased federal government support, they came at a
steep price for many faculty members and administrators.

Institutional Context
The situation at Momingside Heights, the epicenter of the Columbia University
campus, closely paralleled what was happening at colleges and universities elsewhere in
the country. Following World War II, Columbia was inundated with military veterans,
who comprised nearly 80% o f the institution’s new students (Jacobs, 1985). By fall
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1946, there were nearly 14,000 veterans enrolled on campus; a number that nearly
matched Columbia’s entire 16,161 member student body in late 1941 (Jacobs, 2001;
Kahn, 1941). By 1947, roughly half o f Columbia’s students were enrolled under the G.I.
Bill (McCaughey, 2003). Further, possessing a world-class faculty, Columbia was
uniquely positioned to take advantage of the federal government’s emerging research
partnerships with higher education institutions. However, several years of weak
presidential leadership, along with an outdated administrative structure and mounting
financial problems left the university woefully unprepared to meet the demands o f this
emerging era. By the late 1940s, Columbia was in dire straits and in search o f a bold and
compelling leader who could advance the university back to prosperity (Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001).
Interestingly, the decades prior to World War II were highly productive for
Columbia. For many years, the institution was ably led by Nicholas Murray Butler, who
had served as president since 1902 (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985). A respected educator
and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Butler had overseen a massive building program during
his tenure, adding over a dozen buildings and several academic programs to the campus
by the early 1940s (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). His success prompted many observers to
refer to Columbia as the “Acropolis of America” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 14). Moreover,
historian Allan Nevins considered Columbia during this period to be “the largest and
richest seat o f learning in the largest and richest city in the globe” (Jacobs, 1985, p. 556).
Butler himself also helped give the institution an international reputation (Jacobs, 2001).
As president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he was highly respected
in the diplomatic community and visits to his home by foreign government officials and
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other dignitaries were common (Jacobs, 2001). While Butler did have some detractors,
who referred to him as “Czar Nicholas” for his autocratic nature, his supporters were far
more numerous (Jacobs, 2001, p. 15). According to scholar Lindsay Rogers, Butler was
“a great university president - the greatest o f the twentieth century” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 15).
However, as the 20th century progressed the acropolis that Butler had labored so
hard to build began to crumble. First, the Great Depression depleted the fortunes of
Columbia’s largest donors and left a noticeable impact on the institution’s fundraising
(Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, as Butler’s tenure lingered on, many of his closest friends
passed away, which drastically shrank the university’s donor pool (Jacobs, 2001). The
largest problem, however, was Butler himself. Believing that only he could lead
Columbia effectively, he remained at the helm well past the customary retirement age
(Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Consequently, Butler’s final years at the University were
described as “tragic,” with increasing blindness and deafness impacting even his ability
to give speeches (Jacobs, 1985, p. 556). By 1945, this decaying leadership left Columbia
years behind in construction projects, building maintenance, fundraising, and
administrative reorganization (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, there was an
increasing realization that Columbia was nowhere near prepared to respond to the
educational needs o f post-World War II America. Ultimately, Butler had nearly
destroyed the great university he himself had created (Jacobs, 2001). Later in 1945, the
board of trustees finally asked the 83-year-old Butler to step down as president (Jacobs,
2001).

Unfortunately, getting Butler to retire did little to alleviate Columbia’s pressing
problems. By 1945, “the lack of strong leadership and fundraising for over a decade
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meant that Butler’s successor would face a challenge far greater than Butler’s formidable
shadow” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 17). Specifically, Columbia faced the postwar era with an
acting president, an administration in dire need of reorganization, a new presidential
search, and pressing financial problems (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Further, even in
retirement Butler continued to lurk in the shadows, attending board meetings and
endeavoring to exert his influence (Jacobs, 2001). Consequently, many prominent
educators refused to accept the Columbia presidency, prolonging the search and fueling
faculty discontent on the Momingside Heights campus (Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001).
Even after a two-year presidential search, there was still no clear successor to Butler.
Thus, by 1947 Columbia University was in deep trouble on a variety o f fronts. What
follows (See Table 1) is a timeline that highlights key dates pertaining to Eisenhower’s
experience at Columbia. The dates are sorted by historical higher education context,
Columbia’s institutional context, and by Eisenhower’s personal history. These three
categories are placed side-by-side to allow the reader to obtain a thorough contextual
overview o f the key events and issues that occurred during the Eisenhower era at
Columbia.
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Table 1 - Eisenhower/Columbia Timeline
Historical Context

Institutional Context

Personal History

1754: Columbia founded
(as King’s College).
1784: Institution renamed
Columbia College.
1890: Eisenhower bom.
1917-1918: U.S.
involvement in WWI.

1929: Great Depression
Begins.
1940-1945: WWII.
1944: G.I. Bill passed.
Late 1940s: Higher
Education Golden Age
begins.
1946: Veteran college
enrollment tops one million.
1947: Truman Commission
Report Published. Cold War
begins.
1947-1954: Red
Scare/McCarthy Era.

1896: Institution renamed
Columbia University.
1902: Nicholas Murray
Butler named president.
1930s: Massive campus
construction program.
Mid 1940s: Financial
problems arise. Results in
backlogged maintenance
and construction.

1915: Graduated from West
Point.
1917-1918: Served in WWI
(no combat service).

1942-1945: Served in
WWII (no combat service).
1946-1948: Served as U.S.
Army chief o f staff.

1945: Nicholas Murray
Butler steps down as
Columbia’s president.

1948: Appointed president
of Columbia.

1946:14,000 veterans
enrolled on campus.

1951-1952: NATO
commander in Europe.

1947: Almost half of
student body enrolled under
G.I. Bill.

1953: Elected U.S.
president. Resigns from
Columbia presidency.

1954: 200th anniversary of
Columbia.

1956: Re-elected U.S.
president.
1961: Leaves office.
1969: Eisenhower dies.
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Selecting a New President
It was against this contextual backdrop that Dwight D. Eisenhower was first
considered for Columbia’s presidency. The Eisenhower name had popped up regularly in
board deliberations concerning a possible successor for Butler. A popular Columbia
myth is that at one presidential search meeting, a trustee asked, “what about
Eisenhower?” as a possible option, allegedly referring to General Eisenhower’s brother,
Milton, who was an experienced university president (Jacobs, 2001, p. 33; Neal, 1978,
pp. 237-238). However, as the legend goes, the other trustees assumed he meant General
Eisenhower and subsequently initiated contact with the World War II hero (Jacobs, 2001;
McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978). In reality, many o f the trustees were legitimately
interested in General Eisenhower, even though he possessed minimal qualifications at
best for the position (Childs, 1958; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978). Thirty years later, a
veteran Columbia faculty member observed that the university would have been better off
with Milton (Neal, 1978). However, he pointed out that ultimately, “the trustees wanted
General Eisenhower” (Neal, 1978, p. 238).
Despite some initial reservations, the trustees wanted the general to be
Columbia’s president for a variety o f reasons. For one, Eisenhower was widely
considered to be a future U.S. president, and many trustees yearned for Columbia to have
a close association with such an important historical figure (Childs, 1958; McCaughey,
2003). Moreover, the university desperately needed money, and a celebrity president
looked like a viable option to help alleviate the pressing financial problems (Clark, 2013;
Parmet, 1972). Eisenhower’s close friendship with a wide array of wealthy businessmen
and financiers proved very attractive to the board, and they believed that Eisenhower
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could encourage many of those executives to support Columbia (Parmet, 1972). Lastly,
in the midst of the Red Scare and the challenges it created for American higher education,
Columbia needed the international stature and prestige that Eisenhower would bring to
help protect it in that challenging political environment (Clark, 2013; Galambos, 1984a;
Smith, 2012). Overall, it was “as a massive public figure that Eisenhower attracted the
Columbia Trustees.... the Columbia tradition demanded such a public figure” (Neal,
1978, p. 239).
However, while Columbia was very interested in Dwight D. Eisenhower, he was
not nearly as interested in Columbia (McCaughey, 2003). As early as spring 1946,
Eisenhower had politely declined offers to assume the office of president (Ambrose,
1990; McCaughey, 2003). While the general was certainly interested in a college
presidency, he had dreamt instead o f presiding over a much smaller school in a country
setting (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Galambos, 1984a; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978;
Smith, 2012). Conversely, the thought o f leading a complex, urban university like
Columbia intimidated him (Neal, 1978; Parmet, 1972). While military leaders had
certainly served as college presents in the past, none had ever led an institution as
prestigious as Columbia (Neal, 1978). Nevertheless, certain Columbia trustees were so
eager to recruit Eisenhower that they persisted in their lobbying efforts despite his initial
reservations (McCaughey, 2003).
Further, the trustees made unrealistic promises to the general about the nature of
his potential duties at Momingside Heights (McCaughey, 2003). In attempting to fit
Columbia into Eisenhower’s vision for a desired semi-retirement, they insisted that his
responsibilities would include no involvement in purely academic affairs and no
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responsibility for fundraising (Ambrose, 1990; McCaughey, 2003). Instead, those
functions were to be handled by the provost and various deans (Jacobs, 2001). The
trustees also insisted that Eisenhower would not have to engage in excessive entertaining
nor involve himself with burdensome administrative details (Ambrose, 1990;
McCaughey, 2003). Alternately, Eisenhower could be the master of his own time and
use Columbia as a national platform to advance his interests in civic engagement and
democratic citizenship (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985).
Knowing the full extent of Columbia’s financial and administrative problems, it is
striking that these trustees made such absurd promises to Eisenhower. However, they
were desperate to recruit him and were prepared to say nearly anything to help seal the
deal (McCaughey, 2003). Eisenhower eventually gave in and accepted the offer
reluctantly in June 1947 (Ambrose, 1990; McCaughey, 2003). In assuming this new role,
he believed that it would possibly afford him certain advantages and opportunities. For
one, he could focus on his efforts to promote “basic concepts of education in a democracy
with particular emphasis upon the American system of democracy” (Jacobs, 1985, p.
556). Columbia’s presidency also provided him a national platform to speak on
significant issues, while avoiding either business ties or major political controversy
(Parmet, 1972; Smith, 2012). Further, the position potentially provided Eisenhower a
respite from mounting public pressure to run for president o f the United States (Clark,
2013; Parmet, 1972). At the time, Eisenhower and the trustees came to believe that it
would be a mutually beneficial arrangement (McCaughey, 2003; Smith, 2012).
However, in a troubling sign o f things to come, then-West Point superintendent
and Eisenhower confidante, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, felt that the general was perplexingly
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nai ve about the demands on the president o f a large university (Jacobs, 1985). Believing
that Eisenhower had allowed himself to be persuaded by false promises, Taylor remarked
that his friend was “largely unaware of the nature o f the primary duties o f a university
president with the emphasis on money raising and administration” (Jacobs, 1985, p. 556).
As subsequent events proved, this observation was quite accurate and illustrated some of
the key challenges that Eisenhower would face during his presidential tenure at
Columbia. Moreover, Taylor’s sentiments foreshadowed Eisenhower’s difficult
adjustment process to academic culture; one that he never really mastered.

Summary of Emerging Themes
As Taylor’s observations forewarned, Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia was a
troubled one. Although Eisenhower was well-intentioned, he did relatively little to
alleviate the institution’s pressing problems, was frequently away from campus, and
stirred up considerable resentment within the university community as a result (Clark,
2013; Jacobs, 2001; Parmet, 1972). Eisenhower also represents a clear example of a nontraditional college president who did not adjust well to academic culture (Ambrose, 1990;
Childs, 1958; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). While he certainly held no ill will
toward Columbia’s faculty, Eisenhower simply did not have the time, interest, or patience
to learn the ways o f the academy. And, indeed, he was told this area o f oversight would
not be included in his job.
Thus, this inability to adapt to academic culture, coupled with a lack o f progress
in addressing Columbia’s institutional needs, has prompted some modem historians to
consider Eisenhower’s tenure at Momingside Heights a failed one (Clark, 2013; Jacobs,
2001; McCaughey, 2003; Parmet, 1972). Conversely, other historians argue that
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Eisenhower did achieve some degree o f success. He gave Columbia enhanced
international prestige, carefully defended the academic freedom of its faculty, and at least
attempted to fix the institution’s broken finances (Galambos, 1984a; Smith, 2012).
However, regardless o f his level of success as an educational leader, the purpose of this
study was to determine the reasons why he failed - as concluded in this study - to adjust
to academic culture.
To investigate this question, over 2,200 pieces of Eisenhower’s personal
correspondence spanning his years as Columbia’s president (1948-1953) were examined.
Interestingly, only about 220 of these documents were found to be relevant to
Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia, and therefore only those were coded (See Appendix
E). The rest pertained to military, political, and international diplomacy issues that were
not germane to this study and therefore not coded. For the purposes of data triangulation,
the coded data were then compared to analysis by historians as well as the relevant
reflections o f Eisenhower’s Columbia colleagues to ensure that the findings were
consistent.
The objective behind this research was to identify Eisenhower’s perceptions about
academic culture as reflected in his personal and official correspondence with others as
well as in his diary entries. Another key objective was to identify the issues behind
Eisenhower’s failure to adjust to academic life. Open coding identified 12 applicable
codes that showed up multiple times in his writings. Axial coding later narrowed these
codes down into four central themes that helped explain his inability to adapt to academic
culture. These themes included Eisenhower’s frustration over the intricacies o f academic
culture as well as the demands o f mounting political and military obligations. They also
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included the challenges that Eisenhower faced by being too overextended professionally.
While he was president o f Columbia, he also had other important military and political
commitments, which limited the time he could devote to Momingside Heights. The other
two central themes were his lack of academic experience and the disconnect that existed
between Eisenhower’s presidential vision and Columbia’s institutional needs. As the
data ultimately demonstrated, all of these issues conspired to compromise his ability to
adjust to academic culture.

Frustration. Frustration was a theme that showed up repeatedly in Eisenhower’s
writing, being expressed roughly 53 times in various letters and diary entries (Galambos,
1984a; Galambos, 1984b; Galambos, 1989a; Galambos, 1989b). This frustration was
expressed in two distinct forms. First, as a career soldier Eisenhower was clearly
annoyed by the unique dynamics o f academic culture, which he referred to as a
“bewildering world” (Galambos, 1984a, p. 107). He mentioned it in no less than 10
times in letters to friends and relatives, with an overall frequency o f roughly one
reference in every five letters. A particular area o f contention for Eisenhower was what
he considered the glacial pace o f academic decision-making (Ambrose, 1990; Galambos,
1984a). This perspective made sense considering that as a general he was used to having
his orders quickly executed. Conversely, in the academic world he was appalled at the
amount o f time and deliberation it took to get anything done. In one April 5,1950 diary
entry, he expressed these sentiments when reflecting on a search process for a new dean:
There is probably no more complicated business in the world than that of
picking a new dean within a university. Faculties, including the retiring
dean, feel an almost religious fervor in insisting upon acceptance o f their
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views. These are as varied as there are individuals involved, and every
man’s opinion is voiced in terms of urgency. The result is complete
confusion and I cannot see why universities have followed such a custom!
But I’ll be d— glad when we have a new dean of engineering and the fuss,
fury, and hysteria die down (Galambos, 1984b, p. 1067).
Academic governance holds faculty views as central and germane to operations. With a
great deal o f power vested in the professional roles of faculty, the decision-making
process outlined by Eisenhower is typical.
Eisenhower expressed similar frustration over the amount o f paperwork he
noticed in the higher education environment. Following a long career in the U.S. Army,
he thought that no other organization could produce so many documents (Ambrose,
1990). However, following a few months at Columbia, he wrote, “one of the major
surprises... is the paperwork... I thought I was leaving those mountainous white piles
forever” (Ambrose, 1990, p. 241). When Eisenhower tried to insist that every project
should be presented on one typewritten page, the very idea “reduced the professors to
helpless rage or laughter” (Ambrose, 1990, p. 241). The bureaucratic nature o f
academics is long documented and a common cultural artifact for those working in higher
education (Mintzberg, 1980; Bimbaum, 1988).
Eisenhower’s frustration with the dynamics o f academic culture has also been
well documented by both historians and his former Columbia associates (Ambrose, 1990;
Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003; Parmet, 1972; Smith, 2012). Smith (2012)
argued that while universities are governed by consensus, Eisenhower was accustomed to
a chain of command. Thus, Eisenhower viewed the various deans and department chairs
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as his corps and division commanders, faculty members as officers and students as
enlisted personnel (Smith, 2012). Much o f Eisenhower’s frustration therefore stemmed
from the decentralized nature o f the academy (Mintzberg, 1980), and the reality that
academic decision-making did not follow a strict hierarchy (Smith, 2012). Moreover, he
came to find academic affairs increasingly trivial over the course of his presidential
tenure, which further fueled his discomfort and frustration (Ambrose, 1990; Smith,
2012). For Eisenhower, faculty meetings were his “special hell” (Ambrose, 1990, p.
241). According to John Krout, dean of the graduate faculty in 1949, Eisenhower
constantly complained that instead of actually accomplishing anything, all faculty
members did was talk (Ambrose, 1990). Consequently, total boredom combined with
discussion over what Eisenhower considered trivial topics soon drove him away
(Ambrose, 1990).
On this issue o f frustration, the data from Eisenhower’s correspondence were
supported by other Columbia officials as well. According to several faculty sources,
much o f his frustration stemmed from regret over accepting the Columbia presidency in
the first place (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; McCaughey, 2003; Parmet, 1972; Smith,
2012). According to McCaughey (2003), Eisenhower believed that he had been tricked
into taking the job. In later years, Dean Harry Carman recounted a conversation with
Eisenhower that touched on this difficult subject (Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). With a
tinge o f regret, Carman remembered Eisenhower reflecting, “in a moment of weakness I
listened to the blandishments of a couple of your trustees and here I find myself with a
gigantic organization on my hands, and I don’t know a goddamn thing about it” (as cited
in Jacobs, 2001, p. 87). In a similar vein, a close Eisenhower associate once remarked, “I
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don’t think that he had any idea what a complicated thing Columbia University was or is.
No idea of it whatever.” (as cited in Jacobs, 2001, p. 87). By both personal accounts and
those with whom Eisenhower was in contact, academics represented a foreign territory
for this non-traditional college president, and ultimately Eisenhower never embraced the
academic culture.
Eisenhower’s deep frustration also stemmed from the mounting expectations for
him to engage in national military and government service, even while serving as
Columbia’s president. He discussed this aspect o f his frustration in 43 different letters
and diary entries (Galambos, 1984a, Galambos, 1984b, Galambos, 1989a, Galambos,
1989b). Originally, Eisenhower envisioned his post-World War II life to be a semiretirement o f sorts, in which he could be the master of his own schedule (Ambrose,
1990). However, pressing national security issues prompted a military leader o f his
stature to be utilized extensively as a trouble shooter and informal advisor at the Pentagon
throughout the late 1940s (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Smith, 2012).
Eisenhower’s services were needed in particular to work out Department of
Defense budget problems and to smooth over disputes between the armed services
(Ambrose, 1990; Smith, 2012). He therefore spent at least a couple o f days a week in
Washington D.C. during the early stages o f his Columbia tenure (Jacobs, 2001). The
problem grew only worse when President Harry S. Truman asked Eisenhower to head the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in October 1950 (Childs, 1958). To be sure,
Truman was within his rights as commander and chief to make this and other requests,
since a five-star general, under the law creating the rank, never fully retires from active
service (Childs, 1958). However, Eisenhower was still indignant over this assignment,
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which required him to take an unpopular leave o f absence from Columbia (Ambrose,
1990; Jacobs, 2001). Throughout this period, he also had to fend off increasing calls to
run for president of the United States, which further fueled his stress and annoyance
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). Clearly, this did not put
Eisenhower in the ideal frame of mind to learn the ways of academic life, as it was
doubtful he would have a long tenure in a university setting.
Eisenhower’s frustration over these military, government, and political
obligations was highly evident in his correspondence. In explaining his feelings to a
close friend, Eisenhower wrote in a February 24, 1950 letter:
I have read some o f the same comments that you have concerning my
alleged dissatisfaction with my present position! They are merely
examples o f distortion and inaccuracy. It is true that in attempting,
at times, to explain to my friends the difficulties o f my present life,
I have dwelt upon the conflicts that arise between the details of
university administration, unusually persistent adhesions from a
past life, and, finally, the demands that arise out of my earnest effort
to be o f some help to people who are struggling manfully to support the
essentials o f the American way of life (Galambos, 1984b, p. 989).
This letter was written relatively early in Eisenhower’s Columbia presidency when he
was still trying to acclimate as Columbia’s president. Eisenhower’s arc of frustration
peaked shortly thereafter, when he began to realize that he would not be an effective
higher education leader. In other letters and diary entries, Eisenhower expressed similar
sentiments about having too much to do, discussing at length about how “the pressures on
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me are o f several kinds” (Galambos, 1989a, p. 367). Along with his military duties, he
was very frustrated with mounting political expectations, which continued to grow as his
tenure at Columbia progressed. To Eisenhower’s chagrin, pressure for him to run for
president of the United States mounted no matter how much he denied interest in the
position (Galambos, 1984b; 1989a). He referred to the endless calls for him to enter the
presidential ring as “burdensome” and “monotonous” (Galambos, 1989a, p. 667).
Ultimately, no matter what he did or said, Eisenhower could not escape the consensus
from leaders in both political parties that the United States “demanded” him in politics
(Galambos, 1989a, p. 698).
The data from Eisenhower’s writings reflecting these frustrations are supported by
multiple historians and contemporaries (Ambrose, 1990; Childs, 1958; Clark, 2013; Neal,
1978; Parmet, 1972). According to Ambrose (1990), any hopes for Eisenhower of a
future free from politics were shattered on election night in 1948, when Democrat Harry
S. Truman was re-elected president unexpectedly. Following their bitter defeat,
Republicans began lobbying Eisenhower for a 1952 presidential run relentlessly
(Ambrose, 1990). Anti-Truman Democrats were also eager for Eisenhower to run as
their nominee in the 1948 and 1952 elections (Childs, 1958; Parmet, 1972). According to
Childs (1958) Eisenhower was not even fully settled in his Columbia office before a
seemingly endless stream o f governors and congressmen descended upon Momingside
Heights to demand a presidential run. This pressure only increased during Eisenhower’s
tenure as Columbia’s president (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Smith,
2012). A few years later, Eisenhower was furious when U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
entered his name on the Republican ballot for the New Hampshire primary in January
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1952 (Ambrose, 1990). However, Eisenhower later gave in to this pressure and entered
the presidential campaign reluctantly a few weeks later (Ambrose, 1990; Smith, 2012).
Overall, the frustration resulting from these constant demands, as well as possible regrets
about coming to Columbia in the first place, did not put Eisenhower in the best mental
frame to undertake the rigors of learning academic culture. Moreover, Eisenhower had
experienced a culture-shock of sorts engaging with academic culture and was forced to
try and do a job that was much different than the one he was promised. Consequently,
these factors also contributed to his frustration and severely limited his ability to
acclimate to academe.
Overextended. Along with the frustration resulting from these non-academic
professional demands, a related theme in Eisenhower’s writing was how overextended he
was trying to take on all o f these tasks. In a June 26,1951 letter to a friend, he
commented, “here I am working as hard as I ever have in my life” (Galambos, 1989a, p.
387). Despite his interest in seeking semi-retirement, Eisenhower’s workload had
increased. To complicate matters, beyond his academic, military, and political duties,
Eisenhower was also in high demand as a keynote speaker or patron for various
organizations (Galambos, 1984a; 1984b; 1989a; 1989b). He was forced to decline the
vast majority o f these invitations and consequently worried whether this “problem of
saying no and sticking to it” would cause resentment toward Columbia (Galambos,
1984a, p. 328). Eisenhower discussed this problem of overextension in 30 different
letters and diary entries during his tenure as Columbia’s president (Galambos, 1984a;
Galambos, 1984b; Galambos, 1989a; Galambos, 1989b). An underlying theme in these
writings was Eisenhower’s regret that he could not devote enough time to his duties at
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Columbia, even though he had reservations about serving as its president. In a September
23,1948 letter, he wrote:
I have never had more difficulty than I have now in attempting to fulfill
even a tiny percentage o f the requests that are made upon me for various
kinds o f activities ranging from participation in “peace societies” to
taking part in conventions for conservation of natural resources. The
work here at the University would in itself occupy a man if he could give
to it his entire attention. I am so driven that I sometimes feel guilty in the
lack o f time that I can devote to the affairs o f this great institution
(as cited in Galambos, 1984a, p. 221).
This problem only grew worse when Eisenhower took the extended leave of
absence from Columbia to serve as head of NATO, lasting from January 1951 to May
1952 (Ambrose, 1990). He offered to resign upon hearing o f this important assignment,
but the trustees insisted that he remain in office on indefinite leave, asserting that an
acting president could run the university while Eisenhower was in Europe (Galambos,
1989a; Jacobs, 2001). The enthusiasm o f the board to retain Eisenhower as president
likely stemmed from their fear of undergoing another grueling presidential search
(Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, several of the trustees clearly relished having a close
association with the World War II hero (Jacobs, 1985). However, despite the trustees’
best intentions, this arrangement was highly unpopular with the Columbia faculty, who
already considered Eisenhower aloof and uncommitted as president (Galambos, 1984b, p.
1097). Faculty members also began to think that Eisenhower was only using Columbia
as a perch to advance his political career (Smith, 2012). Further, his prolonged absence
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due to this military commitment also meant that Columbia suffered from weak leadership
and diminished fundraising during the absence (Jacobs, 1985).
No one was more aware o f this problem than Eisenhower, himself. By his 27,h
month as president, he realized that he had actually been on campus for less than 10
months’ time (Smith, 2012). During this period, Eisenhower began to label himself an
“absentee president,” indicating a deep sense of guilt that he was not fulfilling his
presidential responsibilities (as cited in Smith, 2012, p. 496). In 10 letters throughout the
summer and fall of 1951, he discussed how this arrangement was unsustainable and
openly considered resignation (Galambos, 1989a). In a May 16,1951 letter, Eisenhower
discussed how his “retention as the nominal president is working against Columbia” (as
cited in Galambos, 1989a, p. 292). Further, in a September 15,1951 letter, he discussed
his fear that “the trustees out o f their friendship for me would permit a situation to
develop that would be inimical to the best interests of the university” (as cited in
Galambos, 1989a, p. 543). Attempting to find a suitable solution, Eisenhower proposed
his reassignment as Columbia’s honorary chancellor, arguing that there must be a real
president based at Momingside Heights (Galambos, 1989a). However, the board was
determined to retain Eisenhower as president, and did not end up accepting his
resignation until shortly before the U.S. presidential inauguration in January 1953
(Jacobs, 2001). In the months prior to that event, Eisenhower was even more distracted
from his Columbia duties by the rigors of his presidential campaign (Jacobs, 2001).
Ultimately, he was spread too thin professionally to provide solid and consistent
leadership at Columbia, despite his best intentions. Further, since Columbia was not
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Eisenhower’s top professional priority during this period, this eliminated any meaningful
chance for him to adjust effectively to academic culture.
These data illustrating Eisenhower’s over extendedness are supported by several
historians as well as by information from his Columbia colleagues. A central theme in
many o f Eisenhower’s biographical treatments is that he was spread in far too many
professional directions during this period (Ambrose, 1990; Childs, 1958; Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978; Parmet, 1972; Smith, 2012). However, instead of Eisenhower
creating this situation, historians maintain that many of these external pressures were
thrust upon him against his will or better judgment (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001; Neal,
1978; Smith, 2012). Consequently, Eisenhower pursued those military and political
commitments out o f a sense o f duty, regretting the impact it had on Columbia (Ambrose,
1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978; Smith, 2012). To his credit, Eisenhower
attempted to remedy the situation by resigning as Columbia’s president. However, he
was thwarted repeatedly by Columbia’s board members, who were eager to keep him at
the helm and avoid another long and costly presidential search (Jacobs, 2001).
Eisenhower’s Columbia colleagues expressed similar sentiments concerning this
problem o f overextension. Regarding Eisenhower’s NATO assignment, Economics Prof.
Eli Ginzberg reflected that President Truman “was really putting a burden on him that he
didn’t want” (as cited in Jacobs, 2001, p. 252). Further, Ginzberg asserted that President
Truman leaned heavily on Eisenhower for support in national security matters, and that
Eisenhower “was not happy about it... that is fact” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 252). Former
Columbia president Grayson Kirk also reflected on the impact that these external
pressures had on Eisenhower, explaining his prediction that following his departure for
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the NATO assignment, Eisenhower would not return to Columbia (Jacobs, 2001). Kirk
explained that:
I had felt that he had not been particularly comfortable in his position, and
also he had been under a great deal of pressure from outside interests to
get into national politics. A combination of some discomfort at
Momingside on his part and the various external pressures made it
unlikely in my judgment that he would return and settle down (Jacobs,
2001, pp. 252-253).
Kirk’s prediction eventually turned out to be an accurate one. While Eisenhower
continued as Columbia’s nominal president following his retirement from the Army, he
never really reconnected with the institution following his NATO service, even though he
continued to profess a fondness for Columbia in several letters (Ambrose, 1990;
Galambos, 1989a). Several historians assert that his interest in being an academic leader
had subsided following his return from Europe (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs,
1985; Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). Smith (2012) concluded that by this point, Columbia
had become a “secondary interest” to Eisenhower (p. 488). He occupied himself
primarily with his U.S. presidential campaign until his final departure from Columbia in
January 1953, when he was designated as president emeritus (Ambrose, 1990; Galambos,
1989b). According to Jacobs (1985) and Smith (2012), Eisenhower could have
potentially been a great leader for Columbia had he possessed the time to do it. However,
constant external pressures conspired to keep him away from Momingside Heights for
much o f his presidency, eliminating any meaningful chance o f engaging with the
academy and learning its culture.
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Lack of academic experience. Another central theme that appeared consistently
in Eisenhower’s writings was his general lack of academic experience. Although he was
a West Point graduate and military historian with an extensive organizational leadership
background, Eisenhower had little to no connection with the scholarly world. In a letter
to a friend, he once wrote, “I know nothing about the workings of a great university and
am certainly far from being an ‘educator’...” (as cited in Neal, 1978, p. 240). This
inexperience was highly apparent during his Columbia tenure, which limited his ability
and willingness to learn the ways o f academic culture. Eisenhower mentioned this lack
o f knowledge in 14 different letters over the course of his Columbia presidency
(Galambos, 1984a). In one such June 2,1949 letter, he wrote to another friend that he
was “under no illusion as to any qualifications involving scholarship” (as cited in
Galambos, 1984a, p. 601). Accustomed to abject followership in the military,
Eisenhower often felt inferior to Columbia’s faculty members and worried that they
questioned his authority as their president.
In other letters, Eisenhower sounded almost apologetic, referring at times to his
“woeful ignorance” o f certain academic fields (as cited in Galambos, 1984a, p. 688).
Moreover, in his first appearance at Columbia’s Low Memorial Library, Eisenhower
commented to a gathering of university deans and administrators that, “nobody is more
keenly aware o f my academic shortcomings than I am” (as cited in Neal, 1978, p. 239).
Such sentiments did not instill much confidence in those campus academic leaders, who
gave Eisenhower a chilly reception (Neal, 1978). Even after nearly two years in office,
he commented to a friend in a February 10, 1950 letter that, “I have never yet understood
some of the methods that we use for the performance of some o f our most important
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work” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 963). Specifically, Eisenhower was at a loss to
understand many organizational processes unique to academia, ranging from faculty
hiring to the tenure review system.
In many cases, this lack of academic experience prompted Eisenhower to take a
hands-off approach to many issues of university governance. This aloof behavior was
reflected in 13 different letters during his Columbia tenure (Galambos, 1984a; 1984b;
1989a). When Columbia constituents would ask him to help with certain administrative
matters, ranging from admissions to athletics, Eisenhower would often respond that the
request was not within his purview, or he did not know enough about the matter to offer
constructive assistance (Galambos, 1984a; 1984b; 1989a). For instance, in a November
4,1949 letter, Eisenhower wrote that he “should not be identified too closely with those
individuals who interest themselves directly in the admission into the college o f students
with known football records” (Galambos, 1984a, p. 816). Despite Eisenhower’s fondness
for football, he did not want to involve himself in recruiting. Further, in an October 9,
1950 letter to a prospective student, Eisenhower wrote that the “president of a great
confederated university, such as Columbia, does not interfere in the slightest degree in
the selection o f students” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 1363). In many cases,
Eisenhower was certainly justified in not over-involving himself in such matters.
However, the persistence o f this sentiment in Eisenhower’s correspondence, coupled with
his lack o f knowledge about academic affairs, suggests the possibility that intimidation
over getting involved in matters unfamiliar to him sometimes prompted Eisenhower to
avoid such situations entirely.
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These data concerning Eisenhower’s challenges with academic culture are echoed
in historical analysis as well as the reflection o f contemporaries. Dean of Columbia
College Harry J. Carman often told a story about his first encounter with a “solemn and
uncomfortable” Eisenhower, who had just been installed as president (Neal, 1978, p.
244). Summoning Carman to his office, Eisenhower exclaimed:
I need your help. I’m awfully green at this job. Damn it, I don’t even
know what to call people around here. I find there are sixteen different
schools here at the university and each one has a dean or director. What
do I call these men? Dean? Director? Doctor (Neal, 1978, p. 244)?
Other faculty members and administrators had similar experiences that convinced them
that Eisenhower was out of his depth in regards to dealing with the minutia o f academics.
In later years, Prof. Lionel Trilling reflected that although he had an “auspicious start... it
gradually and quickly disintegrated” (as cited in Smith, 2012, p. 488). Thus, as
Eisenhower’s tenure progressed, Trilling “began to sense that he was nowhere in relation
to the university and this gradually began to affect people” (as cited in Smith, 2012, p.
488). Douglas Black, a close Eisenhower friend and Columbia trustee concurred,
reflecting that Eisenhower “never had the feeling or understanding of Columbia” (Jacobs,
2001, p. 260). Prof. Eli Ginzberg concurred with this sentiment, concluding that
Eisenhower “never found a way of responding to anything substantive on campus.
Nothing gave him a real kick.... a central focus (as cited in Smith, 2012, pp. 488-489).
Campus members attributed Eisenhower’s aloofness to a lack of understanding o f all
things academic - university operations, curriculum management, and academic
governance.
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Multiple historians have concurred with this sentiment, arguing that there was
considerable tension between Eisenhower and Columbia’s scholarly community
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003; Neal,
1978; Smith, 2012). According to Clark (2013), Neal (1978), and Smith (2012),
Eisenhower was intimidated by Columbia’s learned faculty, and never felt comfortable
around them. Even though Eisenhower was a decorated veteran, he felt out o f place and
inferior in the academic setting o f Columbia, and made no effort to understand what
made faculty members tick (McCaughey, 2003). Smith (2012) also argued that
Eisenhower lacked an intuitive feel to tell him what was important to the faculty.
According to Jacobs (2001), in one widely circulated story at Momingside Heights:
Eisenhower once stated at a faculty meeting, ‘the university is going to do
so and so.’ A senior faculty member, supposedly, stood up and replied,
‘you don’t understand, General Eisenhower, the faculty is the university’
(p. 317).
Further, this divide was not helped by Eisenhower’s military assistants, who were
stationed at Momingside Heights to assist the general with his military correspondence.
Completely unfamiliar with academic culture, these assistants treated administrators and
faculty like junior army officers and restricted their access to Eisenhower (Jacobs, 2001;
McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978). Thus, according to Jacobs (2001) and Neal (1978), such
behavior completely alienated Columbia’s scholarly community from their president.
Overall, this lack of academic experience presented multiple problems for
Eisenhower during his presidential tenure (Clark, 2013). While he did the best he could
under the circumstances, Eisenhower was often at a loss when it came to addressing
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Columbia’s most pressing needs. According to Smith (2012), while some observers held
great promise initially in Eisenhower’s leadership approach, the “complexity of
Columbia confounded him” (p. 484). Consequently, his inability to govern the university
fueled discontent and animosity among the institutional community. According to Smith
(2012), there was intense hostility toward Eisenhower on the part of the faculty and
student body by summer 1950. Ultimately, this tension created a rift that could not be
healed between Eisenhower and Columbia’s scholarly community, precluding any chance
for him to learn the ways o f academic culture.
Lack of institutional vision. Another issue that hindered Eisenhower’s ability to
adjust to academic culture was the complete disconnect between his personal plans for
Columbia and its pressing institutional needs. As noted earlier, Eisenhower only
accepted the presidency after he was assured by a couple o f overeager Columbia trustees
that he would not have to engage himself too deeply in university affairs and could
instead focus on his platform of renewing American civic engagement (Ambrose, 1990;
Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003). Unfortunately for
Columbia, Eisenhower took this to heart and failed to develop a vision that advanced the
institution (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Instead, he occupied himself with developing a
national program for civic engagement that addressed the goals he desired, and while
based at Columbia, this work did little to support the university itself (Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 1985; 2001).
For Eisenhower, the crowning achievement o f his Columbia presidency was the
creation o f the American Assembly, an annual conference where the nation’s top leaders
from government, business, labor, the military, and the professions could meet to deal
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with “basic political and social questions” affecting America (Jacobs, 1985, p. 557). In
going to Columbia, Eisenhower believed that he could do more there “than anywhere else
to further the cause to which I am devoted, the reawakening of intense interest in the
basis o f the American system” (as cited in Jacobs, 1985, p. 556). He therefore discussed
the American Assembly in over 37 letters during his Columbia presidency. Eisenhower
described it as able to “respond to the concern with which American citizens contemplate
the possible future o f our democracy and individual freedom based on a philosophy of
competitive enterprise” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 1379). Moreover, in an April
16,1951 letter, he described the Assembly as his “primary Columbia concern” (as cited
in Galambos, 1989a, p. 214). This focus was highly apparent during his 1951 leave of
absence, when his interest in the Assembly was the main Columbia-related topic in his
correspondence (Galambos, 1989a).
However, Eisenhower’s work with the Assembly illustrated the enormous gulf
between his own personal interests and Columbia’s pressing institutional needs. While
his intense interest in the Assembly prompted him to go to extensive lengths to facilitate
its creation, Eisenhower was not nearly as interested in advancing Columbia itself (Clark,
2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). Even before accepting the Columbia presidency, he
made clear that he was no fundraiser, a fact that should have triggered alarm with the
trustees (Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). Moreover, in four separate letters during his
Columbia presidency, Eisenhower discussed at length his refusal to raise money for the
institution (Galambos, 1984a; Galambos, 1984b). In a May 19,1949 letter to a close
friend, Eisenhower asserted that:
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Much as I believe that an educational institution like Columbia is
essential to the future o f the American system, I am never going to use my
personal friendships as an avenue for approaching anyone for current or
future support o f this university (Galambos, 1984a, p. 587).
Eisenhower reiterated this point in a September 22,1950 letter, when he declared that “I
do not personally solicit funds from anyone” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 1333). He
explained this mindset as the result o f “a lifetime spent in an atmosphere that promoted
respect for ideas and quality o f character and which refused to recognize accumulation of
money as a true index for success” (as cited in Galambos, 1984a, p. 696). Ultimately,
Eisenhower directed most o f what fundraising prowess he could muster toward
generating funds for the Assembly, and not Columbia itself (Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978).
This fact was not lost on the Colombia community, which prompted Eisenhower
speechwriter Kevin McCann to label his boss as “the poorest excuse for a fund-raising
college president in the country” (Neal, 1978, p. 250).
These data from Eisenhower’s correspondence were also supported by writings o f
his Columbia associates as well as by leading historians. Many of Eisenhower’s
contemporaries were distressed at his lack o f understanding for Columbia and its
institutional needs (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Former Columbia president Grayson
Kirk noted that Eisenhower “had alienated many on the faculty by making speeches
about the purpose o f education being to develop citizens rather than develop people
intellectually” (Smith, 2012, p. 490). Another veteran professor recalled a heated
exchange between Eisenhower and faculty leaders, where they debated the societal role
that Columbia’s faculty should play (Neal, 1978). At the meeting, one professor noted
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that Columbia had “some o f America’s most exceptional physicists, mathematicians,
chemists, and engineers” (Neal, 1978, p. 249). Eisenhower then asked if these faculty
members were also “exceptional Americans,” and was told in response that he did not
understand (Neal, 1978, p. 249). Eisenhower then:
Burst into a rage, a large vein on his forehead throbbing as he said,
‘dammit, what good are exceptional physicists... exceptional anything,
unless they are exceptional Americans.’ He went on to say that every
student who came to Columbia must leave it first a better citizen and
secondarily a more learned scholar (Neal, 1978, pp. 249-250).
The preferencing of his own agenda to build a more democratic society was often at odds
with faculty scholars who were focused specifically on advancing knowledge and
understanding in their disciplinary areas.
Historians have also noted this considerable gulf between Eisenhower’s vision
and Columbia’s institutional needs (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001;
McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978; Smith, 2012). According to Neal (1978), Eisenhower
“saw the purpose of American education much as a high school civics teacher might, to
teach the values for ‘effective citizenship’” (p. 249). However, according to Ambrose
(1990) and Neal (1978), Columbia faculty found Eisenhower’s perspective embarrassing,
considering it to be fatuous zeal. Further, they believed that Eisenhower’s diligent work
on behalf o f the American Assembly did nothing to support Columbia or address its
pressing problems (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978).
Ultimately, as Smith (2012) argued, Columbia’s disappointment in Eisenhower stemmed
not so much from administrative ineptitude, but from his inattentiveness to the problems
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o f administration. Consequently, this immense divide between Eisenhower’s vision and
Columbia’s needs precluded any meaningful chance for him to learn the ways of
academic culture (Clark, 2013). His vision for American higher education was simply
too different from that o f Columbia’s faculty for there to develop any kind of meaningful
relationship or mutual understanding (Clark, 2013).

Summary
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower concluded his World War II service as one of
America’s greatest military heroes. During that conflict, he had led organizations the size
and scope o f which few could only imagine. Eisenhower also interacted with many of
modem history’s larger-than-life figures, including Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle,
Gen. George S. Patton, and Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, and found ways
for them to all work together for a common purpose. For all practical purposes, his
presidency o f Columbia should have therefore been a success as well. However, despite
his celebrated military leadership, he was unable to make the transition to civilian
educator or learn the ways o f academic culture. As the findings from this study
concluded, this failure stemmed from four central issues: frustration over engaging with
academic culture as well as the demands of mounting political and military obligations;
being too overextended professionally; lacking academic experience; and possessing a
presidential vision that did not align with Columbia’s institutional needs.
Thus, Eisenhower’s experience at Columbia demonstrates that despite the best
intentions, even a non-traditional college president with a celebrated leadership record
may fail to adjust effectively to the ways o f academic culture. However, the next chapter
will explore a non-traditional president with a professional background similar to
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Eisenhower’s who adjusted to academic culture seamlessly. Moreover, although he had
to overcome some challenges, this college president achieved levels of organizational
success and faculty admiration of which Eisenhower could have only imagined. Chapter
5 will analyze Terry Sanford’s presidency of Duke University and explore why he was
more successful in learning the ways of the academy.
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C hapter 5 - T erry Sanford and Duke University
Although Dwight D. Eisenhower had a challenging experience as Columbia
University’s president, his difficult adjustment to academic culture was not representative
o f all non-traditional college presidents. Other such presidents have had highly
successful tenures, making the transition to academic culture quite effectively. One such
example was former North Carolina Gov. Terry Sanford, a high-profile attorney,
businessman, and politician who served as Duke University’s president from 1969 to
1985. According to Gordon (1998), his storied career read like the resume of a dozen
men combined: four decorations as a paratrooper during World War II, two years as a
state senator, four years as governor, 15 years as Duke’s president, two runs for the U.S.
presidency, and six years as a U.S. senator. Moreover, while certainly confronting some
challenges during his tenure, Sanford transformed Duke from a respected Southern liberal
arts institution into one of the nation’s “preeminent academic powerhouses” (Gordon,
1998, p. 1). This success later led one biographer to refer to Sanford as Duke’s “patron
saint” (Gordon, 1998, p. 1). Sanford’s noteworthy service to his native state as well as to
Duke also prompted former North Carolina Gov. James Hunt to call him “one of the
greatest leaders in North Carolina history” (Gordon, 1998, p. 1). Even today, Sanford is
still considered a legend by many North Carolina residents.
During Sanford’s presidency, he also earned the lasting respect and admiration of
the entire Duke community, including the institution’s faculty (Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Egerton, 1973). Former Duke University President Nan Keohane described Sanford as a
“leader-hero,” and she argued that Sanford surpassed the usual expectations o f political
leadership in pursuing his many projects and overcoming institutional challenges (Rubin
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& Stroup, 1998, p. 1). Many others admired his unique leadership style, which was once
described as a “rare knack and ability to get ordinary people to do unordinary and
extraordinary things” (Rubin & Stroup, 1998, p. 1). Ultimately, Sanford represents a
non-traditional college president who effectively learned the ways of academic culture.
Using data derived from his personal and official correspondence, along with selected
secondary sources, this study found that his success stemmed from a combination of
factors. These included Sanford’s ambitious vision for Duke that coincided well with its
institutional needs; his strong personal commitment to Duke; his prior exposure to higher
education as an education-focused governor; and his highly relational approach as a
leader. To put these factors into perspective, this study situated them within a broader
framework that included Sanford’s personal history, a historical context of the 1960s-era
higher education landscape, and Duke’s institutional context during that period. Those
sections follow below.

Personal History
Terry Sanford was bom on August 20, 1917 in Laurinburg, North Carolina and
came of age during the Great Depression (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Gordon, 1998). He
paid his own way through the University o f North Carolina - Chapel Hill by washing
dishes, graduating with an A.B. in 1939 (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon, 1998). After
college, he served briefly as an FBI special agent before volunteering for the U.S. Army
during World War II. As a paratrooper, Sanford saw combat during five separate
campaigns and participated in the Allied invasion of southern France as well as in the
Battle o f the Bulge. Following his discharge as a first lieutenant, he attended law school
and became active in the North Carolina Democratic Party (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987;
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Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon, 1998). During this period, he also married Margaret
Rose Knight and would go on to have two children (Gordon, 1998).
Sanford served briefly in the North Carolina Senate before being elected governor
in 1961. A firm believer in the value of education, he made that a hallmark of his
administration, nearly doubling the state’s expenditures on public schools during his
tenure (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon, 1998). Moreover, Sanford consolidated the
University o f North Carolina school system to ensure its solvency and strength and
developed the state’s Governor’s Schools as well as the North Carolina School o f the
Arts (Gordon, 1998). Most notably, Sanford fought for racial desegregation during a
time when that was highly unpopular politically (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon,
1998). To demonstrate his commitment to that cause, Sanford even sent his son to a
desegregated public school despite safety concerns (Gordon, 1998). In recognition for
Sanford’s work, a 1981 Harvard University survey named him one o f the best governors
o f the 20th century (Gordon, 1998). As recently as the 2012 Democratic National
Convention, political leaders continued to heap praise on Sanford. Speaking o f Sanford’s
North Carolina legacy, former Gov. James Hunt said:
Fifty years ago, this was a poor state - poor, rural, rigidly segregated. But
we had a governor named Terry Sanford - a hero of mine.... He broke
with most southerners in 1960 and endorsed John F. Kennedy. When
other southern governors stood in the schoolhouse door, Terry Sanford
stood up for civil rights. He worked with business leaders, political and
education leaders to build our great universities, our 58 community
colleges and our public schools (Mercola, 2012, p. 1).
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Throughout Sanford’s administration, his work attracted the interest of national
Democratic Party leaders. A close friend of President John F. Kennedy, Sanford was
even rumored to have been Kennedy’s choice for vice president in the 1964 election
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). Although that campaign never materialized because of
Kennedy’s tragic assassination, Sanford was regarded as a respected and highly
influential political leader throughout this period.
After Sanford’s gubernatorial term ended in 1965, his star continued to rise
nationally as he reentered the fields o f law and Democratic Party politics (Covington &
Ellis, 1999). He interacted extensively with President Lyndon Johnson and was even
offered a position in Johnson’s cabinet as secretary of agriculture (Covington & Ellis,
1999). Sanford also managed Hubert Humphrey’s 1968 presidential campaign with an
eye toward his own run for president in the early 1970s. During this period, a growing
number o f people began to see Sanford as a possible successor to President Richard
Nixon (Egerton, 1973). However, despite all of this political promise, Sanford’s career
took an unexpected turn when he received inquiries from Duke University’s board of
trustees about serving as their next president.

Historical Context
In many respects, the 1960s was a difficult period for American higher education.
The nation’s colleges and universities were nearing the end of their “Golden Age,” and
new challenges were beginning to materialize, ranging from desegregation to student
unrest (Thelin, 2011, p. 260). To be sure, certain institutions still benefitted immensely
from the post-World War II funding boom as well as from record student enrollments
(Thelin, 2011). However, considering the time and cost involved with building
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construction, the question was whether those colleges could respond quickly enough to
accommodate the increases in funding as well as enrollment (Thelin, 2011). A common
solution during this period was for public institutions to rely upon “formula funding,”
which awarded institutions with increased subsidies as they enrolled more students
(Thelin, 2011, p. 285). Thus, many public institutions continued to expand rapidly during
this period.
However, the environment was more precarious for private institutions. Just as
public institutions enjoyed rapid expansion in the 1960s, many private colleges and
universities struggled to stay open (Thelin, 2011). One major problem was that private
institutions could not keep up with the low tuition prices offered by state-supported
public schools (Thelin, 2011). The shortage o f funding that resulted from this disparity
also made it more difficult for private institutions to hire new faculty members (Thelin,
2011). However, as the 1960s progressed, private colleges and universities turned the
tide by designing innovative fundraising programs and capitalizing on the increasing
public desire for their children to attend “prestigious” institutions (Thelin, 2011, p. 294).
The more difficult problems for public as well as private institutions during this
period stemmed from the challenges o f desegregation along with growing student unrest
(Thelin, 2011). During the 1950s and 1960s, desegregation was a politically explosive
issue for many educational institutions throughout the South (Cole, 2013). According to
Thelin (2011), 17 Southern states had legally segregated public educational systems
following World War II. While the 1954 Brown v. the Board o f Education o f Topeka,
Kansas court case outlawed such practices, the subsequent desegregation efforts of many
Southern states were slow and half-hearted (Thelin, 2011). At various Southern state
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universities, court-ordered desegregation often resulted in violent student protests as well
as gubernatorial opposition (Thelin, 2011). Further, a number of black student sit-ins
occurred across the region, with one o f the more notable incidents taking place at
Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960 (Cole, 2013). Overall, desegregation was a difficult
issue that tested the leadership prowess of many college presidents (Cole, 2013;
Covington & Ellis, 1999).
Another challenging issue involved increased student unrest across many of
America’s colleges and universities (Egerton, 1973; Thelin, 2011). Some of this protest
was in reaction to the mass expansion of higher education institutions, which some critics
referred to as the growing “impersonality o f the multiversity” (Thelin, 2011, p. 307).
Consequently, there was growing sentiment among students that they were viewed only
as numbers or statistics instead o f individuals (Thelin, 2011). Thus, students across the
nation protested large lecture classes, cramped housing, and the over-automation o f
campus services in response to this impersonal, mass expansion (Thelin, 2011). A result
o f this movement was a trend toward establishing formal student assembly organizations
in order to continue the fight for better student conditions (Thelin, 2011).
The national political upheaval o f the period, fueled by the tragic assassinations of
John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, also shook college
campuses across the country (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Thelin, 2011).
Moreover, the unpopular war in Vietnam spurred further and widely publicized student
protests (Thelin, 2011). Some o f these demonstrations, such as the May 1970 protests at
Kent State University and Jackson State University, resulted in violent confrontations
between students and National Guard troops (Thelin, 2011). The resulting student deaths
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prompted intense national outcry and received widespread media coverage (Thelin,
2011). Thus, many higher education leaders were at a loss for how to respond, as
“universities everywhere were caught between the desire to be above the battle and the
demand that they be in the midst of it” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). Overall, it was a very
challenging time for college and university leaders across the nation.

Institutional Context
In many ways, the wide range o f 1960s-era challenges found at higher education
institutions across the nation was also present at Duke University. Renamed Duke
University after industrialist James B. Duke donated a fortune in 1924 to then-Trinity
College, the institution was still struggling to find its identity, even though it aspired to
become a preeminent national university (Egerton, 1973). As with many other private
schools during the period, Duke’s finances were unsettled as it struggled to attract high
quality students (Egerton, 1973). The institution even ran its first budget deficit in 1970,
prompting many to worry about its future (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Duke also had poor
relations with the surrounding City of Durham, which created further problems for its
institutional image (Egerton, 1973). Moreover, a lack of strong presidential leadership,
along with the absence of a compelling institutional vision, had resulted in “fading and
discouraged” support from alumni (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 378). By all accounts,
Duke was stagnating and in dire need o f bold and decisive leadership (Covington & Ellis,
1999).
Although the institution had remained relatively quiet in regards to student
protests for much o f the decade, Martin Luther King’s assassination triggered an intense
student reaction, with over 1,500 staging a silent campus vigil in April 1968 (Covington
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& Ellis, 1999). Further protests followed when students began campaigning for minority
student rights and higher wages for black employees (Covington & Ellis, 1999). This all
culminated in a black student sit-in at the Allen Administration Building on February 12,
1969 (Covington & Ellis, 1999). The students, who then declared the building to be the
“Malcolm X School o f Liberation,” then presented a list of demands, which included the
establishment o f a black studies curriculum, a black student union, and the elimination of
the SAT as a requirement for black student admissions (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 368).
With little patience for such activity, the board o f trustees demanded quick and decisive
action from Duke’s then-president, Douglas Knight. Fearing violence, Knight secured
assistance from the governor, who sent in state police to dislodge the protesting students.
Meanwhile, other police officers in full riot gear fired tear gas to break up the boisterous
group o f 2,500 students who had gathered to watch the events unfold (Covington & Ellis,
1999).
Although no one was hurt and the crowd was dispersed, the event inflicted
“grievous wounds” on Duke’s reputation (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 368). Seeing his
days numbered as Duke’s president, Knight resigned shortly thereafter (Covington &
Ellis, 1999). To respond to this problem, coupled with minimal state support and
decreasing alumni involvement, Duke desperately needed a compelling new leader.
What follows (See Table 2) is a timeline that highlights key dates pertaining to Sanford’s
experience at Duke. The dates are sorted by historical higher education context, Duke’s
institutional context, and by Sanford’s personal history. These three categories are placed
side-by-side to allow the reader to obtain a thorough contextual overview o f the key
events and issues that occurred during the Sanford era at Duke.
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Table 2 - Sanford/Duke Timeline
Historical Context

Institutional Context

Personal History

1838: Duke founded (as
Brown’s Schoolhouse).
1859: Renamed Trinity
College.
1917: Sanford bom.

1954: Brown vs. Board o f
Education o f Topeka, KS
decision.
1950s-1960s:
Desegregation crisis in
South.
1961: Greensboro, NC sitin.

1924: Renamed Duke
University to honor
benefactor James B. Duke.
1963: Undergraduate
college desegregated.
1968: MLK and Bobby
Kennedy assassinated.
1,500 student campus vigil
held.

1939: Graduated from UNC
- Chapel Hill.
1942-1945: Service in
WWII.
1953-1955: NC State
Senator.

1969: Allen Building sit-in.
Resignation of Pres.
Douglas Knight. Fuqua
School o f Business opens.

1969: Appointed president
of Duke.

1968: Martin Luther King
and Robert Kennedy
assassinated.

1970: First institutional
budget deficit.

1972: Candidate for U.S.
president.

Late 1960s: Higher
Education Golden Age
coming to an end.

1971: Institute of Public
Policy opens (later named
after Sanford).

1976: Candidate for U.S.
president.

Late 1960s/Early 1970s:
Student protests over
Vietnam War.

Early 1970s: Student
protests o f Vietnam War.

1985: Retires from Duke
presidency.

Early 1980s: Controversy
over proposed placement of
Nixon Presidential Library
at Duke.

1986-1993: U.S. Senator.

1963: Pres. John F.
Kennedy assassinated.

1970: Kent State shootings.

119

1961-1965: NC Governor.

1998: Sanford dies.

Selecting a New President
Following Knight’s resignation, the board named a three-person search
committee, known internally as “the Troika,” to find his successor (Covington & Ellis,
1999, p. 369). Initially, the committee looked at conventional candidates, ranging from
Duke faculty members to up-and-coming academic leaders from other institutions
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). However, at one particular committee meeting, a board
member named Mrs. Earl Brian suggested Terry Sanford. Brian had known Sanford for
years and was impressed by his leadership style (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Combined
with his extensive professional background, she believed that Sanford was just the type of
level-headed problem solver that Duke needed (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Other board
members immediately liked the idea and cleared an impediment to Sanford’s nomination
by changing the requirement that the president hold an earned doctorate (Covington &
Ellis, 1999).
However, Sanford appeared to be a risky selection to others in the Duke
community. In the minds o f many, he was a non-academic politician who had graduated
from Duke’s bitter rival, the University o f North Carolina - Chapel Hill (Covington &
Ellis, 1999). These reservations were best summarized by one senior Duke faculty
member, who said “putting a great university in the hands of a politician seemed to me a
perilous course o f action” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). As an up-and-coming politician, others
in the Duke community wondered how long Sanford would even remain at the university
if he was selected president (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Nevertheless, the board forged
ahead and put out official inquiries to Sanford, who was interested but skeptical about his
prospects (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Duke’s board members believed that the benefits
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Sanford would provide Duke would far outweigh any potential liabilities (Covington &
Ellis, 1999).
However, since Sanford still harbored political ambitions, some o f his advisors
warned him against accepting the position, arguing that it would “embroil [him] in
internal affairs at Duke and compromise any chance he had to build a national
constituency” (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 372). Sanford was intrigued by the
possibilities o f academic leadership, though, and felt that obtaining Duke’s presidency for him a lifetime achievement in itself - was worth the risk (Covington & Ellis, 1999).
Therefore, he accepted the position and reported for work on April 2,1970, putting his
political ambitions aside temporarily to embark upon a new career in higher education.
Sum m ary of Emerging Themes
Over the next 15 years, Sanford would go on to have a highly successful tenure at
Duke, which he often described as the best years of his life (Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Gordon, 1998). He was responsible for constructing 40 new campus buildings at a cost
o f more than $190 million (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Moreover, Sanford led two
successful fundraising campaigns, accumulating more than $435 million total (Covington
& Ellis, 1999). He also more than doubled the Duke endowment from $80 million to
$200 million and helped to increase annual alumni giving from $750,000 in 1970 to more
than $6 million in 1985 (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Further, he was responsible for the
creation o f several academic programs, including the Institute o f Policy Sciences and
Public Affairs and the Institute o f the Arts (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Sanford was also
instrumental in the development o f Duke’s prestigious Fuqua School of Business
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). These achievements led some to label Sanford as an
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“academic miracle worker” (Egerton, 1973, p. 28). In 1985, then-U.S. Secretary of
Transportation Elizabeth Dole, a Duke graduate, summarized Sanford’s tenure by
writing:
The historians of higher education will doubtlessly credit you, as they
should, with a strengthened program of arts and sciences, the new
Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, [and] a school of
business.... They will write that it was during Terry Sanford’s
presidency that Duke became a truly national university (Covington
& Ellis, 1999, p. 435).
Along with achieving success in the realms of fundraising and infrastructure
development, Sanford earned the respect and admiration o f Duke’s academic community.
Although he certainly endured some major controversies, including troublesome early
1970s student anti-war protests as well as a major clash with Duke’s faculty over the
possible placement o f the Richard Nixon Presidential Library on the campus, Sanford
concluded his tenure on good terms with Duke’s academic community (Covington &
Ellis, 1999). In fact, many felt that Sanford’s presidency represented “a very special time
in the university’s history” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). Duke Endowment chair Mary D. B. T.
Semans, a grandniece o f the institution’s principal benefactor James B. Duke, once wrote,
“Terry Sanford was our hero... he made us feel that we were on his magic carpet and that
he expected us to do things we never dreamed we were capable o f ’ (as cited in Rubin &
Stroup, 1998, p. 1). Echoing that sentiment, a later Duke president, Nan Keohane, wrote
“we are all better, and stronger, and more optimistic about the future because of the
lasting legacies o f Terry Sanford’s life and leadership” (as cited in Rubin & Stroup, 1998,
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p. 1). Duke trustee Isobel Craven Lewis Drill, who has sometimes opposed Sanford on
certain initiatives, once reflected he was “the leader Duke needed during perilous days of
student unrest and academic uncertainty” (as cited in Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 435).
Drill also wrote that her strongest recollection of Sanford was his “courageous action in
restoring our university to its intended purposes” (as cited in Covington & Ellis, 1999, p.
435).
Unlike Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford represents a clear example o f a nontraditional college president who adjusted well to academic culture (Covington & Ellis,
1999; Egerton, 1973; Gordon, 1998). The purpose o f this study was to determine the
specific issues that explained his successful adjustment to academe. To investigate this
question, over 300 documents from Sanford’s presidency were examined. Approximately
225 o f those documents were letters, interviews, and memoirs produced by Sanford,
while the other roughly 75 documents were newspaper articles about Sanford and his
Duke tenure. Located in the Terry Sanford Papers at Duke’s David M. Rubenstein Rare
Book & Manuscript Library, these materials included personal and official letters,
speeches, newspaper clippings, and other related documents. In consultation with
dissertation committee member Dr. Eddie Cole, these specific papers were selected for
analysis because they were most germane to this study. Following close examination, all
o f the papers were coded. For the purposes of data triangulation, the coded data were
then compared to analysis by historians as well as the relevant reflections of Sanford’s
Duke colleagues to ensure that the findings were consistent.
The objective behind this research was to identify Sanford’s thoughts about
academic culture as reflected in his personal and official correspondence with others.
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Another key objective was to identify why Sanford was able to adjust so well to
academic life. Open coding identified nine applicable codes that appeared multiple times
in his papers (See Appendix E). Axial coding later narrowed these codes down to four
central issues that helped explain Sanford’s success in adapting to academic culture.
These included Sanford’s ambitious vision for Duke that coincided well with the
university’s institutional needs, his strong personal commitment to Duke, his prior
experience with higher education as an education-focused governor, and his highly
relational approach as a leader. As the data ultimately demonstrated, all of these
dynamics enabled Sanford to overcome some significant challenges and adjust effectively
to academic culture.
Vision. Sanford’s ambitious and compelling vision for Duke University was a
central theme that appeared repeatedly in his papers. Possessing a lifelong interest in
history, he was fascinated by Duke’s evolution as a higher education institution
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). Thus, upon assuming the presidency, Sanford took time to
study the university’s history as well as the successes and failures of presidents who had
served before him (Covington & Ellis, 1999). He then used this information to help craft
his own unique vision for Duke’s future based on its institutional needs and where it had
been in the past. Further, as an education-focused former governor, Sanford had the
ability to ponder this vision in the context o f state and national educational needs. What
resulted was a compelling vision for Duke’s future that generated excitement and
enthusiasm among Duke’s academic community (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton,
1973). Among the approximately 300 documents examined for this study, Sanford
discussed aspects o f his Duke vision in over 16, primarily in his speeches.
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An analysis o f Sanford’s speeches revealed that he had gone to great lengths to
reflect on the purpose o f higher education, particularly at liberal arts institutions, before
assuming Duke’s presidency (Sanford, 1977a, 1979a). This approach was likely a result
o f Sanford’s gubernatorial term, which was noted for its strong focus on developing
North Carolina’s higher education system (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Thus, upon
becoming president, Sanford had specific ideas about the role of America’s higher
education system that he often articulated in his speeches. In one address, Sanford
asserted, “the seeker o f truth, the insister of truth, may be the ultimate mark of the person
with a liberal education” (Sanford, 1979a, p. 5). He echoed that sentiment in another
speech, when he argued, “to keep alive a vision of hope and confidence for humanity is
probably the greatest responsibility o f liberal arts education and of graduates of liberal
arts colleges” (Sanford, 1977a, p.l). Thus, this clear perspective on the uses o f a liberal
arts education likely assisted Sanford in formulating a clear and compelling vision for
Duke itself.
This focused and thoughtful vision for Duke’s institutional future also appeared in
several o f Sanford’s speeches. He envisioned Duke as a university focused primarily on
undergraduate learning with a goal of producing well-rounded leaders with a passion for
seeking knowledge and truth (Sanford, 1970a). In his inaugural address, he touched on
these concepts by remarking:
Duke University can lead, therefore Duke University must lead. We
must lead in the strengthening o f the internal structure o f universities,
making them freer to fulfill the aspirations of students. We must lead
in providing the dynamic dimension of higher education that will provide
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students with the developed capacity to add to civilization. We must lead
in preserving the ancient truths of civilization and in solving the recent
distresses o f society. Duke University accepts leadership as its
hallmark... Duke has led and is positioned for leadership today not by
chance but by careful, deliberate design (Sanford, 1970a, p. 1).
Sanford’s inspiring language empowered a Duke community that had been in a malaise
o f sorts based on recent institutional challenges (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Sanford’s
aspiration to transform Duke into a nationally prominent university resonated with its
community and triggered a renewed enthusiasm and focus (Covington & Ellis, 1999). In
many ways, Duke needed a meaningful institutional purpose and Sanford was able to
provide it by developing a premier center for learning, leadership, and creativity that
remained true to its North Carolina roots (Covington & Ellis, 1999). The heart of
Sanford’s Duke vision was also evident in his inaugural address:
I want to see for Duke University a spirit that makes a Duke graduate a
Renaissance Man with a purpose. I want to see Duke University applying
its special resources in its special setting to seek out and develop as our
primary interest men and women who will exhibit and apply both
creativity and leadership, no matter what occupations they might pursue
(Sanford, 1970a, p. 3).
The power and reach o f Sanford’s vision, along with its noticeable impact on
Duke’s development as a university, has also been commended by university officials as
well as historians over the years. Duke’s first African-American faculty member, Samuel
DuBois Cook, once wrote that Sanford represented “the ultimate in vision, decency, and
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integrity... I don’t know what I’d do without Terry. I just feel less secure in the world
without Terry Sanford” (as cited in Rubin & Stroup, 1998, p. 2). According to Covington
and Ellis (1999), even in Sanford’s earliest interviews with Duke’s presidential search
committee, the members were impressed by his knowledge o f the institution and his
compelling ideas for its future. According to Duke Endowment Chair Mary D. B. T.
Semans, she believed that “he would bring Duke back into focus as the kind of place Mr.
Duke would have wanted” (as cited in Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 374). Indeed, Sanford
and the committee were in full agreement about the need to keep building Duke as a
national university while reconnecting with its local roots in North Carolina (Covington
& Ellis, 1999). Consequently, early in Sanford’s tenure, a new professor remarked,
“Duke is a smug, tweedy place being shaken up by Sanford... they’re trying to decide
whether or not they like it - 1 think they’re about to decide they do” (as cited in Egerton,
1973, p. 29).
According to Egerton (1973), the key objective behind Sanford’s Duke vision was
to find a way to mitigate the contradiction between “academic eminence and social
usefulness” (p. 29). Sanford believed firmly that Duke could be one of the nation’s great
universities while being “actively engaged in seeking and applying solutions to the
nation’s problems” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). Thus, much o f Sanford’s presidency was
dedicated to this pursuit. According to Covington and Ellis (1999), this aspect o f
Sanford’s vision was highly effective as it culminated in a strong partnership between
Duke and multiple local, state, and national constituency groups. Ultimately, as these
data indicated, Sanford’s compelling vision for Duke was an integral factor in his
adjustment to academic life. He formulated a powerful vision for the university’s future
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that generated excitement and enthusiasm among many members of the Duke
community. This vision also allowed Sanford to endure some significant crises during
his tenure and keep the university moving in one, unified direction.
Commitment to Duke. A second theme that appeared multiple times in
Sanford’s papers was his strong, personal commitment to Duke University. Although
Sanford engaged in many outside political activities over the course o f his presidential
tenure, he consistently made it clear that Duke was his number one professional priority.
Sanford discussed his commitment to Duke in approximately eight o f the letters and
personal memoranda examined for this study. This dedication to Duke was significant,
since many in the university community wondered initially how long he would remain as
president (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973). Some speculated that he would
quickly succumb to the pressure he was under to run for offices ranging from U.S.
senator to president o f the United States (Covington & Ellis, 1999).
However, Sanford typically resisted such entreaties, arguing that he could not “be
president o f Duke and keep one eye cocked on a political future” (as cited in Nordheiber,
1970, p. 1). Ultimately, while Sanford did run for political office twice during his Duke
tenure, he pursued those campaigns in a manner that was mindful o f his university
responsibilities (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Specifically, he built his political activities
around his Duke schedule instead of neglecting his presidential responsibilities for the
sake o f his campaign schedule (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Consequently, while Sanford
did not give those ultimately unsuccessful campaigns his full energy and attention, it did
remind the Duke community that the institution itself was most important to him.
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According to Covington and Ellis (1999) and Egerton (1973), Sanford had major
political ambitions during his tenure at Duke and dreamed of one day becoming president
o f the United States. However, he also truly enjoyed serving as Duke University’s
president (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Sanford, 1974). This became a
challenge as he tried to plan U.S. presidential campaigns in 1972 and 1976, and it often
resulted in his campaign timetables being extended (Covington & Ellis, 1999). As
Sanford recalled:
I was far fascinated with running Duke... I was in love with Duke. I
thought it would be great to be the first [modem] Southern president
but not all that damned great... I had accomplished more than I thought I
was going to, but I saw how much more I could accomplish here. I could
see how this would be a worthy ambition in anybody’s life if they didn’t
do anything else. I was really dedicated to Duke and that’s probably why
I was reluctant to leave (Covington & Ellis, 1999, pp. 417-418).
Sanford retained this commitment to Duke even when offered significant political
appointments. In summer 1977, he was offered two such opportunities (Covington &
Ellis, 1999; Sanford, 1977b, 1977c). First, then-North Carolina Gov. James Hunt offered
Sanford an appointment to the State Board of Education, which Sanford promptly
declined (Sanford, 1977b). In a letter to Duke’s board of trustees’ chairman, Sanford
wrote, “I simply felt that I could not devote enough time to it to do the job the way it
should be done” (Sanford, 1977b, p. 1). Actions like this underscored Sanford’s
commitment to Duke.
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Shortly thereafter, President Jimmy Carter asked Sanford to become U.S.
ambassador to France (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Sanford, 1977b, 1977c). True to form,
Sanford also declined this prestigious appointment, remarking, “I felt morally obligated
to stay at Duke, having told everybody that I would not accept a federal job” (Sanford,
1977b, p. 1). Echoing the same sentiment in a private memorandum, Sanford wrote “I
simply felt that I could not leave Duke right now” (Sanford, 1977c, p. 2). He believed
that there would be plenty o f other opportunities in the future and that he wanted to stay
at Duke in order to complete the work he had started there (Sanford, 1977c). Overall,
these data demonstrated that Sanford considered his position at Duke to be his most
important professional responsibility, even though he was offered many other highprofile opportunities during his tenure.
Sanford’s strong commitment to Duke has also been discussed over the years by
university officials as well as historians, providing effective data triangulation for this
study. Reflecting upon Sanford’s presidential tenure, one faculty member stated, “1
thought he would try to make this a base for his political ambitions... but he hasn’t. The
man really works at being president (as cited in Egerton, 1973, p. 32). McKnight (1969)
seconded that point, arguing that Sanford was genuinely motivated to serve Duke
University, along with its students and higher education in general. Covington and Ellis
(1999) also echoed that sentiment, asserting that Sanford “approached his responsibilities
at Duke with the same high ambition that he had carried into the governor’s office” (p.
379). These data concluded that despite his non-traditional background, Sanford
genuinely wanted to serve as an academic leader.
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Overall, while Sanford retained a strong interest in politics throughout his Duke
tenure, he never felt it necessary to totally abandon his work at the university in order to
pursue elected office (Covington & Ellis, 1999). While Sanford was viewed as a serious
presidential or vice presidential contender in American politics for much of the 1970s, his
work at Duke was ultimately more important to him (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton,
1973). According to Gordon (1998), Sanford “never needed a [political] title to do the
work o f kings” (p. 1). As these data indicated, Sanford’s commitment to Duke earned
him a lasting respect among the institution’s academic community. This respect was vital
in facilitating his successful transition to academic culture. However, it also came at the
expense o f Sanford’s failed political campaigns, as he had to choose Duke as his top
professional priority.

Prior academic exposure. A third central theme in Sanford’s writings pertained
to how his prior government service prepared him for his academic leadership role at
Duke. Although Sanford appeared to assume Duke’s presidency with a non-academic
background, he came into office with more higher education exposure than many realized
(Carroll, 1969; Covington & Ellis, 1999; East, 1970; Jackson & John, 1969; McKnight,
1969). According to Jackson and John (1969), Sanford’s gubernatorial term had been
known as “an administration whose reputation [was] founded on its concern for
education” (p. 5). Specifically, higher education was an area o f great focus during
Sanford’s tenure, and the budgets for state colleges and universities increased by 70
percent during that time (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Jackson & John, 1969). Moreover,
Sanford spearheaded the effort to create three new liberal arts colleges and a system of
community colleges while in office (Jackson & John, 1969). This commitment to higher
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education likely generated a spirit of goodwill for Sanford within North Carolina’s
college and university campuses.
Along with pursuing educational goals as governor, Sanford had extensive
personal ties to higher education prior to assuming Duke’s presidency (Jackson & John,
1969). He had served for several years as chairman of the board o f trustees for both the
University o f North Carolina and Methodist College (Jackson & John, 1969). Further,
Sanford had served on the governing boards for Shaw University, Berea College,
Chowan College, Davidson College, Appalachian State University, Guilford College, and
Wake Forest University (Jackson & John, 1969). Such extensive board affiliations likely
gave Sanford at least a basic understanding o f academic culture before even assuming
Duke’s presidency. Further, upon accepting the appointment as Duke’s president,
Sanford immersed himself in preparing for the job (Covington & Ellis, 1999; East, 1970).
For several months, he attended dozens o f meetings with Duke officials and pored over
briefing books to prepare for his presidential duties (Covington & Ellis, 1999; East,
1970). Thus, between his successful, pro-education track record as governor and his
prior higher education exposure, Sanford was well prepared to engage with academic
culture, even as a non-traditional president.
In the primary source materials examined for this study, references to this
academic exposure were discovered in nearly 10 documents. Appearing primarily in
interviews as well as in personal and official correspondence, these references were
present in roughly one out o f every eight documents examined. As these data indicated,
Sanford’s prior experience with North Carolina’s higher education system provided a
degree o f confidence that he brought into office (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973;
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Sanford, 1974a). Because of Sanford’s unique educational background, academic culture
was not entirely new to him, and he felt comfortable engaging with it (Sanford, 1974a).
For instance, in response to critics who predicted that as a non-academic, Sanford would
have a hands-off approach as an academic leader, Sanford reflected:
Several people said, ‘well, he’ll come in here as a great fund-raiser.’ I
said, ‘I’m not coming as a fund-raiser. I’m coming as president of the
university and as the president of the faculty. That’s my position.’ So
occasionally when somebody wanted to categorize me and say, ‘well,
he’s not really a PhD, he’s here for this,’ I slapped that down right then
and there. I said, ‘I’m president of the university from start to finish’”
(Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 380).
Further, Sanford believed that his work as Duke’s president was not much different than
his previous work as governor (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight,
1969; Sanford, 1974a). In one interview, Sanford drew parallels between the two roles
by asserting, “essentially, both jobs require you to deal with people... I think both of
these jobs have a number of similarities and one would probably prepare you for the
other” (Sanford, 1974a, p. 1). He also believed that universities and government
bureaucracy were fundamentally similar, arguing “both are fairly good at resisting change
as institutions. On the other hand, individuals within both are ready for change if the
climate is right...” (Sanford, 1974a, p. 2). Thus, Sanford believed that his work as a state
government executive ultimately provided him the skills he needed to be an effective
university president (Sanford, 1974a).
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Sanford’s conclusions about how his previous experiences prepared him for
Duke’s presidency have been supported over the years by his Duke colleagues, media
observers, and historians (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight, 1969;
Nordheiber, 1970). As one faculty member noted, “when Sanford arrived, he made it
clear he was going to run the university, it wasn’t going to run him” (Nordheiber, 1970).
Echoing that point, McKnight (1969) wrote that in appointing Sanford as president, “the
trustees undoubtedly were motivated in part by the knowledge that Sanford is a strong
man who lets everybody know who is in charge” (p. 1). Nordheiber (1970) noted that
even among Sanford’s critics, they recognized “Mr. Sanford’s adeptness as an
administrator and as a man who is not easily intimidated” (p. 1). Further, Covington and
Ellis (1999) and Nordheiber (1970) both noted that radical students intent on testing
Sanford’s leadership discovered quickly that they were up against a true professional.
According to one Duke graduate, such students came to believe that “it’s impossible to
outfox him ... he’s just plain smarter than the radicals are” (as cited in Nordheiber, 1970,
p. 1). In certain cases, this contrasted with other North Carolina college presidents during
this period, who sometimes struggled to find ways to respond to the era’s tumultuous
challenges (Cole, 2013). Ultimately, while Sanford was not a professional academic, his
commitment to education and significant involvement with North Carolina’s colleges and
universities helped provide him the necessary skills to engage with academic culture
effectively.

Relational approach. The final and most apparent theme derived from an
examination o f Sanford’s papers pertained to his leadership style at Duke. The data
revealed a highly relational approach that appeared to endear him to Duke’s academic
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community. Specifically, Sanford utilized a leadership style that encouraged
transparency, welcomed outside input, and interjected humor to ease stressful situations
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Sanford, 1970b, 1971, 1974b, 1975a, 1975b).
He was also highly approachable and made it a point to interact extensively with his
followers, particularly students (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973). Sanford’s
policy was to be highly visible to Duke students, faculty, and staff when he was on
campus (Egerton, 1973).
Moreover, Sanford was a humble leader who never took personal credit for the
considerable achievements o f his tenure (Egerton, 1973). Often embarrassed by praise,
Sanford would typically respond by saying, “changes were coming to Duke anyway...
it’s not proper for me to take credit” (as cited in Egerton, 1973, p. 28). In other
situations, Sanford would react with self-deprecating humor, remarking:
I told the chairman of the board of trustees when he offered me this job
that I didn’t have sense enough to be president o f Duke, and his reply was,
‘I know that, but I’ve always admired your luck’” (as cited in Egerton,
1973, p. 29).
Sanford’s unique leadership style was consistently evident in the materials examined for
this study. Examples o f his relational approach were found in over 30 primary source
documents, including letters, interviews, and personal reflections. These data indicated
that Sanford’s leadership style played an important role in facilitating his adjustment to
academic culture.
Sanford’s relational approach manifested itself in many ways through his writing.
He believed strongly in transparency and open communication, and regularly sent

135

personal letters to the Duke community to keep them updated on university affairs
(Sanford, 1970b, 1971,1974b, 1975a, 1975b). Throughout Sanford’s tenure, he also
solicited and welcomed input from all members o f the Duke community (Sanford, 1974b,
1978). For instance, in letters to alumni, he used phrases such as “you are an integral part
o f Duke University,” and “your participation is essential to the future o f Duke” (Sanford,
1974b, paragraphs 2, 6). This pattern was the same with Duke’s faculty, and Sanford
requested a special mass meeting with them at least once a year where he would address
their ideas and concerns (Sanford, 1978). Sanford also kept up to date with faculty
research and praised professors for their professional accomplishments (Sanford, 1977d).
In one such letter, he wrote, “I want you to know how much 1 appreciate the work you are
doing and the great credit your work reflects on Duke University” (Sanford, 1977d, p. 1).
This approach helped Sanford to develop a strong, working relationship with much of
Duke’s faculty.
Sanford also forged a strong connection with Duke’s students, who referred to
him as “Uncle Terry” for much of his tenure (Sanford, 1984, p. 1). Sanford preferred
open communication and direct dialogue with students, encouraging them to take an
active role in building Duke’s future and inspiring them to pursue excellence (Sanford,
1979b, 1981,1984). It was also Sanford’s habit to write personal letters welcoming
incoming freshmen to the university (Sanford, 1981). In one such letter, he wrote:
Duke is what it is, and what it is to become, because o f many people
who believed in it, who gave part o f their lives to it, and who knew it
was worth the love and effort they shared... it cannot flourish without
the intellectual excitement you will add to it for the next several years.
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It cannot continue to flourish without your love, attention, and support,
including financial support, after you have left (Sanford, 1981, p. 1).
Along with inspiring students to be active Duke citizens, Sanford challenged them to do
better when their behavior did not meet the university’s expectations (Sanford, 1979b;
1984). For instance, responding to rowdy student behavior at Duke home basketball
games, Sanford sent letters directly to students to express his concerns (Sanford, 1979b;
1984). In his now legendary “An Avuncular Letter,” addressed “To My Duke Students,”
Sanford wrote:
Resorting to the use of obscenities in cheers and chants at ball games
indicates a lack of vocabulary, a lack o f cleverness, a lack of ideas, and
a lack of respect for other people... I suggest that we change... This
request is in keeping with my commitment to self-government for
students. It should not be up to me to enforce proper behavior that
signifies the intelligence of Duke students. You should do it. Reprove
those who make us all look bad. Shape up your own language. I hate for
us to have the reputation of being stupid. With best wishes, Uncle Terry
(Sanford, 1984, p. 1).
In a sign o f respect for their president, Duke students chanted, “we beg to differ” at the
following game when they disagreed with a referee’s call (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p.
433). This was indicative o f the deep bond that Sanford shared with Duke’s students
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973).
Over the years, members of the Duke community, historians, and media observers
have also written extensively about Sanford’s relational leadership style. These
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reflections provided effective data triangulation for this study. Regarding Sanford’s
accessibility to students, one Duke undergraduate claimed that he could see Sanford more
easily than some o f his professors (Egerton, 1973). Similarly, some historians claimed
that no senior Duke administrator had ever provided a more receptive ear to students
about either public issues or campus matters than Sanford (Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Egerton 1973). According to Covington and Ellis (1999) and Egerton (1973), Sanford
was also known to directly intervene whenever members of the Duke community needed
help, on matters ranging from admissions to job searching. This approach fostered a
spirit o f goodwill and respect that endeared Sanford to many members of Duke’s
academic community (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973).
This goodwill was in turn essential for Sanford when it came to enduring some of
the major crises of his administration - most notably the Vietnam War-era student
protests and his clash with Duke faculty over the possible placement of the Nixon
Presidential Library on the Duke campus (Covington & Ellis, 1999). In both instances,
Sanford faced intense pressure and criticism from many faculty members, alumni, and
students (Covington & Ellis, 1999). To counter these threats, Sanford maintained a high
visibility level on campus and engaged in both formal and informal meetings with
members of the Duke community (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Sanford was also highly
transparent in his communications, explaining his actions in full detail through official
letters as well as through personal appearances (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Thus,
although members o f Duke’s academic community may have disagreed with Sanford sometimes intensely - over various matters during his tenure, the goodwill cultivated by
Sanford’s relational approach helped him to weather those storms (Covington & Ellis,
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1999). Thus, the data examined for this study indicated that Sanford’s leadership style
was integral to his successful adjustment to academic culture.
Summary
Sanford represented a non-traditional college president who adjusted successfully
to academic culture. Even today, Sanford is a beloved figure on the Duke University
campus because o f his achievements and the impact he had on so many people (Gordon,
1998; Rubin & Stroup, 1998). As the findings from this study concluded, Sanford’s
success stemmed from four central issues: he possessed a compelling presidential vision
that aligned with Duke’s institutional needs; he made Duke his top professional priority
throughout his tenure; he possessed prior experience with higher education and
government bureaucracy that helped smooth his transition into academe; and he had a
unique, relational leadership style that endeared him to many members of the Duke
community. Thus, Sanford’s experience at Duke demonstrates that it is possible for nontraditional college presidents to adjust successfully to academic culture. The next chapter
will explore a non-traditional president who had a more challenging but ultimately
successful journey in adapting to academic culture. His leadership style was somewhat
different than Sanford’s, but he also learned to operate within the cultural framework of
academe and transform his university in the process. Chapter 6 will analyze Paul Trible’s
presidency of Christopher Newport University and explore how he was also eventually
successful in learning the ways of the academy.

139

Chapter 6 - Paul Trible and Christopher Newport University
In the preceding chapters, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Terry Sanford were
presented as outlier cases in reference to the issues that non-traditional college presidents
face in adjusting to academic culture. Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia University
represented a troubling scenario, highlighting a non-traditional president who failed to
adjust to the ways o f the academy. Conversely, Terry Sanford represented a more
positive scenario, as he succeeded in earning the respect o f Duke’s entire academic
community and left a lasting positive impact on the institution. Eisenhower arguably
failed on both o f those fronts during his time at Columbia.
In a presidential tenure o f nearly 20 years and counting, former U.S. Sen. Paul
Trible’s time in office is the longest o f the three non-traditional presidents included in
this study. He charted his own unique path at Christopher Newport University (CNU),
located in Newport News, Virginia. Like Eisenhower and Sanford before him, Trible
took the helm in 1996 o f a deeply troubled institution, and was expected to be a “miracle
worker” o f sorts to help redefine CNU for the 21st century (Hamilton, 2011, p. 208).
Over the course o f his tenure, Trible took CNU to new heights, transforming a fledging,
commuter school into a vital, up-and-coming liberal arts institution (Hamilton, 2011;
Heuvel, 2009). For Trible, however, this success did not come easy. It was achieved
only after a long and challenging adjustment process to academic culture, which included
many clashes with faculty members (Hamilton, 2011).
Thus, for this study Trible represented somewhat of a middle ground between the
two outlier cases o f Eisenhower and Sanford. As data from this study indicated, he had a
more difficult adjustment process to academic culture than Sanford, but was much more
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effective in the long run than Eisenhower. Using data derived from interviews along with
selected secondary sources, this study found that Trible’s challenges and ultimate success
stemmed from a combination of issues. These included his ambitious vision that
coincided well with CNU’s institutional needs; his frustration with the ways o f academe;
his adaptability; and his ability for consensus building. To put these factors into
perspective, this study situated them within a broader framework that included Trible’s
personal history, a historical context o f the 1990s-era higher education landscape, and
CNU’s institutional context during that period. Those sections follow below.

Personal History
Paul S. Trible, Jr. was bom on December 29,1946 in Baltimore, Maryland
(Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Hamilton, 2011). The son o f a salt company executive, Trible
grew up in Pennsylvania and Louisiana, but possessed deep familial roots in Virginia’s
Middle Peninsula region (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987). With a desire to return to his
family’s native state, Trible completed his bachelor’s degree at Hampden-Sydney
College in 1968 and later graduated from Washington & Lee University’s Law School in
1971 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). Following service as a
law clerk and assistant U.S. attorney, Trible heard of a vacancy in the commonwealth’s
attorney office in his family’s native Essex County and was subsequently elected to that
office in 1974 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). Intent on
a political career, Trible sought federal office and was elected to the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1976 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Hamilton, 2011). Representing
Virginia’s 1st Congressional district, Trible served on the Armed Services and Budget
Committees and was viewed as a rising star in the Republican Party (Di Vincenzo,
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1995a; Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). Along the way, he married Rosemary Dunaway
Trible and had two children (Hamilton, 2011).
In 1982, Trible was elected to the U.S. Senate, eking out a narrow victory against
Virginia’s popular lieutenant governor (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987). A loyal Ronald
Reagan supporter, Trible spent his years in the Senate serving most notably on the
Foreign Relations Committee and was best known for his work during the Iran-Contra
affair (Hamilton, 2011). However, in 1987 he made the surprising decision to not run for
re-election, citing frustration with the legislative process as well as a desire to spend more
time with his family as his reasons for departure (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011).
The following year, Trible ran for Virginia governor but lost in the Republican primary
(Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). At this point, he decided to step back from electoral
politics and pursue other professional opportunities. In the early 1990s, he served on the
American delegation to the United Nations, taught briefly at Harvard, and also ran his
own government consulting firm (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009).
However, a political appointment during this period unintentionally put Trible on
track to pursue a second career in higher education. In 1994, Gov. George Allen
appointed Trible to CNU’s board of visitors (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011;
Heuvel, 2009). While Trible was certainly familiar with the institution because of his
long Hampton Roads governmental service, this appointment allowed him to gain a
deeper knowledge of CNU’s problems as well as its possibilities (Hamilton, 2011). As
his board service progressed, Trible grew fascinated by CNU’s potential and began
looking for ways to serve the institution in a more meaningful way (Di Vincenzo, 1995a;
Hamilton, 2011).
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Historical Context
As Trible considered pursuing more focused CNU service, the nation’s colleges
and universities were undergoing an important period of transition. By the early 1990s,
higher education institutions were many years removed from their golden age (Thelin,
2011). While American higher education endured a bleak economic outlook in the
1970s, followed by a gradual recovery in the 1980s, many challenges still remained
(Thelin, 2011). According to Thelin (2011), the sore spots in this era included increased
competition from the for-profit educational sector, a move toward centralization among
public institutions, uncertainty over how to better incorporate women and minorities into
the field, and increasing public resentment over rising college costs. Despite intense
debate over how to solve these pressing problems, they had to be addressed in order for
the institutions to move successfully into the 21st century.
The rapid rise o f for-profit educational institutions represented a most challenging
predicament for established colleges and universities (Thelin, 2011). The generous
provisions o f the Pell Grant program and other student financial aid initiatives fueled the
growth o f many for-profit educational enterprises, which demanded the right to
participate in federal financial aid programs (Thelin, 2011). Although the presidents of
established institutions fought this vigorously, the government ultimately provided
proprietary colleges a “seat at the table” for federal student aid (Thelin, 2011, p. 340).
Most predominant among the for-profit institutions were distance-learning programs like
the University o f Phoenix, which quickly developed a multi-state network of sites
(Thelin, 2011). The rise of such schools also compelled established colleges and

143

universities to consider how to better incorporate new technology, such as onlineleaming, into their traditional curriculums (Thelin, 2011).
For public colleges and universities, the move toward centralization also
presented a unique challenge. This issue had its roots in a 1972 amendment to the 1964
Higher Education Act, which sought to alter the governance o f higher education (Thelin,
2011). Its intention was to offer funding incentives to states that created higher
education-coordinating agencies, aimed at reducing duplication and promoting long-term
collective planning (Thelin, 2011). However, these “1202 commissions” had decidedly
mixed results and were often viewed as a nuisance by university presidents (Thelin, 2011,
p. 339). Many resented this extra layer of government bureaucracy that only had the
power in most cases to offer recommendations on issues ranging from budget planning to
academic programs (Thelin, 2011). Overall, these state higher education commissions
added an extra layer o f complexity to the work of university presidents, even if they did
promote some positive outcomes, such as statewide policy deliberations (Thelin, 2011).
Along with struggling to find ways to work with these new state higher education
commissions, higher education leaders debated over how to incorporate larger numbers
o f women and minorities into their profession (Thelin, 2011). As early as the 1970s,
higher education observers noted a “chilly” climate for women and an acute lack of
female graduate students as well as faculty members (Thelin, 2011, pp. 344-345).
Though the numbers in both areas had risen since the 1950s, there was still more work to
be done (Thelin, 2011). The famous 1972 legislation, known as Title IX, also had
significant ramifications for higher education leaders in the 1990s, as they urgently
looked for ways to prohibit discrimination for females, especially in college athletics
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(Thelin, 2011). As for minorities, there was a highly publicized debate during the 1990s
over affirmative action (Thelin, 2011). In an effort to boost minority numbers in the
student, faculty, and administrative arenas, some higher education leaders advocated for
affirmative action while other groups lobbied just as forcefully against it (Thelin, 2011).
Overall, there was an urgent need among many within higher education to “promote
access and acknowledge diversity” throughout the 1990s (Thelin, 2011, p. 349).
However, the problem was in finding a clear, realistic path to reach those goals.
Along with increased public debate over Title IX and affirmative action, there
was also widespread concern in the 1990s over rising college costs (Heller, 2001; Thelin,
2011). Much o f this concern was fueled by allegations o f abuses in the federal financial
aid system (Thelin, 2011). Some government officials even insinuated that colleges and
universities artificially inflated their tuition costs in order to demonstrate greater financial
need among their student Pell Grant recipients (Thelin, 2011). As the 1990s progressed,
public outcry continued as some in media and government circles accused higher
education institutions o f increasing their tuition rates beyond the rate o f inflation (Thelin,
2011). In actuality, a root cause behind increased college costs was that the sluggish
economic conditions o f earlier years resulted in deferred maintenance and a backlog of
projects (Thelin, 2011). Thus, by the early 1990s those costs were beginning to catch up
with many higher education institutions (Thelin, 2011). Nevertheless, the public outcry
over college costs often cast private and public institutions against one another, resulting
in a highly charged political atmosphere for much of the decade (Thelin, 2011). Overall,
while America’s colleges and universities were poised to enter a new century full of
opportunity and promise, they also faced a number o f pressing problems.
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Institutional Context
While many established colleges and universities spent the early/mid-1990s
confronting these challenging issues, CNU was struggling to even stay open. Opened in
1961 as a two-year extension of The College of William and Mary, CNU (known
originally as Christopher Newport College) spent the 1960s and 1970s providing a basic
liberal arts education to primarily blue-collar Virginia Peninsula residents (Hamilton,
2011). Although the institution possessed minimal resources, it had a clear educational
mission and stable student enrollments throughout this period (Hamilton, 2011). A
milestone for CNU during this time was when it gained independence from William and
Mary in 1977 and developed its own four-year curriculum (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel,
2009). However, by the 1980s and early 1990s, growing competition from nearby fouryear schools, community colleges, and for-profit institutions created pressing problems
for CNU (Hamilton, 2011). Increasingly, it was left without a niche or purpose as
prospective students began to drift away toward other educational opportunities
(Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). Consequently, CNU experienced a steady decline in
enrollment during this period, despite milestones such as its elevation to university status
in 1992 and the construction of its first residence hall shortly thereafter (Hamilton, 2011).
To complicate matters further, CNU had been led since 1980 by well-meaning but
ultimately ineffective presidents who did not have a clear vision for the institution’s
future (Hamilton, 2011). Thus, CNU spent these years in a wilderness o f sorts, trying to
be all things to all people in order to attract any kind of student interest (Hamilton, 2011;
Heuvel, 2009). Rather than attracting prospective students, however, this offering of a
hodge-podge o f disjointed curricular programs further fueled CNU’s downward spiral
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(Hamilton, 2011). Consequently, the institution developed the reputation as being
inferior or second-rate, and remained entrenched at the bottom of Virginia’s public higher
education system (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011).
Unfortunately, there seemed to be little hope on the horizon for CNU as the 1990s
progressed. A major problem stemmed from its mediocre status in the Virginia General
Assembly (Hamilton, 2011). Since CNU was not really known beyond the Virginia
Peninsula, it remained a low priority when it came to state appropriations (Hamilton,
2011). Specifically, it was difficult to get a legislator from elsewhere in the state to really
care about CNU if none o f his or her constituents had ever heard of it or had their
children enrolled there (Hamilton, 2011). This lack o f state funding resulted in consistent
budget problems for CNU throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Hamilton, 2011;
Heuvel, 2009). Moreover, faculty and staff morale was very poor as members of the
CNU community worried about their institution’s future (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009).
Rumors about closure had circulated around campus in earlier years, but by the early
1990s, there was a very real threat o f CNU shutting its doors permanently or being
merged with another public university within the region (Hamilton, 2011). Thus, as the
1990s progressed, there was an urgent need for a leader who could quickly take CNU out
o f this death spiral and provide a promising and compelling vision for its future. What
follows (See Table 3) is a timeline that highlights key dates pertaining to Trible’s
experience at CNU. The dates are sorted by historical higher education context, CNU’s
institutional context, and by Trible’s personal history. These three categories are placed
side-by-side to allow the reader to obtain a thorough contextual overview o f the key
events and issues that occurred during the Trible era at CNU.
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Table 3 - Trible/CNU Timeline
Historical Context

Institutional Context

Personal History
1946: Trible bom.

1960: CNU founded (as
Christopher Newport
College).
1964: Higher Education Act
passed.

Late 1960s: Development
of four-year curriculum

1972: Title IX passed.
1977: Gained independence
from William & Mary.

Early 1990s-present:
Budget challenges for
public and private higher
education institutions.
Heightened public concern
over rising college costs.
Mid-1990s-present: Rise of
online higher education
institutions. Rise o f neo
liberalism movement in
higher education. Debate
over affirmative action.

Early/Mid 1980s: Budget
problems.

1968: Graduated from
Hampden-Sydney College.
1971: Graduated from
Washington & Lee
University School of Law.
1974-1976:
Commonwealth’s Attorney.
1977-1983: U.S.
Representative.

1992: Renamed Christopher
Newport University.

1983-1989: U.S. Senator.

1995: First residence hall
opens.

1989: Candidate for VA
Governor.

2000-present: Massive
campus construction
program.

Early 1990s: Member of
U.S. United Nations
Delegation.

2001: Football team
established.

1994: Appointed to CNU
board o f visitors.

2003: Budget problems and
decision to eliminate certain
academic programs.

1995: Appointed CNU
President.

2011: The Princeton Review
selected CNU for its annual
“best colleges” guidebook.
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2003: Explored possible
campaign for VA
Lieutenant Governor.

Selecting a New President
In June 1995, CNU’s incumbent president announced his resignation, prompting
the need for a presidential search (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). A hiring
committee quickly formed, comprised of Trible, other board members, faculty members,
and administrators (Hamilton, 2011). As it began its search, the committee
commissioned a consulting firm to draft a report that would assess CNU’s strengths and
weaknesses and outline the key qualities that an ideal presidential candidate should
possess (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). The resulting document stressed that the
institution needed a president with proven leadership experience as well as enough
political savvy to engage with state legislators in Richmond (Di Vincenzo, 1995a;
Hamilton, 2011). The report also suggested that considering the institution’s need for a
new vision, the committee should possibly look at candidates from outside the academic
world, such as business executives or political figures (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton,
2011).
After reading this report, Trible began to think that he was possibly qualified for
the position (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). He quickly discussed the possibility
with his wife, Rosemary, who was initially cool to the idea, considering that Trible did
not hold a PhD and was not a career academician (Hamilton, 2011; Trible, 2009).
However, after they thought it over she became more enthusiastic and encouraged him to
apply (Hamilton, 2011). Thus, at a November 1995 search committee meeting, Trible
announced to stunned colleagues that he was interested in applying for the position (Di
Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). After Trible recused himself from further
deliberations, the shocked committee members discussed the matter over three additional
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meetings (Hamilton, 2011). By December 1995, they concluded that Trible would
indeed be the best candidate for the job and stopped reviewing other applications
(Hamilton, 2011). Shortly thereafter, the committee recommended his selection to the
board o f visitors (Hamilton, 2011). Trible was subsequently selected unanimously as
CNU’s fifth president and took office on January 1,1996 (Di Vincenzo, 1995a;
Hamilton, 2011).
While many faculty members expressed “disbelief’ over the appointment of a
non-academic as president, they were willing to give Trible a chance considering CNU’s
dire situation (Hamilton, 2011, p. 208). They realized that desperate times called for
unusual measures, and Trible at least appeared to have a compelling vision for the
institution’s future, based on content from media interviews and preliminary meetings
with faculty members (Hamilton, 2011). In fact, some faculty argued that Trible’s
selection made good sense, considering his years o f political, fundraising, and leadership
experience (Hamilton, 2011). Nevertheless, some within the CNU community were
surprised upon hearing about Trible’s lucrative compensation package, which exceeded
the salaries former CNU presidents (Hamilton, 2011). However, CNU Rector David
Peebles responded to such criticism by arguing “when you’re looking for a miracle
worker, you’ve got to pay a miracle worker” (Hamilton, 2011, p. 208). On that note,
Trible assumed the presidency of a deeply troubled institution, intent upon achieving
transformational change.

Summary of Emerging Themes
Since assuming CNU’s presidency in 1996, Trible has achieved much of the
change that he promised, namely the complete transformation of CNU from a little-
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known commuter college into a premier liberal arts institution. Over the course of his
tenure, public interest in CNU has grown exponentially, resulting in a 700 percent
application surge between 2003 and 2013, and a steady rise in student quality (Cooper,
2013; Heuvel, 2009). Specifically, the average SAT score for incoming students has
increased by approximately 200 points over the last decade, even though mean scores for
both the SAT and ACT have remained relatively stable across the nation for
approximately the same period (Cooper, 2013; State o f College Admission, 2011).
Moreover, using his fundraising skills honed by several years of political campaigning,
Trible has transformed the CNU campus with an over $1 billion capital construction
campaign (Barrett, 2001a; Cooper, 2013; Hamilton, 2011). Once a commuter school
with aging facilities, CNU became a majority residential campus with state-of-the-art
academic buildings by 2010 (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). According to Hamilton
(2011), under Trible the school “took on the appearance of a well-endowed private liberal
arts college rather than an underfunded and struggling state university” (p. 203). Trible
also revitalized the institution’s finances by securing larger state appropriations as well as
several multimillion-dollar donations from corporate and private donors (Cooper, 2013;
Hamilton, 2011).
Despite all o f these achievements, Trible did not have an entirely smooth
transition into academic culture (Barrett, 2001b; Hamilton, 2011). Early in Trible’s
tenure, some faculty members were either alarmed or skeptical about his transformational
vision, concerned that it would either not work or drive CNU too far away from its
institutional roots (Hamilton, 2011). Further, other faculty members were troubled by
Trible’s lack o f patience as well as his frustration with the ways of academic culture
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(Barrett, 2001b; Hamilton, 2011). This led to some clashes and a period of strained
relations between Trible and some o f his faculty colleagues (Barrett, 2000; 2001b;
Hamilton, 2011). The most significant confrontations occurred early in Trible’s tenure.
They centered primarily on his plans to eliminate several of CNU’s graduate programs
and to completely reorganize the university’s administrative hierarchy (Barrett, 2000;
2001b; Hamilton, 2011). Each initiative was strongly opposed by student and faculty
coalitions that criticized Trible for not promoting enough open communication and for
excluding them from the decision-making process (Barrett, 2001b; Hamilton, 2011).
However, as the data from this study indicated, Trible gradually came to learn the
ways o f academe, and was ultimately able to work effectively within that culture after
several years o f trial and error. The purpose of this study was to determine the specific
issues that explained his successful adjustment to academic culture. To investigate this
question, semi-structured interviews were conducted with Trible along with five senior
faculty and administrative leaders. Using an interview protocol that consisted of nine
questions, each interview was typically an hour long and held on the CNU campus. For
purposes o f confidentiality, the names of the five faculty and administrative leaders were
excluded. For purposes of identification in this study, they were instead labeled
“Participant 1” through “Participant 5” (See Appendix A). Following transcription and
analysis, all o f the interviews were coded (See Appendix E). For the purposes of data
triangulation, the coded data from the Trible interview were then compared to those from
the faculty and administrator interviews. Finally, those data were compared to analysis
by historians and news media observers to ensure that the findings were consistent.
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The objective behind this research was to identify Trible’s thoughts about
academic culture as reflected in his interview and in other publications, including
newspaper articles and books. Another key objective was to identify how Trible was able
to overcome some early challenges at CNU and eventually adjust to academic life. Open
coding identified seven applicable codes that appeared multiple times in the interviews
(See Appendix E). Axial coding later narrowed these codes down to four central themes
that were primary factors behind Trible’s challenging yet successful adjustment to
academic culture. These included Trible’s ambitious vision for CNU that coincided well
with the university’s institutional needs, the impact of his frustration with academic
culture, his willingness to adapt to a new environment, and his unique skill for consensus
building. As these data ultimately demonstrated, these dynamics helped explain how
Trible was able to overcome some significant challenges early in his tenure and
ultimately adjust to academic culture.

Vision. A central theme that emerged from the data was the noticeable impact
that Trible’s CNU vision had for not only the university, but for his acclimation to
academic culture. While not all CNU students, faculty, and staff originally agreed with
the vision, they were nevertheless comforted that Trible at least had a plan, considering
the university’s precarious condition (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013; Participant 2, personal communication, June 2,2014;
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014; Participant 5, personal
communication, April 4,2012). As Participant 3 (2014) noted, “we needed a strong
leader... we needed someone who could lay out the vision and take charge and make a
decision to move forward quickly” (Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,
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2014). For this reason, faculty members were generally willing to “cut [Trible] some
slack,” since CNU was in such dire straits (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,
2013). They were also interested to see if his ideas for revitalizing the institution could
work (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Over time,
this vision had a unifying effect among CNU’s academic community and helped to
solidify Trible’s position as president (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013).
During interviews with senior faculty and administrators, those participants also
noted consistently the importance o f Trible’s vision in forging a bond with the
university’s academic community (Participant 1, personal communication, March 30,
2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal
communication, June 3, 2014; Participant 3, personal communication; May 21,2014;
Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012). Among the seven total interviews
conducted for this study (one senior administrator was interviewed twice), there were
approximately 38 references to Trible’s vision, its impact on CNU, and how it helped him
to forge a sense o f common purpose with the university’s academic community.
Trible’s vision centered on highlighting CNU’s traditional strengths of small
classes and caring faculty and developing a university where students could get the
benefits o f a private school education for a public school price (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel,
2009). Specifically, he endeavored to establish CNU as “a university o f choice for every
Virginian” (Di Vincenzo, 1995b, p. 1). Trible also sought to transform how CNU
students, faculty, and staff perceived their institution and its place in Virginia’s higher
education system, asserting:
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We will work together and we will succeed together. It is time to think
and act like winners. It is time to step out of the boxes in which this
university has operated... We will not tolerate those that say it can’t be
done or that it can only be done this way. We will not allow others to
limit our dreams or diminish our success (as cited in Di Vincenzo, 1995b,
p .l) .
Such sentiments were empowering to a CNU community that had for many years lacked
a compelling purpose as a little-known and cash-strapped commuter school (Hamilton,
2011). Thus, it gave many at CNU a renewed spirit and optimism for the institution’s
future (Hamilton, 2011).
For Trible, this visionary approach was also at the core o f his leadership
philosophy (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). Leadership for him “is
all about vision and values, and sharing vision and values powerfully and persuasively”
(P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Moreover, in taking the helm of a
troubled university, Trible believed that it was crucial to offer CNU’s academic
community hope for the future. Thus, he focused on “eliminating the negatives” from the
organization and used his ambitious vision to “align people’s hearts and minds” (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). As Trible further reflected, “you can’t
dictate from above, but someone has got to put forward that vision” (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013). Ultimately, Trible believed that this vision for liberal
arts excellence helped to define CNU for the modem era, giving the university a clear
sense of purpose (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). He also noted
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that a key component to instilling his vision on CNU’s academic community was to
communicate it consistently, noting:
It’s about wearing those visions and values like clothes on your back. And
everything that you say, everything that you do, pointing people in that
direction. It’s communicating that vision and values powerfully and
persuasively and encouraging others to embrace that vision... and I think
that’s the key to our success here (P. Trible, personal communication,
March 15,2013).
Ultimately, the CNU faculty members who adamantly opposed Trible’s vision left the
university while those who were more receptive became major proponents over time
(Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Thus, his
compelling vision for CNU’s future helped him to forge a strong bond with CNU’s
academic community.
Trible’s thoughts on the significance o f his CNU vision and how it helped
facilitate his adjustment to academic culture were seconded by university officials as well
as historians (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, March 30,2012;
Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant 3, personal
communication, May 21,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012;
Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012). According to Participant 1
(2012), “in the early days o f his administration, he made a real concerted effort to
communicate very broadly within the university... to communicate strongly that vision,
the values, and the strategic direction.” This effort gradually paid off, as reluctant faculty
members in particular began to sense Trible’s optimism and commitment and come
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around to support his plans (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 2, June 3,2014, personal
communication; Participant 5, April 4,2012, personal communication).
Reflecting on this period, Participant 5 (2012) noted that there was initially great
resistance among the faculty to Trible’s plans and to his style o f urgency and directness.
However, “as time passed, he became more participative in some realms, and faculty
recognized the unique value he was bringing to the entire institution and became a little
more tolerant” (Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012). This sentiment
was supported by Participant 2 (2014), who recalled:
I just remember that he was able to articulate a vision. And I think once
he could do that - once he knew enough about running a university to do
that in a way that faculty - 1 mean, you might not have agreed with it, but
it was a vision for the university... and so once he had a vision, there was
still tension about how to get it done, but I think that was the key.
Some participants noted that another key to Trible’s success in this area was found in his
faculty hiring strategy (Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant
3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). When Trible assumed office in 1996, CNU
had only 164 faculty members (Hamilton, 2011). However, he made it an institutional
priority to increase the faculty roster, and through aggressive hiring increased the number
to 268 in 2013 (Pawlowski, 2013). By fall 2014, that number had reached 273 (P. Trible,
personal communication, September 4, 2014). Moreover, plans were put into place to
increase the number o f faculty to 300 by 2020 (Pawlowski, 2013).
Since Trible increased significantly the size of CNU’s faculty during his tenure,
he was able to bring in professors who already subscribed to his vision instead of having
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to focus entirely on converting pre-existing faculty who were entrenched in the old
institutional culture (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,
2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). Moreover, long-serving
CNU faculty members who were in some cases resistant to Trible’s vision retired and
were replaced by these new hires. As Participant 2 (2014) asserted, “if you had only
hired a couple o f people, it wouldn’t have worked. But to double the faculty - you’re
going to be able to get a good body of people who subscribe to your vision.”
This point was supported by Participant 3 (2014), who noted, “with new faculty
coming in, you can imprint that mission and that vision upon them because you’re hiring
for that.” Ultimately, Trible was able to use his compelling vision for CNU’s future to
forge a bond with much o f the university’s faculty, which in turn helped to ease his
transition into academic culture (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 2, personal communication,
June 2,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, June 3,2014). He accomplished
this through a combination o f cultivating allies within CNU’s pre-existing faculty and
through hiring new personnel who already subscribed to his vision (Hamilton, 2011;
Participant 2, personal communication, June 2,2014; Participant 3, personal
communication, June 3,2014). Thus, these data indicated that Trible’s CNU vision
played a vital role in facilitating his adjustment to academe. By coming into the
presidency with a specific plan for CNU’s future, he was gradually able to win the
confidence o f many faculty members and find a common purpose with them.

Frustration. While Trible eventually forged a strong bond with CNU’s faculty
by advancing a compelling institutional vision, other aspects of his adjustment to
academic culture were not as smooth. Another central theme that appeared in the data

158

was the frustration Trible experienced in trying to operate within the unique cultural
dynamics o f academe (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,
2013). This theme was mentioned approximately 18 times during the seven interviews
conducted for this study (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013; Participant
1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June
3,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014; Participant 5, personal
communication, April 4,2012). Possessing a personal preference for quick, decisive
action, Trible was often frustrated by multiple aspects of academic culture, ranging from
shared governance to the typical slow decision-making pace (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013). This presented a key challenge for him, especially in
the early days o f his tenure, which made his adjustment process to academic culture more
difficult.
For Trible, several aspects of academic culture troubled him (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013). For one, he believed that the faculty tradition of
shared governance could be “good and very bad... it’s an invitation to endless discussion
and debate, and often postpones action... sometimes indefinitely” (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013). Further, Trible had great difficulty with the “glacial
pace” o f academic culture, noting that it can be a real obstacle to achieving great results
(P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). According to Trible (2013),
virtually any other type o f organization can move far more quickly and decisively.
Another aspect o f academic culture that frustrated Trible was that “academic cultures are
highly resistant to change... institutionally they are very conservative [and] they want to
embrace the status quo” (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). However,
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Trible also noted that to his surprise the CNU community largely embraced change
during his tenure, which in his opinion was a key to the university’s revitalization (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Trible was also often frustrated in trying to get faculty members to look beyond
their disciplines and departments and understand broader institutional needs (P. Trible,
personal communication, March 15,2013). As he noted:
I have underscored the challenge o f leadership in higher education getting faculty to appreciate the strategic [perspective], because they
are so focused on their individual research or scholarship, or on a
subset o f their academic discipline. Now, that’s not something I dislike it’s just a reality that one has to deal with (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013).
Overall, it took Trible quite some time to overcome these frustrations and learn how to
understand the unique qualities of academic culture (P. Trible, personal communication,
March 15,2013). Later in his presidential tenure, he learned how to work more
effectively within that cultural dynamic, even though he still did not like all aspects o f
that environment (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). Ultimately,
Trible learned how to “survive the landscape and see opportunities and also identify
minefields and avoid those” (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Trible’s frustration with academic culture was also discussed extensively by
historians as well as by several participants in this study, allowing for effective data
triangulation (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014;
Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant 3, personal
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communication, May 21,2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4,2012).
Several participants noted that this frustration was a significant challenge for Trible in his
early years as president, often leading to clashes with faculty on a variety of matters
(Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2,
personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,
2014). Participant 1 (2014) noted that many aspects of academic culture bothered Trible,
including its slow decision-making pace, the cumbersome process of faculty hiring and
tenure review, and the tendency of faculty members to focus solely on their departments
and disciplines.
Participant 2 (2014) supported that point, stressing that academic culture was
initially like a foreign environment to Trible, which further exacerbated his frustration.
As Participant 2 (2014) noted:
I think coming from the political world - 1 mean, this ‘get it done’
mentality - you know, that was like the first main clash. [In academic
culture] you can’t just walk in and say, ‘ok, this is what we’re going to
do,’ and then everybody just says, ‘ok, yes sir.’ So I think that was
probably the first problem - that was his [mistaken] perception. Yeah, and
so I think that was the misconception - that you could come in and
everything would be fine.
Along those lines, other participants believed that Trible’s impatience was what primarily
fueled his frustration with academic culture (Participant 3, personal communication, May
21,2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4,2012). He believed that rapid
and decisive action was needed to stabilize the troubled university, and such action was
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not always possible in an academic environment (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 3, personal
communication, May 21, 2014). According to Participant 3 (2014), since some faculty
members were resisting change early on, Trible grew frustrated and asked himself, “Why
can’t everybody see this the way I see it? Why do I have to explain it so many times?
Why do I have to convince people that this is the best thing for CNU?” As Participant 3
(2014) also explained, “[Trible] was very impatient starting out, very impatient. And that
did not bring out the best in him, quite frankly.” In this case, Trible’s adjustment to
academic culture took time, and trial and error.
However, many participants also noted that Trible learned patience over the years,
allowing him to better engage with academic culture (Participant 1, personal
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014;
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014). As Participant 3 noted, “he’s still
impatient, I mean - he’s not totally cured, but that’s the driving force to move things
forward.” Thus, while Trible’s frustration level with academic culture eventually
decreased with time and experience, it still represented a formidable obstacle in his
adjusting to academe. Moreover, this frustration may have derailed Trible’s presidency
had it not been for other skillsets that he possessed and the maturity o f the university at
the time. As CNU was quite young as an institution, Trible had a degree o f flexibility
there that may not have existed at older, more established institutions.
Adaptability. One o f Trible’s skills - adaptability - represented another central
theme that emerged from the data for this study. Throughout Trible’s presidential tenure,
he made a concerted effort to understand and adapt to academic culture (Hamilton, 2011;
P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Therefore, this effort has resulted
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in a broader perspective and has also been instrumental in his relationship-building with
faculty (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
According to Trible (2013), “Over the years I have developed a much greater
appreciation for the academy and for the ways of the academy. I think that my years here
have made me just a bit more patient.” However, he also retained his expectations for
decisive action and found ways to incorporate that into his interactions with faculty (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Overall, this notion o f adaptability
was mentioned approximately 22 times in the seven interviews conducted for this study,
and represented an important element of Trible’s academic adjustment experience (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication,
March 30, 2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3,
personal communication, May 21,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,
2012; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012).
After a few years o f trial and error, Trible was able to figure out a system of
interaction with faculty that respected the traditions of academic culture while being
receptive to his preference for decisive action and decision making (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013). For instance, Trible came to respect the academic
tradition o f shared governance, but also established expectations that university
committees could not deliberate endlessly on important matters (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013). As Trible (2013) noted, “I more consciously
endeavored to reach out and consult. But I have imposed on that process the expectation
that decisions would be made, and that we would move forward” (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013). Ultimately, Trible believed that a good leader could
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adapt to any situation or environment and achieve success (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013). Thus, he considered it his responsibility to learn about
this culture that had been so foreign to him and figure out how to best work with it (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Historians and CNU officials also seconded these points and discussed
extensively Trible’s willingness for adaptation, pointing out that his approach involved
listening, consulting, and learning not only patience but an appreciation for faculty
members and the work that they do (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal
communication, March 30,2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014;
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014; Participant 4, personal
communication, April 9,2012; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4,2012).
For instance, early in Trible’s tenure, many CNU officials were impressed by his
eagerness to both learn and ask questions (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal
communication, June 26,2014). Specifically, Trible did not pretend to know everything
about higher education and solicited guidance from many individuals (Hamilton, 2011;
Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014). Reflecting on that period, one
participant noted that “one o f [Trible’s] greatest strengths as a leader is the recognition
that he knows what he does not know” (Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,
2012). Thus, Trible’s humble and information-seeking approach allowed him to cultivate
many allies among CNU’s faculty and staff (Participant 1, personal communication, June
26,2014).
Some participants also noted that a more difficult adjustment for Trible involved
learning to respect faculty members and the work that they do (Participant 1, personal
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communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014).
According to Participant 1 (2014):
Trible originally had an outsider’s view of academic culture - that faculty
had a pretty easy life, that they only work eight or nine months a year, and
they have a lot of freedom. But I don’t think he’s there anymore. 1 think
he has come to really recognize and value the contribution of faculty the intensity o f the work, the sacrifice o f the work they do, the hours that
they give to students and to research... I think those are things that over
the years he’s really learned to appreciate o f faculty.
Participant 2 (2014) supported this point, noting that Trible “had to learn to like faculty,
and that was hard for him ... I think the idea that he didn’t have control and couldn’t
control faculty - 1 think that was a hard adjustment.” According to Hamilton (2011), it
took Trible some time to adapt his perspective in this area. Nevertheless, other
participants were impressed by Trible’s ability to make this adjustment in attitude at all
(Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3, personal
communication, May 21, 2014). As Participant 1 (2014) noted, “I’ve been kind of
surprised, frankly, by how adaptable he has been. I think he has probably been surprised
by how adaptable he has been.” Participant 3 (2014) supported this point, asserting that
“as the college was learning and growing, I think [Trible] as president learned and grew
along with it.” As these data indicated, Trible’s willingness to adapt his perspective and
leadership approach was instrumental in facilitating his adjustment to academic culture.
Consensus-building. Along with adaptability, consensus-building was a
leadership skill that Trible utilized extensively in order to adjust to academic culture (P.
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Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). On multiple occasions throughout
Trible’s tenure, he organized groups consisting of faculty members and administrators to
advise him on making important institutional decisions (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013). While Trible made it clear that the university would
not be ruled by a committee, he did appreciate the advantage in soliciting outside input
and support for his initiatives (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). This
tendency toward consensus-building represented another central theme that emerged
from the data, and was cited approximately eight times in the interviews conducted for
this study (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, March 30, 2012;
Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3, personal
communication, May 21, 2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9, 2012).
Along with his willingness to learn and adapt, Trible’s preference for consensus-building
was vital in facilitating his adjustment to academe.
Early in Trible’s presidential tenure, he realized that governance by consensus
was an important aspect o f academic culture (P. Trible, personal communication, March
15,2013). However, he feared that committees composed entirely o f faculty members
would not be nimble enough to make decisions quickly and decisively (P. Trible,
personal communication, March 15,2013). Therefore, he sought to modify the pre
existing norm by altering the composition of certain university committees (P. Trible,
personal communication, March 15, 2013). According to Trible (2013):
In regard to consultation, debate, and discussion, another way that we
have refined a practice o f academic culture is that faculty want to have
committees to investigate virtually everything that goes on. What we’ve
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done at CNU is that we have created committees composed of
administrators and faculty at the same table... and we’re able to
develop consensus and a shared notion o f how we should proceed.
We have therefore become much more nimble. W e’ve been able to
very quickly pursue opportunities, very quickly resolve problems,
and we’ve done it in a way that encouraged broad support.
A prominent example o f this has been CNU’s budget advisory committee, which has
been in operation since 2002 (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Comprised o f senior faculty and administrators, Trible established this committee in
order to give CNU’s faculty more involvement in the university’s budgetary process
(Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). In the years since, the
committee has evolved into an integral advisory body that provides faculty members a
platform in which to dialogue with Trible and other administrators on important financial
matters.
While Trible eventually came to appreciate the value o f utilizing committees in
building consensus, he always emphasized that they would not supersede his decision
making authority as president (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Specifically, he was adamant about his singular responsibility in being the keeper o f the
university’s vision, which he felt could not be delegated to a committee (P. Trible,
personal communication, March 15, 2013). Instead, his approach in this area was to
“consult, listen, and learn - but then based on one’s own vision and values and all that
one’s learned, develop quickly a game plan... and then communicate that game plan” (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
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Overall, Trible’s consensus-building approach involved his developing a
university vision based in part on input from faculty and administrative colleagues (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). However, for it to be successful,
Trible noted that it needed to be done in “such a way that people would then join forces
and support and encourage the success of that enterprise” (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013). Ultimately, Trible learned over time that arbitrary
presidential decisions would not always be well received by CNU’s academic community
(P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). An infamous example o f this
occurred in 2002, when Trible sought to eliminate the institution’s nursing and education
programs due to budgetary concerns (Hamilton, 2011). His unilateral decision was met
with a firestorm o f criticism from CNU faculty as well as concerned area residents
(Hamilton, 2011). Following this incident, Trible sought to achieve his goals by seeking
out faculty and administrative supporters who could help advance their shared agenda (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). This emphasis on consensus-building
therefore earned Trible many allies within CNU’s professoriate.
Trible’s consensus-building approach, as well as the benefits it generated, was
also discussed by historians as well as the participants in this study (Hamilton, 2011;
Participant 1, personal communication, March 30, 2012; Participant 1, personal
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014;
Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012). According to Hamilton (2011),
Trible initially had a heavy-handed decision-making style that alarmed many faculty
members. However, as Participant 1 (2012) noted, Trible’s decision-making style
evolved as his tenure progressed, and he began to seek more input from a variety o f
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university sources. Yet, Trible always maintained his expectation of decisive action in
order to avoid what could sometimes be endless and unproductive faculty debate
(Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012).
Further, a key to Trible’s evolution in consensus-building was to rely more
heavily on the provost for guidance, which helped him to “buffer and improve the
relationships with the faculty” (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014).
There have been a handful o f provosts over the course o f Trible’s 18-year tenure.
According to Participant 3 (2014), the relationship that Trible has forged with the faculty
senate has also been beneficial, noting that “it was second to none. It’s a lot of
transparency and a lot of open communication.” Ultimately, these data indicated that
despite some early setbacks, Trible was able to forge a bond with most of CNU’s faculty
through increased use o f collaboration and consensus-building (Participant 1, personal
communication, March 30,2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014;
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014). Along with Trible’s willingness
to adapt, this focus on consensus-building allowed him to build the faculty relationships
necessary to acclimate effectively to academic culture.

Summary
Despite some initial challenges, Trible represented a non-traditional college
president who adjusted successfully to academic culture. As the findings from this study
concluded, Trible’s challenges and ultimate success stemmed from four central issues: he
possessed a compelling presidential vision that aligned with CNU’s institutional needs;
he found ways to overcome his initial frustration with academic culture; he had a
willingness to learn and adapt to academic culture; and he had a unique ability for
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consensus-building that allowed him to forge relationships with many members of
CNU’s academic community. In many ways, Trible learned from mistakes as he went
and modified his approach accordingly. This willingness to adapt helped to facilitate his
transition into academic culture, as faculty appreciated his efforts to learn and evolve.
Thus, Trible’s experience at CNU demonstrated that it is possible for nontraditional college presidents to adjust successfully to academic culture, even if they
encounter initial obstacles. It also indicated that non-traditional presidents do not always
fall completely into the outlier categories of either successful or unsuccessful when it
comes to their adaptation to academic culture. Conversely, Trible demonstrated that nontraditional presidents can sometimes have a difficult time engaging with academic culture
initially, but can then learn from their mistakes and facilitate a better outcome over time.
The next chapter will take a wider perspective on this issue, comparing and contrasting
the adjustment experiences o f Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible.
Along with examining implications for future research, it will also seek to draw lessons
from the experiences o f each non-traditional president that can then be put into practice
by future non-traditional presidents as well as the hiring boards that appoint them.
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Chapter 7 - Analysis, Conclusions, and Implications for Future Research
As examined in previous chapters, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and
Paul Trible each had unique experiences as president of their respective universities.
These experiences were shaped by different situational dynamics as well as different
professional backgrounds. Moreover, as the data demonstrated, Eisenhower, Sanford,
and Trible implemented distinct approaches and strategies in attempting to leam the ways
o f the academy. Consequently, they each achieved varying degrees of success in
adapting to academic culture. On the one hand, Eisenhower’s experience was very
difficult and ultimately unsuccessful, while Sanford’s experience was nearly the opposite.
While Sanford had to overcome some challenges during his tenure, his adjustment
process was highly successful and he left Duke as a beloved academic leader. O f the
three non-traditional presidents, Sanford was most effective in adapting to academic
culture and proved to be a good fit for Duke’s organizational purposes. Trible’s
experience fell somewhere in between. While his adjustment process was more difficult
than Sanford’s, Trible was ultimately much more successful than Eisenhower in adjusting
to academic culture. Ultimately, each o f these case studies yielded important lessons
about how non-traditional college presidents engage with and acclimate to the academic
world.
As noted in earlier chapters, the purpose o f this study was to explore the issues
that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive
what lessons could be learned to inform future practice. Another purpose of this study
was to examine the perceptions that non-traditional presidents have o f academic culture,
and how those perceptions help or hinder their adjustment to academe. Chapters 4, 5, and
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6 focused on summarizing the findings from the case studies on Eisenhower, Sanford,
and Trible. This chapter analyzes the findings as a whole, pointing out key similarities
and differences in how each non-traditional president perceived and engaged with
academic culture. Literature from Chapter 2 on academic culture and leadership are
incorporated to provide a more thorough understanding of how Eisenhower, Sanford, and
Trible adjusted to their academic roles. The chapter also examines lessons that were
learned from this study that can be o f use to presidential hiring boards as well as future
non-traditional college presidents. The chapter concludes by exploring implications for
future research in this area.

Analysis of Findings
After examining Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible’s academic culture adjustment
experiences individually, it was useful to study them collectively in order to identify key
themes and to note similarities and differences in their circumstances and approaches.
For instance, by endeavoring to glean perception and intention from the historical data,
this cross-case comparison was helpful in analyzing how Eisenhower, Sanford, and
Trible perceived academic culture. A central finding from this study was that their
perceptions o f academic culture varied widely. Ultimately, these divergent views
produced a range of outcomes that either helped or hindered Eisenhower, Sanford, and
Trible’s adjustment process to academe. Further, the application of relevant scholarly
literature on academic culture and leadership yielded several important insights that were
useful in understanding the dynamics behind their adjustment experiences (Baldridge, et
al., 1999; Beckhard & Pritchard, 1992; Bensimon, 1989; Bimbaum, 1988; Bimbaum &
Umbach, 2001; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Bourdieu, 1985; Fullan, 2001; Heifetz, 1994;

172

Heifetz & Linsky, 2002; Lane, 1985; Mintzberg, 1980; Randall & Coakley, 2007;
Rotemberg, 1993). Ultimately, this cross-case comparison provides a broader
perspective about patterns o f academic culture adjustment that may apply to all nontraditional college presidents.
Perceptions of academic culture. Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible differed
significantly in their perceptions of academic culture, based on inferring their perceptions
from the data. Ultimately, these views either helped or hindered them in their adjustment
process to academe. O f the three non-traditional presidents, Eisenhower was the most
intimidated by academic culture (Clark, 2013; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978; Smith,
2012). Lacking a broad scholarly background or advanced graduate degrees, Eisenhower
constantly felt inferior among Columbia’s erudite faculty (McCaughey, 2003). Further,
as noted in Chapter 4, Eisenhower lacked the time, interest, or patience to learn how to
engage effectively with Columbia’s faculty, and made little to no effort on that front
(Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). Consequently, the gulf widened between
Eisenhower and Columbia’s academic community, which resulted in considerable faculty
resentment toward Eisenhower (Smith, 2012). Thus, Eisenhower’s feelings of inferiority
and intimidation among Columbia’s faculty played a key role in compromising his ability
to adjust to academe effectively.
Among the three non-traditional presidents, Sanford had the most positive
perception of academic culture, which was driven primarily by his strong professional
interest in secondary and higher education (Covington & Ellis, 1999). He genuinely
valued faculty service and demonstrated this commitment through providing the
maximum amount o f funding possible to support faculty hiring and research at Duke
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(Egerton, 1973). As noted in Chapter 5, Sanford also kept up to date with faculty
research and praised professors for their professional accomplishments (Sanford, 1977d).
This support had a noticeable impact on Duke’s faculty, leading one professor to
conclude that “you couldn’t ask for better circumstances” (Egerton, 1973, p. 31). As
opposed to Eisenhower, Sanford’s positive perception of academic culture allowed him to
gradually forge a bond with most of Duke’s faculty (Egerton, 1973). Further, this bond
helped Sanford to endure some of the more challenging periods o f his administration,
including the Vietnam War-era student protests and the controversy regarding the
possible placement o f the Nixon Presidential Library at Duke (Covington & Ellis, 1999).
Thus, Sanford’s positive perception of academic culture played an integral role in his
successful adjustment to academe.
As opposed to Eisenhower and Sanford, Trible initially had a negative perception
o f academic culture that gradually grew into a positive one (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014;
Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). Upon arriving at CNU, Trible had
a fairly low opinion o f faculty, subscribing to common stereotypes that they do not work
that hard and are overpaid for what they do (Participant 2, personal communication, June
3,2014). Further, as noted in Chapter 6, Trible was critical of many o f the cornerstones
o f academic culture, including the tradition of shared governance and what he perceived
to be its stubborn resistance to change (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,
2013). However, by consciously endeavoring to leam the ways o f the academy, Trible
gradually began to appreciate the nuances of academic culture and value faculty work (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication,
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June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). He accomplished
this by forging bonds with several faculty members and striving to learn more about the
work that they do (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014). Over time,
Trible began to develop “a much greater appreciation for the academy” (P. Trible,
personal communication, March 15,2013). This positive perception, forged by years of
learning and relationship-building with faculty, proved integral in Trible’s adjustment
process to academic culture. Overall, Sanford and Trible demonstrated that positive
perceptions o f academic culture can help facilitate the adjustment o f non-traditional
presidents to academe. Conversely, Eisenhower demonstrated that a negative or
apprehensive perception o f academic culture can contribute to significant adjustment
problems for non-traditional presidents.
Leading as non-traditional presidents. The literature on non-traditional
presidents provides a useful template to analyze the leadership approaches of
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible at their respective institutions. According to the
presidential paths model created by Bimbaum and Umbach (2001), the three presidents
all most closely resembled “strangers,” to the academy, meaning none o f them had ever
held a formal position within a college setting (p. 206). However, Sanford represented a
possible exception, in that he could arguably be classified as a “spanner,” or someone
who had rotated in and out of higher education over time (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p.
206). While Sanford had not held a full-time academic position prior to assuming Duke’s
presidency, he had served on the governing boards o f at least nine colleges or universities
before beginning his presidential tenure (Jackson & John, 1969). Moreover, he had
served for several years as board chairman for two of those institutions (Jackson & John,
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1969). Consequently, he had a level o f exposure to academic culture that most nontraditional presidents, including Eisenhower and Trible did not have. However, all three
were similar in that they did not have nearly the same level of academic experience that a
traditional college president possessed. Thus, as “strangers,” academic culture was much
more foreign to them than it would have been for their traditional president peers.
Further, according to Bimbaum and Umbach (2001), the academy tends to prefer
presidents who have pursued scholarly endeavors prior to joining the administrative
ranks. This preference therefore created an obstacle that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible
would have had to overcome in order to gain legitimacy among faculty members. As the
data from this study indicated, they each had varying levels of success in achieving that
goal.
Another similarity that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible shared stemmed from the
types o f capital they possessed as non-traditional college presidents (Bourdieu, 1985).
Using Bourdieu’s (1985) model for capital, each came into office with three distinct
forms o f capital. First, they all had economic capital, which refers to command over and
distribution o f economic resources, because they were all hired in part for their possible
fundraising potential (Ambrose, 1990; Bourdieu, 1985; Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Hamilton, 2011). Also, Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible each had social capital, which
refers to resources based on group membership, relationships, and networks of influence,
as they all knew influential people who could benefit their respective universities
(Ambrose, 1990; Bourdieu, 1985; Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). They were
each hired in part because of the large networks of supporters they possessed as highprofile public figures (Ambrose, 1990; Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011).
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Specifically, each of their respective hiring boards wanted to tap into those networks for
fundraising as well as friend-raising purposes (Ambrose, 1990; Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Hamilton, 2011). Finally, Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible all possessed symbolic
capital, because they came from professional backgrounds that had brought them honor,
prestige, and recognition (Ambrose, 1990; Bourdieu, 1985; Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Hamilton, 2011). In turn, each o f their hiring boards wanted to draw upon that prestige in
order to advance their respective institutions (Ambrose, 1990; Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Hamilton, 2011). Thus, it is important to consider what types of capital that Eisenhower,
Sanford, and Trible possessed, as it provides important insights as to what made them
attractive presidential candidates for their respective hiring boards.
However, a challenge they all shared as non-traditional presidents according to
Bourdieu’s (1985) model was that from the perspective o f faculty members, each of the
presidents lacked cultural capital. According to Bourdieu (1985), cultural capital refers
to forms o f knowledge, skills, education, and advantages a person has, which gives them
a higher status in society. While as educated professionals, Eisenhower, Sanford, and
Trible possessed cultural capital in a broad societal sense, they did not have as much
within the higher education realm. Specifically, each had trouble in varying degrees
gaining the acceptance of faculty members, who did not think they had backgrounds
suitable for service as a college president (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001; Covington &
Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). As higher education most closely resembles Mintzberg’s
(1980) model for professional bureaucracy, this challenge was highly significant since
faculty comprise the academic organization’s operating core. Thus, in order to have any
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chance for success, a non-traditional president must gain the support of these academic
professionals (Mintzberg, 1980).
For Sanford and Trible, they were eventually able to prove themselves through
outreach and relationship-building to reluctant faculty and gain their acceptance
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Participant 1, personal communication, June
26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). However, Eisenhower
was never able to forge such a bond with Columbia’s faculty (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs,
2001). Ultimately, this played an integral role in explaining why Sanford and Trible were
more successful in adjusting to academic culture than Eisenhower. Using Mintzberg’s
(1980) model for professional bureaucracy as a reference, Sanford and Trible were
eventually able to gain the support of faculty - the operating core o f their respective
institutions - while Eisenhower was not.
An application of Bolman and Deal’s (1984) Four Frames Model revealed another
similarity between Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible. They each modelled the results of
Bensimon’s (1989) study, which concluded that college presidents view the institutions
they lead through multiple frames of reference. For instance, through his efforts to
restructure Columbia’s administrative hierarchy and his fondness for ceremonial events,
Eisenhower viewed his institution through at least the structural and symbolic frames
(Bolman & Deal, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). For Eisenhower, his tendency toward at least the
structural frame, with its focus on hierarchy and rules, would make sense considering his
military background (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Similarly, Sanford viewed
Duke through at least the political, structural, and human resource frames, considering his
efforts in fundraising, implementation o f new academic programs, and relationship
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building with faculty (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973).
Finally, Trible viewed CNU through at least the political and structural frames,
considering his work in fundraising as well as in academic program development and
administrative reorganization (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Hamilton, 2011). Further, one can
argue that Trible also viewed CNU through the symbolic frame, evidenced by his focus
on transforming the physical appearance o f the campus (Bolman & Deal, 2013;
Hamilton, 2011). Thus, this analysis revealed that non-traditional presidents such as
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible may view the institutions they lead through multiple
frames, much in the same way as the traditional presidents examined in Bensimon’s
(1989) study. Further, the ability to view institutions through multiple frames would be
highly useful for non-traditional presidents, as it would allow them to understand the
complex dynamics present within academic organizations. However, in reference to
Heifetz’s (1994) model for adaptive leadership, developing this ability to view
organizations through multiple frames would require a process of learning to which nontraditional presidents would have to fully commit. The data from this study concluded
that Sanford and Trible were more open to this process of learning than Eisenhower, who
never attempted to adapt to the ways o f the academy (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).

Engagement with academic culture. While there were some similarities in the
ways that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible engaged with academic culture, there were
also key differences that helped explain why they each achieved varying degrees of
success. These differences became even more pronounced when compared with pertinent
scholarly literature on leadership and academic culture (Baldridge et al., 1992; Beckhard
& Pritchard, 1992; Bimbaum, 1988; Fullan, 2001; Heifetz, 1994; Lane, 1985; Mintzberg,
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1980; Rotemberg, 1993). For instance, they each had a different reaction to
decentralization and goal ambiguity, which are two primary characteristics of academic
culture (Baldridge et al., 1992; Lane, 1985). Coming from a military leadership
background, Eisenhower could not comprehend goal ambiguity or the decentralized
environment he found at Columbia (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, he made
little to no effort to try to understand those perspectives since they were so foreign to him
and he had neither the time nor patience to learn (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs,
2001). Ultimately, this helped explain why Eisenhower’s transition to academic culture
was so difficult (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001).
Conversely, Sanford was more accustomed to decentralization and goal ambiguity
because o f his prior higher education exposure and his long tenure working in state
government (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight, 1969; Sanford, 1974a).
Sanford even maintained that his experience as Duke’s president in this area was similar
to when he worked with politicians and bureaucrats as North Carolina’s governor
(Sanford, 1974a). In certain respects, Sanford believed that state government was similar
to the professional bureaucracy found within academic culture, since in his view both
cultures contained highly trained specialists who had a certain degree o f autonomy in
their work (Mintzberg, 1980; Sanford, 1974a). Thus, Sanford was better equipped than
Eisenhower to operate in such a decentralized and ambiguous decision-making
environment, because he had spent several years prior to his presidency operating within
a similar organizational culture (Sanford, 1974a).
For Trible, he also had a difficult time understanding decentralization and goal
ambiguity since he personally favored prompt decision-making (Hamilton, 2011; P.
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Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). In many ways, this challenge
stemmed from Trible’s strictly political and business-focused background and the fact
that he assumed the presidency during the height o f the neo-liberalism movement in
American higher education (Hamilton, 2011; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
Consequently, this focus on applying business practices to the academy compelled him to
express concern regarding decentralization and goal ambiguity (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013). However, unlike Eisenhower, Trible made a concerted
effort to adjust to these tenants of academic culture and worked with faculty to find
common ground when it came to setting institutional objectives (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013). As the data indicated, this outreach to faculty was an
important reason why he eventually adjusted to academic culture (P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013). Ultimately, the reactions that Eisenhower, Sanford,
and Trible had to goal ambiguity and decentralization helped explain why they had such
different adjustment experiences to academic culture.
Differences between academic and non-academic organizational cultures help
reveal why Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible had different adjustment experiences in the
early stages o f their presidencies (Bimbaum, 1988; Lane, 1985; Mintzberg, 1980;
Rotemberg, 1993). With the previously-mentioned exception of Sanford, each nontraditional president was more accustomed to more centralized, hierarchical forms of
organization (Hamilton, 2011; Jacobs, 2001; Mintzberg, 1980; Sanford, 1974a). Thus, a
key challenge for each was to acclimate to the professional bureaucracy found in higher
education (Mintzberg, 1980). As Mintzberg (1980) noted, managers in this culture must
have the support o f professional operators and be professionals themselves in order to
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maintain credibility and power. To varying degrees, this was difficult for Eisenhower,
Sanford, and Trible because they were not academicians (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001;
Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). Thus, they were compelled to earn legitimacy
with faculty members in order to get anything accomplished (Bomstein, 2003).
Sanford and Trible were able to achieve legitimacy over time through relationship
building and vision setting, but Eisenhower was not (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton,
2011; Jacobs, 2001). Conversely, many Columbia professors did not respect Eisenhower
and believed he was not suited to be the institution’s president (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs,
2001). This helped explain why his adjustment experience was so difficult while
Sanford’s and Trible’s were somewhat smoother. Overall, Eisenhower fell victim to one
o f Bomstein’s (2003) key threats to legitimacy: the lack o f cultural fit (Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 2001). Columbia’s faculty never accepted Eisenhower as an academic leader,
and this severely compromised any chance he had for adaptation success (Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 2001). Further, Eisenhower was guilty of another key threat to legitimacy:
inattentiveness (Bomstein, 2003; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Specifically, Columbia’s
faculty did not think Eisenhower was a committed academic leader because he was
constantly preoccupied with outside military and political obligations (Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 2011).
Another significant issue centered on the differences between administrative
authority and professional authority, and how those differences impacted the three nontraditional presidents examined in this study (Bimbaum, 1988). According to Bimbaum
(1988), leaders from non-academic organizational cultures are more familiar with
administrative authority, which is “predicated on the control and coordination of
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activities by superiors” (p. 10). Conversely, academic leaders operate in a professional
authority environment, which is “is predicated on autonomy and individual knowledge”
(Bimbaum, 1988, p. 10). Coming from a military administrative authority background,
Eisenhower could not understand why his directives were not immediately followed by
faculty members (Bimbaum, 1988; Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, he did not know how to
operate within a professional authority-based environment. Thus, Eisenhower was
unable to move away from an autocratic leadership approach toward the more collegial
style to which faculty members were accustomed (Bimbaum, 1988; Jacobs, 2001;
Rotemberg, 1993). To a lesser extent, Sanford and Trible also had challenges adjusting
to a professional authority environment (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011).
However, their political backgrounds spent working with legislators and bureaucrats
likely helped them to acclimate in a manner that was not possible for Eisenhower.
Sanford and Trible also presided at institutions that were smaller and less
organizationally complex compared to Eisenhower. Thus, these factors also helped to
explain why Sanford and Trible were ultimately more successful in acclimating to
academic culture.

Implementing adaptive and change leadership. An examination of the
adaptive and change leadership styles that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible employed as
non-traditional presidents also helped to explain why their adjustment experiences varied.
As noted in Chapter 2, Heifetz and Linsky (2002) proposed that leaders are confronted by
two types o f problems - technical and adaptive. Technical problems are well defined
with known solutions, and anyone with the right expertise and resources can solve them
(Heifetz, 1994; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Conversely, adaptive problems are not well
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defined and consequently present no known solutions in advance (Heifetz, 1994; Randall
& Coakley, 2007). Instead, it requires learning to formulate workable solutions (Heifetz,
1994). As accomplished leaders in their given professions, Eisenhower, Sanford, and
Trible were all highly proficient with technical problems. However, given the goal
ambiguity present within academic culture, adaptive problems were also regularly present
within that environment (Baldridge et al., 1999). For Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible,
these adaptive problems ranged from trying to tackle complex budget problems to finding
ways during their early tenures to inspire demoralized campus communities in the midst
o f crisis at their respective institutions. Given these circumstances, adaptive problems
were more challenging for them to solve within their respective academic settings.
A key difference between Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible in this regard was in
their willingness to learn. According to Beckhard and Pritchard (1992), any successful
change or adaptation requires a conscious decision for the leader to transition to a
learning mode. In this respect, there was a key difference between the manner in which
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible approached adaptation to academic culture. In
Eisenhower’s case, he was too frustrated by academic culture and too overextended
professionally to engage in the self-direction o f learning necessary in andragogy
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Knowles, 1980; Merriam, 2001). In
addition, Eisenhower was not willing or able to alter his military-centered frame o f
reference, which is a necessary step in transformative learning (Mezirow, 1996; Taylor,
2008). Thus, his adaptation capability was severely compromised.
In Sanford’s case, he was the most familiar between the three non-traditional
presidents with academic culture, so there was not the same sense o f urgency for
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adaptation. However, through his humble and relational leadership approach, Sanford
demonstrated that he had the ability to adapt if needed (Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Egerton, 1973). Renowned for his personal charm and administrative skill, Sanford was
a great believer in compromise and adaptation, arguing that “people have to be able to
cross lines” (Egerton, 1973, p. 35). Thus, as per Mezirow’s (1996) transformative
learning model, Sanford demonstrated an ability to change his frame o f reference in order
to understand faculty needs.
Overall, Trible demonstrated the greatest adaptation capability, expressing a
willingness to learn and ask questions in order to better understand academic culture
(Participant 1, personal communication, June 26, 2014; Participant 4, personal
communication, April 9, 2012). This process of learning allowed him to transition from a
negative perception of academic culture to one that was much more positive (P. Trible,
personal communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication, June
26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). Thus, despite some
difficult adjustment challenges, Trible was ultimately successful in learning how to work
within academe. He overcame some initial clashes with faculty and was able to forge an
effective working partnership with them that has culminated in a significant and highly
publicized university transformation (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 3, personal
communication, May 21, 2014). Overall, this willingness to learn proved to be a crucial
indicator o f success or failure in examining how non-traditional college presidents
adapted to academic culture.
The leadership qualities that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible demonstrated as
college presidents also presented another important clue in evaluating their efficacy
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adjusting to academic culture. According to Fullan (2001), the qualities needed for
effective change leadership include energy, enthusiasm, and hopefulness. However, each
non-traditional president examined for this study varied when it came to possessing these
traits. Preoccupied with outside political and military commitments, the data indicated
that Eisenhower did not have the energy or enthusiasm to pursue his work at Columbia
effectively (Ambrose, 1990; Bomstein, 2003; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Eisenhower
did seem to be hopeful for Columbia’s future, but his lack of a clear vision and general
inattentiveness toward the institution precluded that optimism from mattering much
(Bomstein, 2003; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Conversely, by possessing strong commitments to their presidential duties,
Sanford and Trible demonstrated all of those qualities effectively (Covington & Ellis,
1999; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 4, personal
communication, April 9,2012). They each pursued their duties at Duke and CNU with
vigor and brought an enthusiasm to their respective institutions that eventually spread to
students, faculty, staff, and alumni (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Participant 1, personal
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012).
Further, Sanford and Trible each offered compelling visions that came to inspire many
members o f their institutional communities (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011).
Therefore, Sanford and Trible were in stronger positions than Eisenhower to overcome
their initial adjustment challenges and become legitimate academic leaders.
Consequently, this variance in leadership style proved to be critical when determining
who succeeded in adjusting to academic culture and who did not. What follows (See
Table 4) is a chart comparing and contrasting the adaptive leadership styles ultimately
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employed by Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible based on Heifetz’s (1994) model for
adaptive leadership.
Table 4 - Adaptive Leadership Comparative Chart
Adaptive Leadership
Step
1. Identify the
adaptive
challenge.
2. Keep the
level of
distress
within a
tolerable
range for
doing
adaptive
work.
3. Focus
attention
on ripening
issues and
not on
stressreducing
distraction.
4. Give the
work back
to the
people, but
at a rate
they can
stand.
5. Protect
voices of
leadership
without
authority.

Eisenhower

Sanford

Trible

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Conclusions
Along with examining how non-traditional presidents perceive academic culture,
a primary objective for this study was to identify what lessons could be learned by
studying the adjustment experiences o f three non-traditional college presidents to
academic culture. An examination of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul
Trible revealed that some non-traditional presidents have been more successful than
others in learning the ways o f the academy. However, for the benefit of hiring boards as
well as future non-traditional presidents, it was imperative to draw lessons from those
experiences that could help inform future practice. What follows are four conclusions
that were formulated after evaluating the issues behind Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible’s
adjustment experiences. On one level, these conclusions should be of great importance
for institutional hiring boards who are considering the appointment of a non-traditional
president. Further, they would also be o f use in guiding a new non-traditional president
through the academic culture adjustment process. As there has been little empirical
research on non-traditional presidents to date, these conclusions help inform our
understanding of how they can most effectively engage with academic culture.
Vision. A central lesson from this study was that non-traditional college
presidents need to have a clear and compelling institutional vision to help facilitate their
transition into academic culture. While developing an institutional vision would also be
expected o f traditional presidents, it is particularly critical for non-traditional presidents
as it helps to demonstrate their commitment to becoming legitimate academic leaders. A
fundamental problem that Eisenhower faced was that he had no vision for Columbia upon
assuming the presidency (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). He had only accepted the
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appointment reluctantly and had not given much thought to the university’s future
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). While Eisenhower intended to use the
institution as a platform for his proposed civic engagement initiatives, he had no vision
for Columbia itself (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Consequently, Columbia’s faculty
gradually lost faith in Eisenhower as an academic leader and he lost whatever chance he
had to forge a bond with them (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Conversely, Sanford and Trible both had distinct institutional visions that they
had created for their respective universities upon assuming the presidency (Covington &
Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). While Sanford and Trible later encouraged the refinement
o f those visions with their respective campus communities, the precarious nature o f Duke
and CNU at the beginning of their presidencies compelled them to enter office with
distinct visions of their own creation (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011;
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). Sanford and Trible each used
these visions to build alliances with faculty members and administrators and identify
common areas o f interest and concern (Egerton, 1973; P. Trible, personal
communication, March 15, 2013; Participant 1, personal communication, March 30,
2012; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014).
Even if there was initial faculty resistance to the visions, there was at least a
comprehensive plan in place for each university’s future (Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Hamilton 2011). In both cases, it also impressed many faculty members that a nonacademic would take so much time and effort to understand academic culture and to
develop a plan for their institution’s future (Egerton, 1973; Participant 1, personal
communication, June 26,2014). It demonstrated to them that Sanford and Trible were
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very serious about their academic leadership work. Thus, faculty support for each
president gradually grew as support for each vision began to take shape (Covington &
Ellis, 1999; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). For Sanford and
Trible, this support was integral in smoothing their transitions into academic culture.
A daptability. Another important conclusion from this study was that nontraditional college presidents must be willing to adapt to the academic environment in
order to acclimate successfully. As this study demonstrated, Eisenhower was not willing
to adapt to academic culture for a variety o f reasons. First, academe was entirely foreign
to him and he did not understand it (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Second,
Eisenhower was intensely frustrated by the intricacies of academic culture and that
frustration prevented him from acclimating effectively (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 2001). Most importantly, because Eisenhower had so many outside professional
commitments during his Columbia tenure, he lacked the time, energy, or patience to
focus on learning academic culture (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Ultimately, all o f this conspired to compromise his relationships with faculty as well as
his reputation as Columbia’s president.
Compared to Eisenhower, Sanford and Trible proved to be much more adaptable
in regards to their engagement with academic culture. Emulating Heifetz’s (1994)
framework for adaptive leadership, they both engaged in a process of learning that
culminated in the ability to work effectively within academic culture. As previously
noted, Sanford was arguably the best prepared of the three to engage with academic
culture, thanks to his prior higher education experience and his gubernatorial tenure
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Sanford, 1974a). Nevertheless, Sanford still demonstrated
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adaptability by consulting extensively with Duke’s students and faculty members to learn
their priorities, views, and concerns (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973). This
interaction with Duke’s academic community provided Sanford the opportunity to see
beyond his own perspective and adjust his views and priorities when needed. The
knowledge obtained from these interactions also equipped Sanford to engage in the
activities most associated with non-traditional presidents - fundraising and friend-raising
- more effectively.
Trible followed a similar path by demonstrating a strong willingness to learn
despite his frustration with aspects o f academic culture (Participant 1, personal
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012).
He asked many questions during his early tenure and made a concerted effort to learn
about faculty views and concerns (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,
2014). This approach impressed many faculty members and made them more willing to
work with Trible in an effort to find common ground. While traditional presidents could
certainly engage in this outreach as well, members of CNU’s community found it
reassuring that Trible made such effort to leam about the institution as an outsider with
limited prior academic experience (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,
2014). Ultimately, this willingness to leam proved to be a vital component of Trible’s
success in adjusting to academic culture. Therefore, adaptability played an integral role
in determining the success or lack thereof that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible achieved
in adjusting to academic culture.

Commitment to institution. The third conclusion from this study was that in
order for non-traditional presidents to adjust successfully to academic culture, they must
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demonstrate complete commitment to the institutions that they lead. Specifically, they
must make the institution their number one priority over all other professional obligations
and opportunities. While institutional commitment would also be an important trait for
traditional presidents, it takes on an added sense of urgency for non-traditional presidents,
who are often exposed to a wider array o f professional opportunities. For instance, as
noted in Chapter 5, Sanford passed up several political opportunities, including an
ambassadorship and a prestigious position on the North Carolina Board of Education, in
order to stay at Duke (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Such commitment demonstrated to
those within Duke’s academic community that Sanford was focused on the university and
that he genuinely wanted to be an academic leader (Egerton, 1973).
However, as this study concluded, Eisenhower did not demonstrate much
commitment to Columbia as president (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Although Eisenhower had good intentions he was too preoccupied with other obligations,
namely important military and political matters, to give Columbia his full attention
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). As noted in Chapter 4, Eisenhower
recognized this and sorrowfully labeled himself an “absentee president” (Smith, 2012, p.
496). Further, Eisenhower offered to either resign or shift to a more ceremonial role, but
was prevented from doing so by Columbia’s board of trustees (Galambos, 1989a; Jacobs,
2001). Consequently, this lack of commitment to Columbia eroded any confidence that
faculty members had in Eisenhower and prevented him from acclimating to their culture.
Compared to Eisenhower, Sanford and Trible displayed much greater levels of
commitment to their respective universities (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011).
Although they both engaged in other professional activities during their tenures, Sanford
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and Trible always regarded their institutions as their top priorities and consistently
demonstrated that through their actions (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Participant 1, personal
communication, June 26,2014). For instance, although business and political leaders
encouraged Trible to run for lieutenant governor o f Virginia in the 2005 election, he
ultimately declined, stressing that “my first commitment is to CNU” (Scanlon, 2003, p.
1). In addition, Sanford ran for President o f the United States twice during his tenure, but
always built his campaign schedule around his duties at Duke (Covington & Ellis, 1999).
While that limited Sanford’s efficacy as a political candidate, he made it clear that
serving at Duke was ultimately more important to him (Covington & Ellis, 1999).
In each case, this commitment gave Sanford and Trible a level of legitimacy as
academic leaders that Eisenhower was never able to obtain. Since neither Sanford nor
Trible were initially expected to stay in office very long, they each earned critical faculty
support by demonstrating their commitment to remaining at Duke and CNU for
significant tenures (Egerton, 1973; Hamilton, 2011). Ultimately, it was crucial to their
adjustment experiences into academic culture to have the support and goodwill that this
commitment generated from their respective university communities. As the data from
this study indicated, for a new non-traditional college president to have any legitimacy
with faculty, he or she must demonstrate their commitment to serving as an academic
leader and not get preoccupied with too many non-academic endeavors.
P rior academic exposure. The final conclusion from this study was that prior
exposure to higher education could possibly help non-traditional college presidents adjust
more quickly and effectively to academic culture. This type of non-traditional president
would most closely resemble the “spanner” included in Bimbaum and Umbach’s (2001)
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presidential pathways model (p. 206). While none o f the non-traditional presidents
examined in this study had worked in academe prior to assuming their presidencies, some
were more familiar with it than others. O f the three, Sanford had the most familiarity
with academic culture by virtue of his prior college board of trustees service and his work
in higher education as governor (Covington & Ellis, 1999; McKnight, 1969).
Conversely, Eisenhower had no previous connection to higher education beyond his cadet
tenure at West Point (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001). Thus, according to Bimbaum and
Umbach’s (2001) model, Sanford most closely resembled a “spanner,” while Eisenhower
most closely resembled a “stranger” (p. 206). Ultimately, this could help explain why
Sanford’s academic culture adjustment process was much smoother and more successful
than Eisenhower’s.
As noted in Chapter 6, Trible was situated somewhere in between Sanford and
Eisenhower when it came to previous academic exposure. Beyond Trible’s tenure as a
student, he had served briefly as a teaching fellow at Harvard and had been on CNU’s
board o f visitors for only a year before becoming its president (Hamilton, 2011). Thus,
he had less familiarity with academe than Sanford, but had more than Eisenhower
possessed. Consequently, that could be a factor in explaining why he fell somewhere in
between the two when it came to adjusting to academic culture. Overall, the data from
this study indicated that prior professional exposure to higher education could play a
useful role in helping facilitate the transition of a non-traditional president to academic
culture. However, more research in this area is needed to explore this dynamic further.
Conclusions summary. By examining the academic culture adjustment
experiences o f Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible, this study yielded
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some significant conclusions that will be o f use to presidential hiring boards as well as
aspiring non-traditional presidents. First, it is imperative for a non-traditional president
to have a clear and compelling vision for the institution that he or she has been selected to
lead. Such a vision communicates to faculty members that the individual is serious about
becoming an effective academic leader. Second, a non-traditional president must be
willing to adapt to academic culture by demonstrating a willingness to listen and learn.
Specifically, even in an age o f neoliberalism, non-traditional presidents must be able to
keep an open mind when engaging academic culture and make an effort to understand
faculty traditions and needs. As this study indicated, non-traditional presidents who react
to academic culture with frustration or stubbornness will have a difficult time acclimating
effectively. Third, a non-traditional president must demonstrate a strong commitment to
his or her institution and not be preoccupied with other professional obligations or
opportunities. This commitment demonstrates that the individual is serious about serving
as an academic leader and is not merely using the office as a temporary assignment until
something better comes along. Finally, this study indicated that prior higher education
exposure could be useful for non-traditional presidents in helping them acclimate to
academic culture.
Overall, the fundamental lesson from this study was determined by combining
these four conclusions together. Taken as a whole, they ultimately equated to legitimacy
with faculty, which is a non-traditional president’s “currency” (Participant 5, personal
communication, April 4, 2012). This perspective is rooted in the notion that legitimacy is
earned from constituents who are being served and led (Bomstein, 2003). For nontraditional college presidents to adapt successfully to academic culture, they must gain
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legitimacy with faculty members in order to survive (Bomstein, 2003; Participant 2,
personal communication, June 3, 2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4,
2012). Without legitimacy, a non-traditional president would be severely limited in his
or her ability to engage effectively with academic culture (Participant 2, personal
communication, June 3,2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012).
Thus, this represents a key lesson that should be heeded by hiring committees as well as
by new and aspiring non-traditional presidents.

Implications for Future Research
The purpose of this study was to explore the issues that non-traditional college
presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive what lessons could be learned
to inform future practice. Following a statement of the problem, a literature review, and
an explanation o f methodology, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focused on summarizing the
findings from case studies on Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible.
Further, as the data presented in this chapter indicated, Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible
demonstrated key similarities as well as differences in formulating an institutional vision,
expressing willingness for adaptation, displaying a personal commitment to their
respective universities, and possessing some degree o f prior academic experience.
This study concluded that their degree of efficacy in adapting to academic culture
was influenced by each o f those four factors. Moreover, it also concluded that these
factors ultimately equated to credibility with faculty, which a non-traditional president
needs to earn in order to adapt successfully to academic culture. Overall, several lessons
were drawn from these conclusions that could be o f use to presidential hiring committees
as well as new and aspiring non-traditional college presidents. Specifically, a non-
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traditional president must have a thoughtful and compelling institutional vision in order
to generate support within the university’s academic community. He or she must also be
willing to adapt, displaying to scholars a strong desire to learn and acclimate to the
environment around them. A non-traditional president must also display a strong
commitment to the institution, and not be preoccupied with other professional
commitments. Finally, prior exposure to academic culture can be useful for nontraditional presidents in facilitating their adjustment to academe. Collectively, these
lessons provided a starting point to help guide future non-traditional presidents in their
transition into academic culture. They also provided a framework for hiring boards that
could be used to help identify prospective non-traditional presidents who are best
prepared to adjust successfully to academe.
This framework could include multiple recommendations for practice among
hiring boards. For one, as this study concluded, non-traditional presidents with some
degree o f prior exposure to academe (such as Sanford) appear to be better equipped to
acclimate to academic culture than those with no prior academic exposure. Hiring boards
should seek out such “spanners” when possible over non-traditional candidates with no
academic experience (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 206). Further, hiring boards should
conduct extensive background research to determine the level of commitment a nontraditional candidate has in making a transition to academic leadership. Specifically,
hiring boards need to determine whether the candidate really wants to become an
academic leader, or if he or she is merely looking for a temporary assignment until the
next opportunity in their professional field comes along. This would be particularly
important with politicians, where there is always a question of whether or not they plan to
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run for office at any given time. To gauge this commitment level, hiring boards should
question non-traditional candidates extensively on their knowledge o f the institution they
intend to lead. Further, hiring boards should compel non-traditional candidates to
articulate their vision for the institution’s future. If a non-traditional candidate knows
little about the institution and cannot articulate a thoughtful and compelling vision, those
are likely signs that their commitment level is not where it needs to be. Ultimately, such
strategies could help hiring boards distinguish between non-traditional candidates who
could become effective academic leaders and those who could not.
While some useful insights on non-traditional presidents were discovered by
examining Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible, the conclusions from this study also
generated many questions that should be addressed in future research. Exploring these
questions would help researchers better understand the unique dynamics surrounding
non-traditional presidents beyond the realm of Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible. For
instance, how much does institutional context account for in assessing the acclimation of
non-traditional presidents to academic culture? Specifically, is it possible for a nontraditional president to acclimate to any higher education environment, or does it depend
upon institutional context? In addition, would differences in gender or ethnicity among
non-traditional presidents influence how they perceive and engage with academic
culture? Further, what role does historical context play in this process o f acclimation to
academic culture?
Also, how would “spanner” presidents (sometimes referred to as hybrid
presidents), meaning those who possess academic as well as non-academic backgrounds,
differ in their adjustment to academe compared to non-traditional presidents (Bimbaum
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& Umbach, 2001, p. 206)? Another key question is whether certain professions prepare
non-traditional presidents for academe better than others. Specifically, would someone
from a governmental background be better equipped to engage with academic culture
than someone from a military background? Also, is there a way that presidential hiring
boards can gauge the academic culture adjustment potential of a prospective nontraditional president? Further, if non-traditional presidents become the norm in higher
education, what are the implications for academic culture? This section will examine
these questions in greater depth and explore the implications they have for future higher
education research.
Individual vs. context. This study examined the adjustment process of three
non-traditional presidents in distinct institutional environments. Moreover, Eisenhower,
Sanford, and Trible operated in unique historical contexts during their tenures. For each
non-traditional president, these contexts presented different challenges and opportunities
when it came to a pursuing acclimation to academe. As this study concluded, they
ultimately achieved varying levels of success in adjusting to academic culture. However,
the connection between individual leadership style and institutional context needs to be
examined further. Future research should explore the extent to which institutional and
historical contexts influence the acclimation process to academic culture for other nontraditional presidents. Looking beyond the experiences of Eisenhower, Sanford, and
Trible, can other non-traditional presidents adjust successfully to academe in any kind of
environment, or does it depend upon the institutional and historical contexts? Further, to
what extent does institutional type influence the adjustment process? With the possible
exception o f Columbia, the institutional type of the universities in this study changed
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over time during the tenure o f each non-traditional president, presenting another
important consideration.
Data from this study provided an inconclusive response to these questions. As
examined in Chapter 4, multiple historians noted Eisenhower’s initial desire to serve as
president at a small, Midwestern liberal arts college (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Neal,
1978). Eisenhower believed that he could operate effectively as a college president in
such an academic environment (Clark, 2013). However, as the data from this study
indicated, Columbia University was far removed from that type o f institution and proved
to be too complex for Eisenhower to understand or lead effectively (Ambrose, 1990;
Clark, 2013; Neal, 1978). Conversely, Sanford and Trible presided over smaller
institutions that were less organizationally complex, which may have helped to ease their
transitions into academe. What remains unknown is whether Eisenhower could have
adjusted more effectively to academic culture in a smaller and less complex institutional
environment. Further, it is difficult to ascertain whether Sanford and Trible would have
had different adjustment experiences at larger institutions. This would all suggest that for
non-traditional presidents, efficacy in adjusting to academic culture may be influenced by
institutional type, as well as where the institution is in its life cycle.
However, another viewpoint that was expressed in this study is that effective
leadership is universal (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). According
to Trible (2013), “a good leader can adapt to any situation and achieve success” (p. 8).
Such sentiment challenges the notion that a non-traditional president such as Eisenhower
could have fared better at an institution other than Columbia, or that he could have even
been an effective academic leader in the first place. This would also suggest that a non-
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traditional president with strong leadership skills could overcome any kind of
institutional challenge and engage successfully with academic culture. This
inconsistency in the data reinforces the need for further research in this area. To
understand fully the challenges that non-traditional presidents face in adjusting to
academic culture, it is imperative that researchers achieve a better understanding o f the
role that institutional and historical context plays in this area. Specifically, does
institutional or historical context drive the acclimation process to academic culture for
non-traditional presidents, or is the process directed by the individual regardless of
context? More research is needed to answer these questions more thoroughly.
H ybrid presidents. Another question that merits further investigation pertains to
the emergence o f hybrid college presidents. According to Basinger (2003) and Redden
(2008), hybrid presidents are leaders who have spent their careers alternating between
academic and non-academic positions. As noted earlier, they are very similar to the
“spanner” president included in the Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) presidential pathways
model (p. 206). Within higher education, hybrids are desirable as presidents because they
combine a familiarity with academe with the benefits of non-traditional presidents - most
notably strong professional networks as well as fundraising prowess (Redden, 2008).
Thus, they are often better prepared to engage with academic culture than a nontraditional president with no prior academic experience (Redden, 2008).
As this study concluded, the non-traditional president who was closest to being a
hybrid (Sanford) was also the most successful in adjusting to academic culture. Sanford
had served on multiple college boards of trustees prior to assuming Duke’s presidency
and therefore came into office with greater confidence and awareness (Covington & Ellis,
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1999). Conversely, the non-traditional president who had the most difficult adjustment
experience (Eisenhower) had the least prior experience with higher education.
Possessing no academic experience, Eisenhower came into office with a sense of
uncertainty and intimidation when it came to dealing with faculty (Clark, 2013; Jacobs,
2001). This raises the question of whether hybrid presidents may present an ideal
solution to the leadership challenges facing higher education. However, what remains
unknown is whether there would be enough hybrid presidents available to become a
viable type o f higher education leader. In the future, efforts such as academic stints for
mid-level leaders in business, government, and other related professions may be
necessary in order to groom future hybrid presidents. Ultimately, it is currently unclear
whether hybrid presidents could be a wave of the future or simply an occasional anomaly
at certain colleges and universities.
More research on hybrid presidents is urgently needed in order to gauge their
potential efficacy as academic leaders. Little empirical research exists for them and there
are still many unanswered questions about their viability as educational leaders. For
instance, do all hybrid presidents generally adjust to academic culture successfully, or
does their acclimation also depend upon individual or contextual factors? It would be
useful to study hybrid presidents who had troubled presidencies to compare them to those
who were more successful and derive lessons. Further, most existing literature on hybrid
presidents has presented them in a favorable light (Basinger, 2003; Redden, 2008).
Therefore, it would be advantageous to examine whether there are any potential
disadvantages to utilizing hybrid presidents. A cross-case analysis case study examining
multiple hybrid presidents would be useful in addressing such questions. In addition, it
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would be useful to study faculty perceptions of hybrid presidents to determine whether
they are perceived differently than non-traditional presidents. For instance, would faculty
view hybrids as being more legitimate as academic leaders than non-traditional presidents
with no prior academic experience? Overall, there are currently more questions
pertaining to hybrid presidents than there are answers. As the college presidency
continues to evolve, they are a type of educational leader that needs more focused
examination.
Differences in professions. Another question generated from this study
concerns whether certain professions prepare future non-traditional presidents more
effectively for academic culture than others. According to ACE’s The American College
President (2012), non-traditional college presidents come from a variety o f professional
backgrounds, including K-12 education, business, religion, government, law, the military,
medicine, and the non-profit sector. However, what remains unknown is whether some
o f these professions prepare non-traditional presidents for academe better than others.
For instance, would a non-traditional president with a government background be better
equipped to transition to academe than a non-traditional president with a business
background? Little is known about this question and more research is needed to explore
it further.
However, this study provided some insights that could be examined in greater
depth by future researchers. For instance, it concluded that Eisenhower’s military
background - much o f it accumulated during wartime - did not prepare him to adjust
successfully to academic culture (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Specifically, the autocratic approach to leadership that he learned in the military was not
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effective within an academic culture environment (Bimbaum, 1988). Moreover,
Eisenhower did not know how to operate within an organizational culture that is
characterized by goal ambiguity and decentralization (Baldridge et al., 1999; Lane,
1985). Consequently, this lack o f organizational knowledge produced a significant
disadvantage for Eisenhower and his efforts at Columbia.
Conversely, this study concluded that Sanford and Trible were better prepared to
acclimate to academic culture because of their backgrounds in government. As a former
governor, Sanford in particular was well equipped to engage with academe because he
was accustomed to working with professional bureaucrats, who in his opinion were
similar to tenured faculty members, in a complex governmental organization (Covington
& Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight, 1969; Sanford, 1974a). This sentiment was
supported by another non-traditional president during an October 2013 William & Mary
School o f Education forum on higher education policy and leadership. At this event,
former U.S. Secretary o f Defense Robert M. Gates, a former president of Texas A&M
University as well as William & Mary’s current chancellor, noted that tenured officials
can be found in other public sector venues beyond academe (R. Gates, personal
communication, October 25,2013). Thus, this experience gave Sanford a significant
advantage when it came to transitioning to academic culture.
While Trible did not have gubernatorial experience like Sanford, his legislative
background was useful in preparing him to find common ground with multiple
constituency groups. This proved to be useful when he had to cultivate relationships with
faculty members to advance his vision for CNU. However, the experiences of
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible in this area represent only a limited perspective onto
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what is a broad and complex issue. More research is needed to determine whether these
findings were anomalies or representative of most non-traditional college presidents
across multiple professions.

Lessons for hiring boards. This study concluded that four factors that
determined successful adjustment to academic culture for non-traditional presidents were
the possession o f an institutional vision, adaptability, the possession o f institutional
commitment, and the possession o f prior academic experience. Moreover, a central goal
for this study was to provide guidance for hiring boards that were considering the
appointment o f non-traditional presidents to lead their institutions. However, further
research is needed to determine how hiring boards can develop practical methods to
apply the conclusions from this study and future studies on this topic. Specifically, is it
possible to develop ways to identify potential non-traditional presidents who can adjust
successfully to academe versus those who cannot? This would assume that it is possible
to identify in advance whether or not a potential non-traditional president possesses such
things as institutional vision and commitment. Moreover, would it be possible to
implement such methods, which could include interviews or surveys, during the hiring
process to ensure that potentially troublesome non-traditional presidents would not be
appointed? More research in these areas is urgently needed as non-traditional presidents
are becoming a more common sight across the higher education landscape.
As indicated in this study, a non-traditional president who is ill equipped to
acclimate to academic culture can cause significant problems for his or her institution.
This was evident with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had such a difficult presidency at
Columbia that it left a legacy o f bitterness within that institutional community that lasted
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for many years after his departure (Jacobs, 2001). Therefore, it is in the best interest of
the higher education community to find ways to help non-traditional presidents succeed
instead of allowing them to fail. One way may be to develop resources for hiring boards
to use in identifying non-traditional presidents who hold potential for transitioning to
academe versus those who do not. While this study provided some general lessons for
further reflection, more research is needed in this area to develop tangible strategies for
hiring boards to implement.
In a similar vein, more research is needed regarding the influence o f boards of
trustees on the hiring o f non-traditional presidents. As previously noted, modem colleges
and universities are increasingly limited by insufficient resources, greater calls for
scrutiny and accountability, and a highly competitive marketplace (Statement on Board
Responsibility for Institutional Governance, 2010). In the cases of Eisenhower, Sanford,
and Trible, these challenges compelled their hiring boards to select them against the
preferences of each institution’s academic community, who would have preferred more
traditional, academic candidates. More recently, the aforementioned hiring o f veteran
Florida state legislator John E. Thrasher as president of Florida State University caused
considerable tension between the FSU board and FSU’s academic community, which
wanted an academic at the helm (Schmidt, 2014). It is likely that this tension between
boards o f trustees and academics will become only more acute in the future. Thus, the
role o f boards o f trustees in the hiring o f non-traditional presidents presents a
confounding factor that merits further research.

Non-traditional presidents as the norm.

A final set of questions arises when

considering the future prospects for non-traditional college presidents and their
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relationship with academic culture. For several generations at America’s colleges and
universities, non-traditional presidents were an exception rather than the rule.
Consequently, many academics viewed them as an occasional curiosity and nothing
more. However, non-traditional presidents have become more common in the modem
era, constituting over 20% o f presidents serving across all institutional types in 2011 (The
American College President, 2012). As the numbers of non-traditional presidents
continue to grow, it raises the question of what impact they will have on academic culture
in the years ahead. For instance, if non-traditional presidents someday become a majority
among all serving presidents, will that force academic culture to further evolve?
Some scholars have already begun to consider that question. While academic
culture has a long and distinguished tradition in Western civilization, many scholars have
argued that its long-term survival is under threat (Beck & Young, 2005; Dill, 1982; Rice,
1999; Rowland, 2002; Williams, 2008). As noted in Chapter 2, Beck and Young (2005)
identified the modem primary threats as the increased calls for greater professionalism,
productivity, and managerial oversight coming from non-academic authorities. Further,
Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) noted the rise of academic capitalism, where academic
culture is being compelled to take on an increasing number o f market-like behaviors.
Conversely, Bastedo (2012) concluded that non-academic organizations are actually
taking on characteristics found traditionally within academe. Ultimately, more research
is needed to examine how and if academic culture is evolving in the modem era.
Moreover, research is also needed to examine whether the gradual increase of nontraditional presidents is having a noticeable impact on the evolution of academic culture.
What remains unknown is whether in the future non-traditional presidents will have a
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greater influence on academic culture, or whether academic culture will have a greater
influence on non-traditional presidents. As non-traditional presidents are becoming more
common, it is imperative that more research be conducted on that topic.

Summary
This study analyzed the experiences o f three non-traditional presidents and
concluded that successful adjustment to academic culture involved possessing an
institutional vision, adaptability, possessing institutional commitment, and possessing
some degree o f prior academic exposure. Further, this study concluded that a nontraditional president must gain legitimacy with faculty in order to have a successful
adjustment experience to academe. Ultimately, these findings will help hiring boards as
well as new and aspiring non-traditional presidents better understand the unique
dynamics o f acclimating to academic culture from a non-academic background.
However, as the ranks o f non-traditional presidents are growing steadily in
American higher education, it is imperative that greater scholarly attention is placed upon
them. Building upon this study, more focused research is needed to determine what
issues they face in adjusting to academic culture. As the rising number of non-traditional
presidents is beginning to generate significant potential for a culture clash between the
worlds o f academic and non-academic culture, this issue needs to be studied further in
order to provide current and future non-traditional presidents the information they need to
succeed in adjusting to academe. Only then can this new breed o f educational leader that
is looked to increasingly for leadership be in a position to help guide America’s colleges
and universities into the future.
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Appendices
Appendix A - Interviewee List
1) The Honorable Paul S. Trible, Jr. - President, CNU (1996-present)
2) Participant 1 - Senior Administrator, CNU (25+ years of service)
3) Participant 2 - Senior Faculty Member, CNU (25+ years of service)
4) Participant 3 - Senior Administrator, CNU (20+ years of service)
5) Participant 4 - Senior Administrator, CNU (10+ years o f service)
6) Participant 5 - Senior Administrator, CNU (15+ years o f service)
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Appendix B - Search Plan for Archival Research
Search Plan for Archival Research at Duke University:
Step 1 - Obtain inventories o f records and papers of Terry Sanford at Duke University.

Step 2 - Review these inventories and identify the specific materials that will most likely
have information pertaining to Sanford’s experiences with academic culture (i.e. personal
notes, letters, diary entries, newspaper articles)

Step 3 - Share this information with the historical research expert on my dissertation
committee (Dr. Eddie Cole) and obtain his feedback, guidance, and suggestions.

Step 4 - Send emails to the head of special collections at Duke University’s library that
explain my dissertation project and solicit their feedback, guidance, and suggestions.

Step 5 - Schedule research trip and make appointments at the appropriate library
departments at Duke University.

Step 6 - Visit those departments and conduct archival research.

Step 7 - Collect data and complete regular field journal entries.
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Appendix C - Interview Protocols
1) Interview Protocol for Paul Trible
Project: Culture Clash: A Case Study o f the Issues that Non-Traditional College
Presidents Face in Adjusting to Academic Culture
Time of Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewer: Sean M. Heuvel (PhD candidate - The College o f William and Mary)
Interviewee:
Position o f Interviewee:
[Describe here the project, telling the interviewee about (a) the purpose of the study, (b)
the individuals and sources of data being collected, and (c) how long the interview will
take].
[Have the interviewee read and sign the consent form].
[Turn on the tape/digital recorder and test it].

Questions
1) How would you define a non-traditional college president? Please add specific
examples to illustrate this definition.

2) How would you define academic culture? Please add specific examples to
illustrate this definition.

3) In what ways do you find academic culture unique compared to other
organizational cultures? (Probes - How does this differ from your experience in
the private sector? How does this differ from government?)
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4) In what ways is academic culture similar to non-academic cultures, such as those
found in the business, military, and government realms? Please give examples to
illustrate how the culture is similar.

5) At the beginning o f your presidency, what was your perception o f academic
culture? Has that perception changed over the years? Please offer examples to
illustrate. (Probes - What are some of your earliest memories when becoming
president o f CNU? Was there a specific critical incident?)

6) What (if any) issues have you faced in adjusting to academic culture? Can you, as
the president o f the university, actually adjust or impact the academic culture? If
yes, can you offer examples to illustrate?

7) Are there aspects o f academic culture that you have grown to like? If so, what are
they?

8) Are there any particular aspects of academic culture that you dislike? If so, what
are they?

9) What suggestions would you give to a new non-traditional college president about
how to best adapt to academic culture?
[Thank the individual for his cooperation and participation in this interview. Assure him
that he will see the final research product and of the potential for future interviews].
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2) Interview Protocol for Senior CNU Administrative/Faculty Leaders
Project: Culture Clash: A Case Study of the Issues that Non-Traditional College
Presidents Face in Adjusting to Academic Culture
Time o f Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewer: Sean M. Heuvel (PhD candidate - The College of William and Mary)
Interviewee:
Position o f Interviewee:
[Describe here the project, telling the interviewee about (a) the purpose o f the study, (b)
the individuals and sources o f data being collected, and (c) how long the interview will
take].
[Have the interviewee read and sign the consent form].
[Turn on the tape/digital recorder and test it].

Questions
1) How would you define a non-traditional college president? Please add specific
examples to illustrate this definition.

2) How would you define academic culture? Please add specific examples to
illustrate this definition.

3) In what ways do you find academic culture unique compared to other
organizational cultures?

4) In what ways is academic culture similar to non-academic cultures, such as those
found in the business, military, and government realms? Please give examples to
illustrate how the culture is similar.
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5) At the beginning of Paul Trible’s presidency, what was his perception of
academic culture? Has that perception changed over the years? Please offer
examples to illustrate. (Probes - What were your first impressions of President
Trible? Describe one o f your first interactions with him. Was there a critical
incident?

6) What (if any) issues have President Trible faced in adjusting to academic culture?
Can he, as the president of the university, actually adjust or impact the academic
culture? If yes, can you offer examples to illustrate?

7) Based on your observations, are there aspects of academic culture that President
Trible has grown to like? If so, what are they?

8) Based on your observations, re there any particular aspects of academic culture
that President Trible dislikes? If so, what are they?

9) What suggestions would you give to a new non-traditional college president about
how to best adapt to academic culture?
[Thank the individual for his/her cooperation and participation in this interview. Assure
him/her that he/she will see the final research product and of the potential for future
interviews].
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Appendix D - Consent Form
Title - Culture Clash: A Case Study of the Issues that Non-Traditional College Presidents Face in Adjusting to
Academic Culture
Principal Investigator - Sean M. Heuvel (PhD candidate, The College of William and Mary)
Co-Principal Investigators - Dr. Pamela Eddv. Dr. Monica Griffin, and Dr. Eddie Cole (The College of William
and Marv)
To:
The following information is provided to help you decide whether you wish to participate in the present
study. You should be aware that you are tree to decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time without facing any
sort o f negative repercussion.
The purpose o f this study is to analyze the issues that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to
academic culture. A case study approach will be used to explore how they adapted to academic culture during their
presidential tenures.
Data will be collected by conducting an interview with you and other participants. You will be asked nine
questions, along with some follow-up questions in certain cases. The responses to these questions will comprise part of
the data collected for this study. The rest o f the data will come from archival research and document analysis.
Do not hesitate to ask questions about the study before participating or during the study. The findings of this
study will be shared with you upon the project’s completion. Your involvement in the study will be considered
confidential and your name will not be included in the final document. Moreover, only the principal investigator will
know the true identity o f all participants. In the event that the researchers plan to publish the findings or present them
in an academic or public setting, your permission will be obtained in advance.
There are no known risks and/or discomforts associated with this study. The expected benefit associated with
your participation is the advancement o f scholarly knowledge concerning college presidents who come from
professional backgrounds outside o f higher education and how they adapt to academic culture.
Please sign this consent form. You are signing it with full knowledge o f the nature and purpose o f the
procedures. A copy o f this form will be given to you to keep.

Signature

Date

[ ] 1 agree to have this interview recorded.
NOTE. THIS PROJECT WAS FOUND TO COMPLY WITH APPROPRIATE ETHICAL STANDARDS
AND WAS EXEMPTED FROM THE NEED FOR FORMAL REVIEW BY THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND
MARY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE (Phone 757-221-39661 ON 2014-01-10 AND
EXPIRES ON 2015-01-10.
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Appendix E - List of Preliminary Codes
1) Dwight D. Eisenhower:
Frustration over political expectations/military service - 43 references
Vision non consistent with Columbia’s institutional needs - 37 references
Overextended - 30 references
Attachment to Columbia - 20 references
Focus on administrative reorganization - 18 references
Lack o f knowledge about Columbia/academic culture - 14 references
Hands-off approach to governance - 13 references
Frustration with academic culture - 10 references
Consideration o f resignation - 10 references
Utilizing military governance style - 3 references
Defending Columbia faculty during Red Scare - 2 references
Concern for private colleges and universities - 1
2) Terry Sanford:
Relational approach: 20 references
Compelling vision for Duke: 16 references
Firmness/very direct communication style: 11 references
Strong commitment to Duke: 8 references
Solicits outside input: 7 references
Folksy/humorous approach: 4 references
Prior academic exposure: 3 references
Comfortable with change: 2 references
Promotes diffusion o f power: 1 reference
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3)
Compelling vision for CNU: 38 references
Adaptability: 22 references
Frustration with academic culture: 18 references
Determination: 9 references
Consensus-building: 8 references
Strong commitment to CNU: 1 reference
Prior academic exposure: 1 reference
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Paul Trible:

